Tambura County, Western Equatoria State

Demographics

2008 NBS Census population: 55,365

2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 59,088

2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 119,333

2024 UN OCHA population estimate*: 59,089

2024 IPC population estimate: 122,913

2025 UN OCHA population estimate*: 122,913

Ethnic groups: Azande (plural)/Zande (singular), Balanda Bor

Displacement Figures as of September 2024: 23,975 IDPs (+18,135 Sept. 2023) and 17,190 returnees (+1,510 Sept. 2023)

IPC Food Security: November 2024 – Crisis (Phase 3); IPC Projections: December 2024 to March 2025 – Crisis (Phase 3); April 2025 to July 2025 – Crisis (Phase 3)

Economy & Livelihoods

Tambura County is located in Western Equatoria State. It borders Nagero County to the north-east and Ezo County to the south and east. It also borders Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State (Raja and Wau Counties) to the north and the Central African Republic (CAR) to the west.

The county falls within the western plains groundnuts, sesame and sorghum livelihoods zone (FEWSNET 2018). The main crops cultivated are groundnuts, sesame, sorghum, maize, cassava, pumpkins and okra. Similar to other parts of Western Equatoria, Tambura is a part of South Sudan’s greenbelt, with fertile land ideal for cultivation – in 2018 it was estimated that 90% of households practiced agriculture (FAO & WFP 2018). However, in line with regional trends, agricultural livelihoods have been impacted by insecurity, which have prevented Tambura residents from accessing their land during key periods of planting and harvesting. This is reflected in a pronounced decline in the estimates of households engaged in agriculture, which had fallen to 70% in 2021 (which accompanied the outbreak of conflict in the county). Gross cereal yields were estimated to be 0.8 tonnes per hectare in 2021, increasing to 1.0 tonne per hectare in 2022 (FAO/WFP 2022; FAO/WFP 2023).

Tambura has historically been a key location on the main transport routes connecting Yambio and Wau that run along the western part of South Sudan. This has meant that small businesses are typically able to import goods for sale and even export commercial produce from the county during times of stability, especially to neighbouring CAR via the border crossing at Source Yubu/Ri Yubu. However, insecurity since 2015 has led to restrictions in the import of goods with inflation, price fluctuations and shortages of staples leading to decreased market access.

In November 2024, Tambura County was determined to be experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) levels of food insecurity. This is predicted to persist until at least July 2025.

Infrastructure & Services

The county’s headquarters is located in Tambura town in Tambura Payam. As a key colonial district, Tambura has historically possessed a dense concentration of infrastructure and services, largely due to a significant missionary presence. The town has a large market relative to that of towns in other counties in western areas of the state, reportedly second only to Yambio in terms of its size. Its position along key trade and transportation routes has allowed small businesses to develop. In the latter half of 2021, Tambura town market closed for five months as a result of widespread violence and insecurity. In November, the SSPDF presence deployed to the market allowed for a stabilization in the security situation and greater confidence among traders which led to the reopening in early November 2021.

Tambura County is home to thirty-two (32) Early Childhood Development (ECD) centres, sixty-six (66) primary schools, and seven (7) secondary schools. The county’s secondary schools are located within Tambura and South Yubu payams and include Tambura Secondary located in its namesake payam. Mupoi Payam hosts the first Catholic Church built by the Comboni missionaries in 1912. Since then, the Comboni missionaries have played a significant role in Western Equatoria, in terms of supporting schools, higher education institutions and local healthcare facilities. The secondary schools serve the larger area as many parts of Western Equatoria only have primary schools, however many schools were temporarily turned into shelters to host the increase of IDPs caused by recent fighting.

In December 2024, the WHO reported that Tambura County had thirty (30) health facilities, of which twenty-five (25) were functional. These functional facilities included twenty-one (21) primary health care units (PHCUs), three (3) primary health care centres (PHCCs), and one (1) hospital. This means there were approximately 2.56 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 1.22 PHCCs per 50,000 people in the county at that time, which ranked Tambura as among the counties with the highest ratios of PHCUs/person in South Sudan. Tambura County Hospital was reported to be moderately functional at the time.

According to OCHA’s 2025 Humanitarian Needs Overview, there are an estimated 63,661 people in need in Tambura County, which represents approximately 52% of the county’s total population reported by OCHA for 2025. For comparison, in 2024, OCHA reported that there were an estimated 32,296 people in need in Tambura County, of whom 25,514 were non-displaced people, with the remainder comprising IDPs and returnees. According to OCHA’s Humanitarian Overview for 2023, there were 89,500 people with humanitarian needs in the county (a significant increase from 30,100 in 2021), which represented 75% of the estimated population of Tambura County reported in the HNO that year. Nearly 49,588 of those with significant needs were IDPs. The deterioration in humanitarian conditions in Tambura reflects the outbreak of conflict in the county across 2021, which displaced approximately 80,000 people and resulted in the deaths of at least 440 people (Amnesty International 2021; UNMISS HRD 2022). The conflict is discussed further below.

Conflict Dynamics

Though located at the geographical periphery of South Sudan, Tambura County sits on the borders between Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el-Ghazal states, and adjoins the Central Africa Republic (CAR). Tambura is also close to the tri-border area with the CAR and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which meets the South Sudanese border at nearby Ezo County to the south. Patterns of conflict in the county have tended to reflect Tambura’s simultaneously remote – yet relatively integrated – position along multiple border regions. On the one hand, the county’s isolation has helped to spare it from serious conflict during much of the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005) and the initial stages of the recent national conflict (2013-2018), despite control of the county changing hands at several points. On the other, the county has been increasingly affected by cross-border conflicts, and has more recently become a focal point for political tensions in south-western areas of South Sudan in the years following the signing of the R-ARCSS in 2018.

These characteristics have fed into a trajectory of militarisation in Tambura, in which local self-defence forces have emerged to address cross-border insecurity and compensate for the relative absence of state authority, with these same forces subsequently being drawn into conflict stemming from disputes among parts of Western Equatoria’s political and military elite. Simultaneously, self-defence forces have also become increasingly detached from traditional authorities, and moved more firmly into the military sphere. Across periods of political reordering and militarisation, the relations between Tambura’s Balanda and Azande communities have at times been thrown into flux, most recently during the violence that swept through the county in 2021.

Historical dynamics prior to the national conflict (pre-2013)

The SPLM/A arrived in Tambura in 1990, with the area becoming part of the movement’s stronghold in the predominantly Azande areas of Western Equatoria that were relatively insulated from the direct effects of the second civil war (Rolandsen 2005, p.105). With assistance from donors and NGOs, the SPLM/A’s Western Equatoria enclave would assume an important role within Southern Sudan’s economy between 1995 and the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), becoming a hub for locally grown food to be distributed within Southern Sudan, and an important distribution centre for Operation Lifeline Sudan (Roque 2017, pp.169-171).

Tambura’s Balanda and Azande communities have enjoyed historically close relations, characterised by inter-marriage and peaceful coexistence under the same paramount chief. However, following the arrival of the SPLM/A a newly created Balanda chieftainship was established by the movement, which became a source of tension between parts of the two communities (Sudan Peace Fund 2004, p.8), with relations reportedly experiencing a further deterioration in the wake of localised conflict relating to the defection of a number of SPLM/A soldiers in late 2002. Efforts to reconcile the two communities were reportedly unsuccessful. Tensions between parts of the two communities were also linked to the separation of Nagero county from Tambura in 2004 (Sudan Peace Fund 2004, p.8). This resulted in an ongoing internal boundary dispute, and heightened tensions between elements of the Balanda and Azande (Sudan Tribune 2012).

After the signing of the CPA, Tambura was affected by rising cross-border insecurity, while Tambura’s proximity to the Bahr el-Ghazal region and migratory routes to west Africa has also meant that pastoralists from those areas at times travel across the county to access water and grazing land. This includes intermittent tensions between parts of traditionally agriculturalist Azande community and Ambororo/Mbororo-Fulani pastoralists who cross between the CAR and Western Equatoria, whose presence in the state has been the subject of politicisation (Schomerus and Allen 2010, p.66). However, due to the presence of tsetse flies is the county, cattle do not typically stay in Tambura for long periods of time. Alongside disputes relating to grazing, insecurity associated with irregular movements of armed groups across the tri-border area – including the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) –affected Tambura County during the CPA-era. LRA abductions and attacks in were reported in Tambura in 2007 (Sudan Tribune 2007), and escalated between 2009 and 2011 (Small Arms Survey 2011).

Instability between local farmers and pastoralists, alongside LRA activity, led to the growth of localised community protection forces known as ‘Arrow Boys’ (which include female members) in eastern areas of the state in 2005. Arrow Boy networks expanded in western parts of the state after 2008, including in Tambura. While many parts of the Arrow Boy network enjoyed a degree support from parts of the Western Equatoria State government, Arrow Boys in Tambura are reported to have asserted that they had no connection with local authorities (Schomerus 2015, p.122). LRA activity in Tambura would decrease after 2011, though insecurity was periodically reported in the following years (Sudan Tribune 2013). Between bouts of activity, the Arrow Boys largely resumed civilian life, returning to their families and tending crops (Schomerus and Rigterink 2016, p.17, 21).

Tambura during the national conflict (2013-2018)

As with other areas of Western Equatoria, Tambura initially avoided the large-scale fighting that followed the outbreak of the national conflict in December 2013. However, in 2014 these dynamics began to evolve and a number of communities in Western Equatoria began to mobilise in opposition to the government, including parts of the Arrow Boys network. By late 2014, Arrow Boys from Nagero County (who were predominantly Balanda) under the command of Alfred Futuyo were reported to have joined the SPLA-IO in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State (Small Arms Survey 2016, p.7). In November 2015, Arrow Boys in Western Equatoria (which by this point included an increasing number of military defectors, notably in leadership positions) were formally integrated into the SPLA-IO as ‘SPLA-IO Sector 6’, and their main leader, Alfred Futuyo, was appointed Major General (Boswell 2017). In addition to the changes in composition and political alignment, the Arrow Boys had become largely divided into two factions, one of whom was under the command of Futuyo, and the other linked to the (now defunct) South Sudan National Liberation Movement opposition group, alongside some non-aligned Arrow Boys (ICG 2016).

Fighting was reported between the SPLA and an unspecified faction(s) of the Arrow Boys in Tambura in November 2015 (UN Panel of Experts 2016, p.41; Schomerus and Taban 2017, p.11), while intra-military tensions reportedly resulted in an attack on the Tambura County Commissioner’s convoy in the same month (Radio Tamazuj 2015). Fighting resumed in mid-2016, when Arrow Boys under the command of Futuyo were reportedly attacked at a cantonment site in Tambura County (Small Arms Survey 2016, p.15). An alleged assassination attempt made against the governor of the (now defunct) Gbudwe State was undertaken by unknown attackers in Tambura County in August 2016 (Sudan Tribune 2016), while later that year residents of Source Yubu (a.k.a. Ri Yubu) were displaced into the CAR by fighting, though began to return in mid-2017 due to a reported lack of food (REACH 2017).

By mid-2018, Tambura County had been affected by the escalating conflict in neighbouring Nagero County, with both counties comprising the (now defunct) Tambura State. A joint UNMISS/OHCHR report (2018, pp.15-16) alleged that military forces engaged in looting and destruction of property as they launched a counter-offensive into Nagero from Tambura, affecting settlements along the road between the two areas, and resulting in significant displacement. Around 18,000 people were displaced to Tambura County, and 2,000 were displaced to Wau County. In Tambura, local authorities accused the IDPs of supporting opposition activities, amid alleged political resistance to permitting relief operations to occur within Tambura town (REACH 2018).

Escalating sub-national and cross-border violence (2018-present)

Conflict in Tambura escalated in the context of the establishment of the 2020 R-TGoNU, which was accompanied by mounting political tensions among parts of Western Equatoria’s elite (CSRF 2021; Craze 2023, p.2). Additionally, developments within the military sphere helped to lay the groundwork for subsequent violence. Following the merging of parts of the Arrow Boys network with the SPLA-IO’s Sector 6 (Division 9B), the Arrow Boys reportedly underwent a transformation during the national conflict from being a relatively informal force serving under the influence of local chiefs to an increasingly militarised and structured force, that had also become detached from traditional authorities (McCrone 2020, p.9). Internal SPLA-IO tensions also increased during the cantonment process. This process had resulted in members of the SPLA-IO’s Sector 6 being assembled at cantonment sites in the area. In March 2020, the Zande deputy leader of the Arrow Boys defected from the SPLA-IO, and re-joined government (Craze 2023, p.2). This development resulted in clashes within Tambura County in June 2020 (UNSC 2020b, p.6).

These military and political tensions cumulatively impacted relations among parts of the Balanda and Azande communities, with a number of violent incidents involving elements of the Balanda and Azande reported in 2019 and 2020 (UN Panel of Experts 2022, pp.10-11; UNSC 2020a, p.4). By early 2021, escalating violence – primarily affecting the Balanda community – was reported in parts of Tambura County, including in the Source Yubu area (UNMISS/HRD 2022, pp.5-6). Efforts to contain the simmering crisis in Tambura proved largely unsuccessful and in June 2021, large-scale violence (organised largely along ethnic lines) erupted between former Arrow Boys affiliated with the SSPDF and those affiliated with the SPLA-IO. In this context, ethnicity became a salient factor in mobilising combatants, feeding into increasingly polarised community relations (CSRF 2021, p.2; The New Humanitarian 2022). Insecurity greatly restricted freedom of movement along major trade and transportation routes, which were key to the local economy.

Satellite imagery analysed by Amnesty International found widespread damage or destruction of structures between June and October across the county, including in and around Tambura town and Mupoi and the vicinity of Source Yubu (Amnesty International 2021). Up to 80,000 people were displaced to neighbouring areas with reports of ethnic targeting, forced recruitment, sexual violence and mass destruction of property (OCHA 2021). Patterns of displacement were influenced by the ethnicisation of the conflict (CSRF 2021, p.6).

An UNMISS/HRD report (2022, p.3) observed that at least 440 people were killed in Tambura County between June and September 2021, and alleged that a number of civilian and military officials played a role in organising the violence (UNMISS/HRD 2022, pp. 16-19). The UN Commission on Human Rights further alleged that the conflict had been fueled by armed forces belonging to the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO, including through supply of arms and ammunition to the Zande and Balanda tribes respectively (Eye Radio 2021a). These allegations are also reflected in accusations between politicians and community leaders on either side of the conflict (Eye Radio 2021b), although have been firmly denied by those alleged to have been involved. Additionally, the Small Arms Survey reported that SPLA-IO forces were allegedly supported by elements of the ‘Fertit’ community from Western Bahr el-Ghazal State, building on the linkages between the Balanda and parts of the ‘Fertit’, and allegedly had a relationship with former armed groups in the CAR (Craze 2023, p.7).

Since the conflict of 2021, tensions in Tambura have periodically increased, resulting in (comparatively limited) violence in early 2022 (UNSC 2022, p.4). In late April 2024, a series of incidents have been reported in parts of Tambura, raising concerns about possible further escalation. These include alleged attacks on the residence of a sub-chief (Eye Radio 2024) and on a Catholic priest (Sudans Post 2024a), alongside several reported abductions (Sudans Post 2024b).

Tambura has also been affected by cross-border instability relating to developments in the CAR. In the spring of 2023, cross-border violence escalated in the Source Yubu area along the Central African border, following earlier tensions along the border that took place in 2020 (UN Panel of Experts 2021, p.114). This violence represented a partial convergence of tensions between elements of the Fulani (sometimes referred to as Peuhl/Peul in the CAR) and agriculturalist Azande communities on the Central Africa side of the border, which have been refracted through conflict in the far south-east of the CAR involving the predominantly Fulani opposition movement, the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (Union for Peace in the Central African Republic, UPC) (IPIS/DIIS 2018, pp.26-28, 65). The recent tensions and insecurity have given rise to an ethnic Zande militia (primarily associated with parts of the Azande community from the CAR) known as Ani Kpi Gbe, which has reportedly engaged in attacks against groups of Fulani pastoralists on the Central African side of the border (UN Panel of Experts 2023, pp.50-51). Ani Kpi Gbe was subsequently alleged to have clashed with the SSPDF in the Source Yubu area in April 2023, in unclear circumstances (Craze 2023, p.6; Eye Radio 2023).

Administration & Logistics 

Payams: Tambura (County Headquarters), Mupoi, Source Yubu

UN OCHA 2020 map for Tambura County: https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-tambura-county-reference-map-march-2020

Roads:

• A primary road runs northward to Wau (Western Bar el-Ghazal State) and eastward to Juba (Central Equatoria State) via Yambio Town. During the rainy season of 2024 and the dry season of 2025, the section of the road running north to Wau was designated ”passable with difficulties,” while the eastern parts of the road were deemed passable all the way to Juba.

• A secondary road connects Tambura to Source Yubu to the south, whereupon it continues east to Ezo County. Seasonal road conditions are unknown.

• A secondary road runs along the western portion of the county and connects Tambura to Deim Zubeir in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State. Seasonal road conditions are unknown.

UNHAS-Recognised Heli and Fixed-Wing Airplane Airstrips: None

MAF-Recognised Airstrips: Tambura

References

Amnesty International. (2021). South Sudan: Survivors describe killings, mass displacement and terror amid fighting in Western Equatoria. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Boswell, A. (2017). Spreading Fallout: The Collapse of the ARCSS and New Conflict along the Equatorias-DRC border. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Craze, J. (2023). Jemma’s War: Political Strife in Western Equatoria. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 4 December 2023.

Eye Radio. (2019). Tombura gov. accused of extra-judicial killing. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Eye Radio. (2021a). Army ‘fuels’ Tambura ‘massacre’ – Sooka. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Eye Radio. (2021b). Nunu, Zamoi among politicians fueling violence in Tombura – official. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Eye Radio. (2023). WES officials point fingers over border insecurity. Retrieved 30 January 2024.

Eye Radio. (2024). Yakani calls for restraint after fresh attacks in Tambura. Retrieved 28 April 2024.

FAO/WFP. (2023). South Sudan 2022 Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) Summary of findings. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

FEWSNET. (2018). Livelihoods Zone Map and Descriptions for the Republic of South Sudan (Updated). Retrieved 10 July 2023.

ICG, International Crisis Group. (2016). South Sudan’s South: Conflict in the Equatorias. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

IPIS, International Peace Information Service/DIIS, Danish Institute for International Studies. (2018). Central African Republic: A Conflict Mapping. Retrieved 30 January 2024.

McCrone, F. (2020). Hollow Promises: The Risks of Military Integration in Western Equatoria. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 30 January 2024.

The New Humanitarian. (2022). How South Sudan’s peace deal sparked conflict in a town spared by war. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

OCHA. (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2021. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

OCHA. (2021). South Sudan: Tambura conflict. Flash Update No. 1. Retrieved 21 July 2023.

PACT. (2003). Report on the Tore Peace and Reconciliation Conference, 7 April 2003. Retrieved via the Sudan Open Archive 1 February 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2015). SPLA attack Tombura County Commissioner’s convoy. Retrieved 29 January 2024.

REACH. (2017). Tambura Displacement Brief: Tambura County, Western Equatoria State, South Sudan, November 2017. Retrieved 29 January 2024.

REACH. (2018). Situation Overview: Western Equatoria, July – September 2018. Retrieved 4 December 2023.

Rolandsen, Ø. (2005). Guerrilla Government: Political Changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s. Mordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Roque, P.C. (2017). The Rebel Governance of the SPLM/A and UNITA A comparative study on parallel states in Angola and South Sudan. Doctoral thesis, Oxford University. Retrieved 15 December 2023.

Schomerus, M. (2015). ‘Protection and militarisation in Western Equatoria’ in Schomerus, M. (eds.) Conflict and Cooperation in the Equatorias, pp.114-149. AECOM/USAID.

Schomerus, M. and Rigterink, A. (2016). Non-state security providers and political formation in South Sudan: the case of Western Equatoria’s Arrow Boys. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Schomerus, M. and Allen, T. (2010). Southern Sudan at odds with itself: dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace. Retrieved 17 November 2023.

Schomerus, M. and Taban, C. (2017). ‘Arrow boys, armed groups and the SPLA: intensifying insecurity in the Western Equatorian states’. Chapter 2 in ‘Informal Armies: Community defence groups in South Sudan’s civil war’, Saferworld. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2011). Lord’s Resistance Army (July 2011). Retrieved 29 January 2024.

South Sudan News Now. (2020). SPLA-IO officer killed in SSPDF attack in Western Equatoria. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Sudan Peace Fund. (2004). Quarterly Report: October 1, 2004 – December 31st, 2004. PACT/USAID. Retrieved 1 February 2024.

Sudans Post. (2024a). CEPO condemns extrajudicial killing of Tambura Catholic priest. Retrieved 28 April 2024.

Sudans Post. (2024b). Armed youths abduct seven near Tambura. Retrieved 28 April 2024.

Sudan Tribune. (2007). Ugandan rebels kill 2 in fresh attack in Sudan’s Western Equatoria. Retrieved 29 January 2024.

Sudan Tribune. (2009). Western Equatoria seeks peaceful settlement to Tambura-Nagero’s row. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Sudan Tribune. (2012). Western Equatoria border dispute conference begins. Retrieved 4 December 2023.

Sudan Tribune. (2013). 3 killed in LRA attack on South Sudan. Retrieved 29 January 2024.

Sudan Tribune. (2016). South Sudan governor survives assassination attempt. Retrieved 29 January 2024.

UNICEF. (2021). South Sudan: Tambura Conflict Displacement. October 2021. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

UNMISS/HRD, Human Rights Division. (2022). Attacks on Civilians in Tambura County, June – September 2021. Retrieved 20 July 2023.

UN Panel of Experts. (2016). Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015), S/2016/70. Retrieved 29 January 2024.

UN Panel of Experts. (2021). Midterm report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2536 (2020), S/2021/87. Retrieved 30 January 2024.

UN Panel of Experts. (2022). Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2577 (2021), S/2022/359. Retrieved 30 January 2024.

UN Panel of Experts. (2023). Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2648 (2022), S/2023/360. Retrieved 30 January 2024.

UNSC. (2020a). Situation in South Sudan: Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/145. Retrieved 30 January 2024.

UNSC. (2020b). Situation in South Sudan: Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/890. Retrieved 17 February 2024.

UNSC. (2022). Situation in South Sudan: Report of the Secretary-General, S/2022/156. Retrieved 17 February 2024.

Reports on Tambura 

Braak, B. J. (2016). Exploring Primary Justice in South Sudan: Challenges, concerns, and elements that work. Leiden: Van Vollenhoven Institute, Leiden University.

CSRF. (2021). Tambura: Violence, Displacement and Response. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Dr Vries, L., & Schomerus, M. (2024). “They consider themselves very different” Disparate dreams of Zande governance across the South Sudan-Central African Republic borderland. Hau 14(3). Retrieved 24 March 2025.

MSF. (2022). Meeting mental health needs in the aftermath of violence. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Rigterink, A., Kenyi, J., and Schomerus, M. (2014). Report JSRP Survey in Western Equatoria, South Sudan,

First round, May 2013. Justice and Security Research Programme: LSE. Retrieved 22 November 2023.

Rigterink, A., Kenyi, J., and Schomerus, M. (2016). Report JSRP Survey in Ezo and Tambura counties, South Sudan, Second round, February 2015. Justice and Security Research Programme: LSE. Retrieved 22 November 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2016). Conflict in Western Equatoria: Describing events through 17 July 2016. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

UNMISS/OHCHR. (2018). Violation and Abuses Against Civilians in Gbudue and Tambura States (Western Equatoria) April-August 2018. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.