HPN
Humanitarian
Practice Network

Managed by
Humanitarian Policy Group

Humanitarian Exchange

Special feature
South Sudan at a crossroads

Contents

About HPN

Editorial

© UN Photo/Tim McKulka

This edition of *Humanitarian Exchange*, co-edited with Sara Pantuliano, focuses on the humanitarian situation in South Sudan, the world's newest state. In July 2011, the people of South Sudan voted for independence from Sudan in a largely peaceful referendum. Although much has been accomplished, the humanitarian situation remains extremely fragile. Conflict and violence affects hundreds of thousands of people, and up to five million will need food and livelihoods support this year.

In the lead article, Toby Lanzer sets out the key factors affecting food security in South Sudan, highlighting the need for programmes that simultaneously address short-term needs and build resilience. Nicki Bennett argues that the humanitarian community in South Sudan needs to address growing constraints to humanitarian access in a more proactive, principled and transparent manner. Luka Biong Deng explains how years of conflict have affected the livelihoods of communities in South Sudan, and Helen Young and Zoe Cormack explore the humanitarian implications of conflict and insecurity for pastoralists and cross-border livelihoods in general.

Judith McCallum and Alfred Okech examine the drivers of conflict in Jonglei and call for the inclusion of peace-building and conflict resolution in agency responses. Sandrine Tiller and Sean Healy review the slow and inadequate humanitarian response to the refugee emergency in Maban County. In contrast, Clay Westrope and Emilie Poisson explain how the REACH initiative, which uses GIS as a planning and coordination tool in refugee camps in South Sudan, has improved response time. Drawing on lessons learned from transition and recovery programmes in South Sudan, George Conway emphasises the need to better understand and manage the trade-offs between multiple priorities including peace- and state-building. Sarah Pickwick explores the impact of Tearfund's water, sanitation and hygiene work on peace and state-building in two projects in South Sudan, while Manfred Metz and colleagues look at the comparative advantages of cash and food for work interventions. We end the issue with an article by Nick Helton and Ivor Morgan highlighting the importance of credible and independent NGO coordination in complex operating environments like South Sudan.

As always we welcome comments and feedback, which can be sent to hpn@odi.org.uk or to The Coordinator, 203 Blackfriars Road, London SE1 8NJ.

SOUTH SUDAN AT A CROSSROADS

South Sudan's greatest humanitarian challenge: development

Toby Lanzer

Independence was a milestone in the history of South Sudan, raising hopes for long-lasting peace and stability, development and economic growth. Well into the second year of independence, the challenges remain enormous and there are regular setbacks. One key question has been how we can continue to respond to emergencies without losing sight of longer-term development needs. This article elaborates on some of the key socio-economic challenges in South Sudan, with a particular focus on food insecurity. Food aid constitutes the bulk of the international community's humanitarian response in South Sudan, with 2.7 million people receiving food assistance in 2012. Overcoming food insecurity is also among the government's key development priorities. The fight against food insecurity therefore requires action that saves lives in the short run, and addresses the structural causes of widespread hunger.

Progress has been made

The debate about 'linking' relief and development is by no means new. Operation Lifeline Sudan, which started in 1989 and continued until early 2005, was among the first protracted emergency responses where international organisations 'widened' lifesaving assistance to encompass recovery support and integrate development approaches in order to counter food insecurity. This approach has not been without criticism.[1] The challenge of combatting structural food insecurity in South Sudan with humanitarian action persists today, albeit in a different political reality.

In the years since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, important progress has been made in state-building, including the formation of functioning national and state governments and the establishment of key rule of law institutions such as the police, the prison service and the judiciary. The number of children enrolled in primary school increased six-fold between 2005 and 2012, from 300,000 to 1.8 million, infant mortality decreased by 25%, the number of skilled midwives is growing and polio has been eradicated.

Despite this progress, people in South Sudan are poor and the country remains the recipient of large-scale international assistance. The Consolidated Appeal for 2013 is the second largest in the world after Somalia, seeking $1.16 billion. Over 50% of the population lives below the poverty line and life expectancy is 42 years. Maternal mortality rates are amongst the highest in the world, with 2,054 deaths for every 100,000 births. Notwithstanding improving education figures, only 10% of children actually finish primary school, and fewer than 2% are enrolled in secondary education. Limited government capacity to deliver basic services means that a significant portion of the population remains in need of food, healthcare and education provided by aid agencies.

Over the last three years, more than 10% of the population has been severely food insecure and another 30% moderately food insecure, with peaks during the hunger season, a period of scarcity between harvests that runs from May to August. Various forms of undernutrition have been prevalent in South Sudan for many years, including severe acute malnutrition, reflecting short-term nutritional deficiency. Chronic malnutrition and micronutrient deficiency reflect the long-term effects of poor nutrition as a result of inadequate diets.

Compounding the threats to people's already fragile livelihoods has been the government's decision to stop oil production in January 2012.[2] With oil revenues accounting for 98% of government revenue, the shutdown has prompted deep cuts in public spending. These problems are exacerbated by seasonal flooding, displacement, loss of assets, high food prices and the closure of the border with Sudan following conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, cutting off major trade routes between Sudan and South Sudan.

A complex humanitarian operation

Humanitarian action in South Sudan is complex and involves large-scale, multi-sector coordination. By the end of 2012, the UN and partners were delivering humanitarian assistance in 52 of South Sudan's 79 counties. Given the limited road network and the fact that large areas are inaccessible for six months of the year due to heavy rains, the humanitarian operation is also costly. It requires meticulous planning and timely prepositioning of emergency stocks in deep field locations during the dry season.

Emergency operations are partly in response to shocks, the impact of which is difficult to predict. For example, 2012 saw the arrival of refugees fleeing to South Sudan as a result of ongoing violence in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states in Sudan. While at the beginning of 2012 humanitarian partners had planned for 80,000 new arrivals, this number had to be revised upwards when more than 112,000 people crossed the border to seek refuge between April and July alone. As of December 2012, according to UNHCR, there were 170,000 refugees from Sudan in South Sudan. Humanitarian response in 2012 was also directed at assisting around 190,000 people affected by communal violence in Jonglei, and over

---

1 See for example Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, *Humanitarianism Unbound? Current Dilemmas Facing Multi-mandate Relief Operations in Political Emergencies*, African Rights Discussion Paper 5, 1994; and Ataul Karim et al., *Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Review*, 1996.

2 Oil production resumed in April 2013.

Cattle herd in Abyei

155,000 South Sudanese returnees from Sudan. A further 260,000 people were affected by floods, three times as many as in the previous year.

While the exact scope of humanitarian needs in South Sudan is not always easy to predict, as last year's refugee situation has showed us, we know that hunger and undernutrition are persistent and seasonally recurring problems in South Sudan. This year, the UN and partners plan to reach 2.3m people with food assistance, and nutritional services will be provided to an estimated 3.2m.

Enormous potential

South Sudan's agricultural potential is enormous, and encompasses crops, horticulture, fish, livestock and forests. Conditions generally favour production and, in theory, there should be no food shortages. Yet this year the annual cereal deficit is expected to be around 350,000 metric tonnes – less than last year, but more than in 2010, when the deficit was 225,000 metric tonnes. Food imports accounted for nearly half of all imports in 2010. The portion of South Sudan's national budget spent on agriculture is currently 5.2%, although the president recently pledged to increase this to 10% in line with the African Union target as set out in the Maputo Declaration of 2003.

With an estimated cattle population of 12.2m and an asset value of $2.4bn, South Sudan has the sixth-largest cattle economy in Africa and the largest per capita. However, extremely high livestock mortality means that South Sudanese are losing millions of animals each year, reducing the proportion of herds suitable for commercial trade. With a land area of 648,000 square kilometres, most of which is suitable for livestock rearing, there is immense potential for the sector to meet domestic demand for livestock products, provide surplus for exports and generate enough income to provide a pathway out of poverty. Fish are available in large quantities, but the sector remains largely unexploited and investment in processing, storage and preservation is lacking.

More than 80% of the population lives in rural areas, relying principally on livelihood systems that include rain-fed, small-scale agriculture, fishing, livestock and natural resource extraction. Decades of civil war prevented households from undertaking long-term production activities as they sought to avert risks. With almost no access to irrigation, food production is largely determined by rainfall, despite the fact that one of the world's mightiest rivers flows through the country. More advanced agricultural techniques and agricultural value chains have yet to be introduced. Further factors undermining food production include a lack of appropriate storage and poor road connections, making it difficult for food to reach markets.

It is in this context of under-development that recurring emergencies lead to humanitarian response. Humanitarian assistance in the context of a crisis saves lives. But by solely responding to humanitarian needs we fail to address the underlying causes that undermine sustainable livelihoods, agricultural production and economic growth and perpetuate the pattern of emergency. In supporting the world's newest country, we need to help South Sudanese avert crises, not merely respond to them.

The right kind of programmes

Addressing food security and breaking the cycle of hunger requires investment in the right kind of programmes. This is why the UN has been working with the government and NGO partners to design programmes that address short-term needs and at the same time build the resilience of households and communities. In the past year, food

security partners have strengthened their links with other actors, including in the nutrition sector. Approaches to food insecurity increasingly have an eye for human capital. For instance, daily feeding programmes in some 1,350 schools aim to prevent children from dropping out. Using food assistance, communities are being organised to address the causes of food insecurity, for example by building roads that connect them to markets, health facilities and schools. Farmer field schools have been instrumental in the increased use of ox-ploughs in some states, leading to higher agricultural production. In 2012, 2,000 farmers were trained on 76 farmer field schools in six states. Discussions have begun on addressing rural labour shortages by creating cash schemes for urban, unemployed youth. Institutional capacity to detect food insecurity is being strengthened by establishing monitoring systems in the National Bureau of Statistics. The establishment of a strategic food reserve will provide relief after harvest failures.

Most people in South Sudan find themselves in a continuous mode of survival, and will need humanitarian assistance for some time to come. However, in order to make meaningful progress in attaining food security we need to strengthen our collective focus on building resilience. Similarly, we need to continue to build government capacity to deliver health and education services, strengthen governance and rule of law institutions and further professionalise the armed forces. These processes are long and difficult, and may not yield the rapid results that humanitarian action can achieve. Nevertheless, in order to build a viable and sustainable state in which people are able to cope with shocks without large-scale and costly emergency assistance, addressing under-development requires our increased support.

Toby Lanzer is UN Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Resident Development and Humanitarian Coordinator, South Sudan.

Humanitarian access in South Sudan

Nicki Bennett

South Sudan is host to one of the world's largest humanitarian responses, bringing together national and international humanitarian actors in an operation worth more than $1.2 billion in 2013. While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 brought an end to the civil war and led to the creation of an independent country, the security situation in the new nation remains volatile. Out of a population of 12 million, more than 4.6m are food insecure, many of them recent returnees. Ongoing tensions between Sudan and South Sudan, as well as communal violence within the country, displace hundreds of thousands of people each year. South Sudan also plays host to several hundred thousand refugees, mainly from neighbouring Sudan.

Few experienced humanitarian actors would describe South Sudan as one of the most dangerous places for aid workers,[1] or the most bureaucratically restrictive. The level of active hostilities has decreased since 2005, and humanitarian workers have become more adept at overcoming logistical obstacles and negotiating access. Yet the overall impression of humanitarian workers – supported by nearly four years' worth of data on access incidents – is that humanitarian access in South Sudan is shrinking.[2] Humanitarian activities are hampered by

the extremely challenging physical environment, growing violence against aid workers and assets and a rapidly mounting set of bureaucratic impediments. While the first constraint has not changed substantially over recent years, the remaining two have increased significantly. Bureaucratic impediments in particular have become more prominent as well as more complex since South Sudan's independence, and the relationship between humanitarian actors and the authorities has undergone some fundamental changes.

Physical environment
Few places are more physically challenging for aid workers than South Sudan. Up to 60% of the country is cut off during the rainy season, meaning that road access in key locations of humanitarian response is minimal or impossible from July until December (and in some cases longer). This includes all areas currently hosting Sudanese refugees, as well as conflict-prone areas in Jonglei and Warrap states.

The context demands effective planning and prepositioning, which in turn depends on timely and predictable funding. While some improvements have been made on this front, most humanitarian actors are still struggling to get it right, and attribute their shortcomings to lengthy procurement and transport processes, difficulties in accurately predicting caseloads per location and the persistent risk of looting and diversion of prepositioned goods by armed actors and the authorities.

Humanitarian actors have established common support services that take the country's logistical challenges into account, including more than a dozen fixed-wing aircraft, which operate all year round, and at least four helicopters

1 Many humanitarian workers in South Sudan were surprised when the Aid Worker Security Database announced that the country ranked third among the world's most dangerous places for aid workers in 2012, ahead of Somalia and Syria (https://aidworkersecurity.org/incidents/report/contexts/2012/2012). It should be noted that the ranking is based on the total number of incidents (not just the most violent, such as killings or abductions).

2 According to OCHA's access database, humanitarian access in South Sudan deteriorated over the course of 2012. In total, there were 197 reported access incidents, which represents a 48% increase on the previous year. All statistics on access incidents in this article are from the OCHA access database.

during the rainy season. Over the course of 2012, the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) transported nearly 90,000 passengers, while the logistics cluster moved more than 5,000 metric tonnes of humanitarian goods for 93 different humanitarian agencies with its fleet of aircraft, trucks and boats. Such assets do not come cheap, and the humanitarian response in South Sudan is frequently criticised for its high operational costs. Yet the needs of humanitarian actors continue to outstrip supply – and many humanitarian actors candidly admit to an inappropriate reliance on the even more impressive assets of the UN peacekeeping mission UNMISS, especially for engineering equipment and helicopters.

Loading a United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) helicopter to deliver assistance in Pibor county, Jonglei

While UNMISS' generous sharing of resources with humanitarian actors has increased access in some areas, it has also led some humanitarian actors to develop far too cozy a relationship with the peacekeeping mission. Major UN humanitarian agencies co-locate their offices or accommodation with UN peacekeepers and inappropriately or unnecessarily share assets. This high level of cooperation between the mission and humanitarian actors has not gone unnoticed by communities and armed groups, who routinely lump humanitarian actors into the same category as UNMISS and question the real intentions of humanitarian actors[3] – leading, in some cases, to the outright denial of humanitarian access.

Active hostilities and attacks against humanitarian activities

While parts of the country have stabilised, the overall security situation in South Sudan remains volatile. Particularly in Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile and Lakes states, humanitarian actors report regular suspensions of humanitarian activities or the temporary withdrawal of staff due to fighting between armed groups. Mines and unexploded ordnance continue to give cause for concern, with a total of 684 known or suspected hazardous areas at the end of 2012.

Humanitarian actors are not just indirectly affected by hostilities: more than 60% of access incidents recorded in South Sudan in 2012 were attributed to direct violence (or threats thereof) against humanitarian workers, assets or premises. While the number of killings or abductions

3 A recent example of this is the language used by the Greater Akobo Youth Assocation Board in a petition handed to UNMISS in February 2013 to protest against the mission's perceived inaction over a cattle raiding incident reported to have killed more than 100 civilians. Among other things, the Association 'urges [UNMISS] impartiality in all ethnic conflicts because we observe UNMISS/other Humanitarian Actors as Partial Organizations'.

of aid workers in South Sudan remains very low, physical violence – especially against national staff – is common: over the course of the year, at least 61 humanitarian workers were assaulted by state security forces. Health and education facilities have been occupied, looted and destroyed, prompting agencies involved in the education sector to strengthen their engagement and advocacy with the security forces, including through the secondment of a child protection expert to the headquarters of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLA in turn has established child protection units and regularly issues command orders on the vacating of schools. The number of occupied schools has dropped significantly over the past year as a result – from 18 in January 2012 to three in December 2012.

Bureaucratic impediments

The regulatory environment for humanitarian activities in South Sudan is a key concern, with aid workers reporting a significant increase in bureaucratic impediments since the country's independence. It should not come as a surprise that a newly independent nation needs to establish governance structures and policy frameworks, and it is difficult to work in an environment where NGO registration laws, labour laws and immigration laws are still being drafted. Yet there is a sense among humanitarian workers that the authorities are deliberately undermining the operational independence of humanitarian activities. Bureaucratic impediments can be attributed to both inadequate governance structures and capacity and deliberate attempts to control or divert humanitarian assistance.

An example of the first challenge is the standing order issued by the South Sudan Customs Service in October 2012, which announced an end to tax exemptions in South Sudan. Despite the fact that senior government officials appeared unaware of the order, the document

was circulated to all customs offices in the country and immediately led to massive disruption of imports of humanitarian goods. While subsequent orders issued by other ministries eventually helped to resolve these customs problems, this situation highlights the challenges that come with a weak regulatory environment.

With regard to deliberate interference, humanitarian actors report increased difficulties in obtaining work permits and visas. The visa on arrival facility was removed in mid-2012 for all but a handful of nationalities, while surveys by the South Sudan NGO Forum indicate that 40% of NGO work permit applications made in 2012 took more than three months to process (in early 2011 almost half of all applications were completed in under a month). The authorities are increasingly demanding that certain posts be nationalised, but there is no clear and transparent nationalisation policy based on an assessment of actual national capacity.

Extortion and arbitrary taxation have increased since the collapse of the South Sudanese economy following the shutdown of oil production in January 2012. In Maban County humanitarian agencies report significant constraints and delays in delivering assistance to more than 113,000 Sudanese refugees. As in many other counties, the authorities have gradually – and usually informally – introduced a wide range of arbitrary fees and taxes, for instance for vehicle rental and road use, as well as price controls for items required for humanitarian purposes, such as wooden poles. These measures have sometimes been coupled with tight restrictions on UN and NGO hiring and procurement procedures, including insistence on hiring or contracting within the county or state, and participation by the authorities in recruitment. Other questionable or unethical demands by the authorities include access to humanitarian assets for personal or professional use. Over the course of 2012 79 humanitarian vehicles were commandeered by the authorities for non-humanitarian purposes.

Attempts to question or resist these demands have been met with violence or expulsion (or threats thereof). At least 78 national and international humanitarian workers reported being arbitrarily arrested or detained over the course of the last year, while at least five aid workers were 'expelled' from areas where they were working. In addition, the number of forced entries into humanitarian compounds by the authorities increased by 150% during the past 12 months, with most cases involving searches for staff (especially staff suspected to be falsely claiming South Sudanese citizenship) or demands for human resource and finance files.

Conclusion
Humanitarian actors in South Sudan are grappling with a complex set of constraints on humanitarian access. While it would be naive to believe that access constraints in a complex emergency environment like South Sudan could be totally eliminated, there are a number of steps that humanitarian actors should take to mitigate current challenges and steer the humanitarian response onto a more effective and principled course.

First, humanitarian actors must redouble their efforts to build constructive relations with the authorities, above all the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, the Relief & Rehabilitation Commission, the SPLA and the police. This engagement must take place at all levels of the organisation, in the capital, states and counties. The relationship between humanitarian actors and the authorities is at a turning point, and it will be crucial over the coming months to strengthen (and in some cases rebuild) trust and understanding among individuals and institutions. If humanitarian actors fail to engage effectively now, relationships are likely to deteriorate and bureaucratic impediments are likely to increase.

Second, humanitarian actors should more closely examine their actual and perceived neutrality, and explore opportunities for strengthening operational independence. Coordination with government officials and other political and military entities (including UNMISS) should take place in line with agreed policies and principles, and humanitarian agencies must work to reduce their current over-reliance on UNMISS assets and guard more vigilantly against the politicisation or militarisation of their work. They should also strengthen their capacity to engage with non-state armed groups and explain their humanitarian mandate to communities that have questioned their neutrality.

Finally, humanitarian actors must demonstrate a greater degree of transparency in discussing the constraints they face. While some international NGOs regularly report access constraints, the majority of humanitarian actors (including several UN humanitarian agencies) seem unconvinced of the value of sharing information on access challenges. This undermines the humanitarian community's ability to develop a shared analysis of access constraints and common advocacy positions and strategies.

Humanitarian actors may not have the power to influence most of the external factors – such as border tensions and financial crises – that threaten lives and livelihoods in South Sudan. They can, however, determine how they respond to the resulting constraints. Unless this is done in a much more proactive, principled and transparent manner, the humanitarian community may have to face the reality that access in South Sudan is likely to get worse rather than better.

Nicki Bennett works for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in South Sudan. She writes here in a personal capacity, and the views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

Changing livelihoods in South Sudan

Luka Biong Deng

Livelihoods in South Sudan are based on transhumant animal husbandry, agriculture, fishing, trade and gathering wild food, with various combinations of these elements making up specific household economies depending on each zone's agro-ecological conditions and tribal traditions and culture. Livelihood systems were first mapped out by Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in the mid-1990s. Using the Household Economy Analysis (HEA) framework, seven distinct zones were identified (Figure 1). These zones are still used in livelihoods planning and analysis today. Livelihood systems in these zones have undergone drastic changes during the prolonged civil war (1983–2005) and in the period of post-conflict transition and independence (2005–present). This article traces key aspects of these changes.

## The impact of the civil war on livelihoods

The 1983–2005 conflict and how it was conducted had a dramatic impact on livelihoods in South Sudan. Government bombing campaigns, helicopter raids in what are now Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei states and periodic raids in Bahr el Ghazal caused widespread terror, death (of both people and livestock) and displacement. During the 1990s over 40% of families in Northern Bahr el Ghazal lost all of their livestock. This was a major contributing factor to the famine that struck Bahr el Ghazal in 1998.[1]

Households across South Sudan tried to mitigate risk and adapt their livelihood strategies to these circumstances by relying much more on wild foods and fishing, and by moving animals outside of traditional grazing areas. Some households sent household members, particularly women and children, to northern Sudan and major towns in southern Sudan, on their own or to stay with relatives, both to protect them and for employment opportunities and education.

Households also diversified agricultural production by planting different crops and intercropping, reducing the number of fields planted and planting in different fields, staggering plantings and using drought-resistant varieties. To minimise looting of animals and grain during attacks, households retained more livestock and grain, moving animals farther from homesteads and storing grain underground. Some households 'subcontracted' the management of livestock to close relatives or friends engaged in pure pastoralism.

The war had a contradictory effect on kinship and community ties and related social support mechanisms. In communities affected by internal conflict such ties were weakened, whereas in communities attacked by outsiders they were strengthened. For example, communities in

Figure 1: Livelihood zones in South Sudan

Source: South Sudan Centre for Statistics and Evaluation and Save the Children UK, *Southern Sudan Livelihood Profiles: A Guide for Humanitarian and Development Planning*, 2006.

---

1 A. Catley et al., *Policies, Practice and Participation in Complex Emergencies: The Case of Livestock Interventions in South Sudan*, Case Study for the Agriculture and Development Economics Division of FAO (Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, and FAO, 2005).

Figure 2: Livelihood activities in the Abyei area of Bahr el Ghazal, Sudan, before and during the civil war

Figure 3: Livelihood activities during war in Gogrial area of Bahr el Ghazal, Sudan, before and during the civil war

the Gogrial area were subject to raids by their own people – Dinka militia, who targeted better-off people with assets. In contrast, external (northern or 'Arab') militia attacked entire communities in Abyei. Figures 2 and 3 show the different ways in which communities in these areas adjusted their livelihood activities to mitigate the risks they faced.[2]

Before the civil war, the Dinka economy in Bahr el Ghazal was based on transhumant animal husbandry, agriculture, fishing, trade and some gathering of wild foods.[3] During the war, communities in Abyei did not change their sources of livelihoods markedly, but those in the Gogrial area did, reducing farming and livestock-rearing activities and replacing them with gathering of wild foods (Figure 3). Despite these livelihood adaptations, poverty levels increased among all communities, but rose most sharply among non-poor households and communities exposed to attacks by internal forces.

Livelihoods in the post-war period

The long civil war finally ended in 2005, with the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). A Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) report in March 2005 laid out a programme for the transition from war to peace in the south. Key elements of this programme included developing infrastructure, prioritising agriculture, the provision of basic services, regenerating social capital, including the safe return and reintegration of internally displaced people and refugees, and developing institutional infrastructure

and governance.[4] Six years later, in 2011, South Sudan declared its independence from Sudan, making it the world's newest country.

Eighty-five per cent of South Sudan's people live in rural areas. More than 83% of the poorest 20% of households are engaged in non-wage work in agriculture or livestock rearing. In contrast, 57% of the richest 20% of households work in agriculture, and 27% live mostly on wages and salaries (Figure 4, p. 10).

Agricultural production has not significantly improved following the peace agreement, and the area cultivated, production levels and yields remain about the same as they were during the conflict (as shown in Figure 5, p. 10); indeed, if data on the area cultivated and levels of production before the peace agreement are adjusted to account for conflict conditions one could easily conclude that the level of agricultural activity has in fact declined since the end of the war. In 2003, the yield per hectare was *higher* than in 2009 and 2010. Only 4% of arable land is cultivated and only 20% of livestock production potential has been realised.[5] South Sudan imports the majority of its food, including grain, frozen fish and vegetables, from neighbouring countries.

Most of the rural population remains food insecure and levels of malnutrition are stubbornly high (Figure 6, p. 11). Meanwhile, new forms of insecurity have emerged in

2 Both figures and accompanying analysis appear in Luka Biong Deng, 'Confronting Civil War: The Case of Risk Managing Strategies in South Sudan in the 1990s', presentation to the High Level Forum on Protracted Crises, Rome, 13–14 September 2012.
3 L. Deng, *Famine in the Sudan: Causes, Preparedness and Response: A Political, Social and Economic Analysis of the 1998 Bahr el Ghazal Famine*, IDS Discussion Paper 369 (Brighton: IDS, 1999).

4 The Joint Assessment Mission, or JAM, was initiated in December 2003, and was conducted with the guidance and participation of the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The primary objective of the JAM was to provide a detailed assessment of rehabilitation and transitional recovery needs for the immediate post-CPA period.
5 WFP, *Southern Sudan: Annual Needs and Livelihoods Assessment 2010–2011* (Rome: WFP, 2010).

Oil worker in Unity State, South Sudan

the wake of the CPA and independence which have also affected rural livelihoods. Relations with Sudan are poor, and the government in Khartoum has used militias in an attempt to destabilise the new administration in Juba. Law enforcement systems are weak and there has been little attempt at reconciliation to heal the wounds of the prolonged civil war.

South Sudan's failure to realise its potential as an agricultural producer may in part be a consequence of the migration from rural to urban areas that followed the conclusion of the CPA, attracted by significant government investment in construction, the provision of public services and increased employment opportunities. Juba, the capital of South Sudan, witnessed a rapid boom in construction and employment and a significant increase in demand for consumer goods, housing and services

Figure 4: Livelihood sources

Source: World Bank, *A Poverty Profile for the Southern States of Sudan* (Washington DC: World Bank, 2011).

Figure 5: Agriculture in South Sudan

Source: FAO and Ministry of Agriculture.

Figure 6: Food security in South Sudan

Source: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment, 2011.

with the influx of foreigners. Inhabitants of the farming communities that had traditionally supplied Juba and other urban areas in South Sudan, as well as exporting their agricultural produce to border towns in Uganda, found it more lucrative to work in Juba than to continue farming.

The 'resource curse'

Despite the predominance of agriculture and livestock in local livelihoods, South Sudan's economy is overwhelmingly dependent on oil. Oil accounts for 98% of the country's total exports and over 80% of its gross domestic product. No other oil-exporting country is as highly dependent on this one commodity. The extra income from oil exports is spent on non-tradable goods such as construction and services, pushing their prices up relative to the prices of traditional goods. While public spending in South Sudan on agriculture, including livestock and fisheries, remains extremely low (less than 5% of total public expenditure), public spending on non-tradable services and infrastructure has been relatively high (about 20% of total public expenditure).

The dangers inherent in such extreme over-reliance were laid bare in January 2012, when the government suspended oil production after failing to resolve a dispute with Sudan over oil export terms and payments. With no alternative means for exporting its oil, South Sudan was forced to introduce severe austerity measures. However, the loss of oil revenue has also prompted the government to improve its fiscal discipline, maximise non-oil revenue (mainly taxes and budgetary assistance) and reduce the economy's dependence on oil exports, notably by seeking to develop the agricultural sector. Oil production resumed in April 2013, and it is too soon to say whether the government will continue with these measures. If it does so, it may stand a better chance of making oil a blessing, rather than a curse.

Conclusion

Livelihood systems in South Sudan have undergone drastic and volatile changes over the last three decades. These changes require a thorough and in-depth understanding as a prerequisite for any policy towards sustainable livelihood recovery in South Sudan. Critical to this will be the establishment and embedding of security and the rule of law across South Sudan. Besides the focus on strengthening the state's monopoly over the means of violence, addressing the challenges of regenerating and rebuilding social capital in the wake of the conflict is critical for building sustainable grassroots peace among communities. This in turn can help to rebuild the kinship support systems that underpin the resilience of Southern Sudanese livelihoods. To do this effectively, a more nuanced understanding of how different forms of conflict have affected different communities is necessary. It is important that peacebuilding efforts address conflict both within and between communities, as experience in Gogrial and Abyei shows that such internal conflict can have a greater negative impact on livelihoods than conflict generated by external actors. South Sudan will also need to draw on experiences from other oil-rich countries in adopting appropriate policies to ensure that oil revenue is used to transform the agricultural sector and promote private sector development. This will be central, not only for addressing the challenges of livelihood diversification, but also for achieving sustainable peace and development.

Luka Biong Deng is currently a fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, John F. Kennedy School of Government. He recently stepped down as representative of the President of the Republic of South Sudan on the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, where he was co-chair. He served as Minister of Cabinet Affairs in the united Sudan and as Minister in the Office of the President of the government of South Sudan. He also held the post of senior economist at the World Bank in Southern Sudan.

SOUTH SUDAN AT A CROSSROADS

Pastoralism in the new borderlands: a humanitarian livelihoods crisis

Helen Young and Zoe Cormack

In July 2011 an international border was created between Sudan and the new state of South Sudan. This new border cuts through a socially and economically active region and some of the most fertile land in Sudan. The adjacent area is home to more than 25% (12 million) of the combined total population of Sudan and South Sudan. It is in every sense a pastoralist border. It runs through grazing lands containing important migration routes, especially for northern pastoralist groups, enabling them to access dry season pastures in the south for up to five months of the year.

The border region has been dubbed 'the new South' – part of a growing zone of conflict and insecurity that has brought Sudan and South Sudan to the brink of war. The border remains undemarcated and a fragile peace in the disputed border region of Abyei is being overseen by a 4,000-strong UN force. Beyond Abyei, in the border states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, conflict between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)-North and the Sudan Armed Forces has displaced hundreds of thousands of people. Negotiations are complicated by oil, with major pipelines running through the border areas. Although an agreement in September 2012 promised security, demarcation, economic and trade deals and citizenship rights for border communities, at the time of writing little has changed on the ground, and attacks on civilians near the border have continued. In 2013, the UN is planning to assist more than 700,000 people affected by fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The scale of this crisis is potentially vast, affecting livestock producers right along the 2,100km border from Darfur in the west to Blue Nile State in the east.

Conflict and insecurity in the border region have significantly disrupted livestock migratory routes. The southwards cross-border migrations of cattle pastoralists are part of an annual movement adapted to seasonal and highly variable rainfall. To the north, on the desert's edge, annual rainfall is less than 150mm, gradually increasing southwards up to 600mm. During the rainy season livestock are kept further north where conditions are more conducive to health and breeding. Cattle then move southwards during the dry season as they become increasingly reliant on permanent water sources. These seasonal migrations connect ecologically diverse regions and economies, so what happens in the borderlands has a knock-on effect further north, and vice-versa.

Invisible needs

The humanitarian needs of pastoralists are often invisible to humanitarian organisations until the loss of their herds is so acute that it leads to drop-out and destitution.[1] Pastoralists are hard to reach, and their mobility can make it difficult for humanitarians to work with them. There is a dearth of humanitarian indicators on pastoralists because their scattered distribution makes them difficult to sample, and when data is collected it is usually aggregated with other population data and thus indistinguishable. Even if they are not technically excluded by humanitarian action, by default their specific needs as pastoralists might go unrecognised. There is a growing body of best practice in supporting livestock-based livelihoods in emergencies,[2] and unique experience in Sudan of supporting pastoralist livestock mobility, for example by supporting local negotiations to agree on the course of stock routes, the actual physical demarcation and mapping of stock routes and support for water catchments and veterinary services. When such initiatives also target farmers, they become a contact point between groups. In Darfur one agency has helped with the transport of animals to allow them to pass through insecure sections of livestock corridors. This experience is patchy, and more needs to be done in terms of better assessments and monitoring and addressing pastoralists' humanitarian needs.

Implications for pastoralist livelihoods

The border crisis has had serious implications for pastoralist livelihoods. Of pressing concern are the humanitarian implications for cross-border livestock mobility in light of the deteriorating security conditions in the border areas of South Kordofan, East Darfur and Blue Nile State. The hot dry season, from May up to the beginning of the rains, is the most challenging time for pastoralists, who need to access permanent water and valuable dry season pastures. Insecurity and conflict have hindered the migration of cattle south, resulting in concentrations of livestock in border states and in some states to the north. Some cattle producers in North Kordofan are not moving south, but are instead restricting their migratory patterns within the state.[2] This increases the risk of conflict between farmers and cattle herders as they compete over access to pastures, crop residues and water. In Blue Nile State the local authorities are reporting considerable pressure on water and pasture resources, a direct result of increasing concentrations of livestock, and cattle have reportedly destroyed crops in parts of Dilling and Kadugli localities in South Kordofan.

Poor relations between northern pastoralists and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) troops on the border are another serious concern. During the long civil war, the Sudanese government recruited pastoralists as pro-government militia, and bitterness persists. The Misseriyas' annual dry season migration alone takes some 50,000 herders and 1.2 million cattle from South Kordofan as far as Unity and Warrap states in South Sudan.[3] However, in the 2013 dry season they were denied entry into Warrap State. A recent FEWSNet (2013) report expressed concern for 'over 10 million heads of Rizeiqat cattle' needing to

1 See *Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS)* (Rugby: Practical Action Publishing, 2009).

2 S. Krätli et al., *Standing Wealth: Pastoralist Livestock Production and Local Livelihoods in Sudan* (Khartoum: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University United Nations Environment Programme, SOS Sahel Sudan, forthcoming).

3 J. Craze, *Living the Line: Life along the Sudan–South Sudan Border* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, forthcoming).

Cattle herders in Unity State

cross the border into South Sudan to access water and grazing during the dry season.[4]

Many pastoralists depend on local relationships to negotiate access to pastures in the south. There are also local agreements between groups; for example, in 2011 Hawazma pastoralists and an SPLM-North committee agreed commitments to peaceful coexistence, an end to livestock looting, a joint mechanism to recover looted livestock, open markets and access to pastures in SPLM-N-controlled areas.[5] However, ongoing insecurity will put increasing pressure on these arrangements. Recent reports of the expulsion of northern pastoralists from South Sudan to Darfur, Sennar and Blue Nile states are of concern.

The Federal and State Ministries of Animal Resources recognise the problems facing pastoralists and are aware of increasing concentrations of livestock and pressure on water and pasture. In Blue Nile State there are government plans to protect pastures for livestock and migratory routes by releasing agricultural land for grazing.[6] This year's harvest is reportedly extremely good, which should increase the availability of crop residues for use by livestock, though labour shortages in some areas, caused by the decreased flow of migrating agricultural labourers from the South, may reduce the amount harvested.

Tensions also affect the informal trade in livestock and commodities between South Sudan and Sudan, though the precise impact on the cross-border economy, markets

4 FEWSNet, *Sudan Food Security Outlook. January to June 2013,* 2013, p. 3.
5 ICG, 'Sudan's Spreading Conflict (I): War in South', *Africa Report No 198*, International Crisis Group, 2013.
6 G. Gebru et al., *Livestock, Livelihoods and Disasters. Part 2 Case Studies from Kassala, Blue Nile and North Darfur State, Sudan.* (Medford, MA: Tufts University, forthcoming).

and trade, and how this is controlled and managed, is poorly understood. According to a recent FEWSNet report, conflict-affected households in South Kordofan face a lack of access to markets and sharp price increases; prices in SPLM-N-controlled areas are 5–10 times higher than they are in areas controlled by the Sudanese government.[6]

International responses

Lack of access and insecurity remain the two major challenges to undertaking field assessments and delivering assistance. There is a dearth of information about the current situation of pastoralists and their southward migrations. Several organisations have planned assessments in South Kordofan, but these have stalled due to conflict and restricted access. At the time of writing access to Blue Nile State had improved, and two joint interagency humanitarian missions have visited Ed Damazine, Geissan and Kurmuk localities. Many internationally supported initiatives have focused on promoting dialogue on cross-border issues (see Box 1), but these talks have limitations given the difficulties involved in ensuring that all parties are present, solutions are workable and resolutions maintained.

Box 1: Initiatives to promote dialogue and understanding on north–south cooperation

Cross-Border Forum, also known as the Tamazuj (Intermingling) Forum, was initiated in 2010 and brought together leaders of north–south border states (and Abyei) to work towards greater economic, social, security and development integration. It was supported by the National Council for Strategic Planning, UNMIS-Civil Affairs, the US government and the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, amongst others.

Conflict Drivers: Concordis International (2010) undertook a study on drivers of conflict in the north–south border area, as well as related initiatives. This was combined with seven workshops held in areas along the border.

Pastoralism and Citizenship Project and national symposium (2010): UNHCR organised a symposium in Khartoum and reviewed issues around citizenship for pastoralists.

Mapping of nomadic issues by the Crisis and Recovery, Mapping and Analysis (CRMA) Unit of UNDP: initially focused on Darfur, but 44 workshops have been held in Abyei and in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Gedaref, Kassala and Red Sea states in Sudan, and seven states in South Sudan.

UNMIS Civil Affairs Unit (2010) supported a review of issues related to grazing rights and pastoralist migrations to South Sudan.

AECOM has supported the southward migrations of the Rizeiqat and the Misseriya through community committees and dialogue.

Recent attention to people affected by war in South Kordofan and Blue Nile is positive. However, funding trends indicate that donor support to Sudan is waning: only 53% of the $1 billion Consolidated Appeal (CAP) was met in 2012, a sharp drop from 2011 (partly blamed on poor humanitarian access). The shortfall in funding to the UN Workplan in Sudan contrasts with increased flows to South Sudan. There are, though, positive developments. For the first time, the UN Workplan in Sudan for 2013 includes the category of 'pastoralists/nomads', who comprise approximately 10% of the 5.1m caseload.[7] The Workplan specifically mentions the 'sustained needs among pastoralist communities', which require 'continued monitoring of the humanitarian situation, with a focus on livelihoods, livestock and food'. While this attention is welcome, it is not clear how pastoralists' needs will be monitored. Tufts, UNEP Sudan and partners are currently piloting longitudinal monitoring of livestock mobility and pastoralist decision-making, using interviews and GPS tracking.

Conclusion

The new border between Sudan and South Sudan runs through a large number of pastoral migration routes. The

7 United Nations, *Sudan United Nations and Partners 2013 Workplan*, 2013, pp. 55, 37.

current heightened awareness of cross-border issues for pastoralists is recent, and it will be important to tailor any humanitarian action to their unique livelihood needs, followed by analysis of what works, what has most potential and why. Potential actions include releasing land for livestock migration and grazing, storage of crop residues as dry season feed resources, construction of new water points and rehabilitation of old ones and the use of transportable water bladder tanks to allow access to grazing areas that are currently unused because of lack of water.

Continued instability and tensions along the border area, as well as ongoing conflict between the SPLM-N and the SAF in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, are affecting pastoralists' access to the rangelands they need to sustain their livelihoods. This in turn can only increase and entrench conflict in the region. There can be no sustainable political solution to the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan without accommodating a viable future for pastoralists.

Helen Young leads the Darfur Livelihoods Program at the Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. **Zoe Cormack** is a PhD student at Durham University.

Drivers of conflict in Jonglei State

Judith McCallum and Alfred Okech

Almost two years after South Sudan's independence, peace in Jonglei State remains elusive, despite attempts by the government, the international community, the Church and other national institutions to address the protracted violence there. This is not surprising given that these efforts have been disjointed, driven by multiple and conflicting agendas, lacking in strategic vision and seldom reflective of local perspectives. Grievances have been driven by a range of factors, including the perceived failure of the government to protect civilians and provide security and justice in an equitable manner; forced disarmament processes; perceptions of inequity in development and the distribution of resources; and unequal political representation at the state and national level. Environmental factors and lack of infrastructure have exacerbated these problems, undermining livelihoods and food security and rendering remote areas of the state inaccessible and, for a large part of the year, ungovernable. External support for and manipulation of armed groups by the Sudanese government and other actors with interests in resource extraction have compounded the violence.

The roots of the conflict

Conflict in Jonglei State has deep roots. Historically, Nuer, Dinka and Murle pastoralists all participated in cyclical cattle raiding and child abduction. Cattle are central not only to all three communities' livelihoods but also to their social and cultural systems. During the twentieth century, the proliferation of guns, the commercialisation of cattle

and rising bride prices made cattle raiding more violent and more lucrative. Customary mechanisms for addressing cattle raiding became less effective as governance systems changed and respect for traditional leadership declined.

After over 40 years of civil war, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 ended overt conflict between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudanese government. However, it did little to improve security in Jonglei State. Communities remain divided and continue to raid each other's cattle. Both the Lou Nuer and the Murle communities feel politically and economically marginalised by the politically dominant Bor Dinka; the Murle in particular feel threatened as they have little physical presence in the capital, Bor town, or representation in the Jonglei State government.

The 2010 elections sparked a number of insurgencies in South Sudan. In Jonglei State, General George Athor and David Yau Yau formed interlinked rebellions.[1] Although the insurgencies ended in 2011 with the death of Athor and an amnesty for Yau Yau, tensions continued to escalate. Raids between communities culminated in an attack in December 2011/January 2012 by over 6,000 Lou Nuer on Murle in Pibor County, resulting in massive displacement, loss of life, the abduction of children and women and cattle

1 For more details on these and other insurgencies following the elections, see *Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile*, Small Arms Survey HSBA Issue Brief 18, November 2011.

Victims of attacks in Jonglei

The government response

The government has responded to insecurity in Jonglei in several ways. It initially sought to bring insurgent groups back into the SPLA, including by offering an amnesty to Yau Yau and his followers, but the SPLA rank and file are less willing than their superiors to accommodate militia groups such as Yau Yau's.[3] There is no comprehensive strategy to reduce cattle raiding and violence more generally, and disarmament efforts in Pibor have only served to exacerbate tensions. The SPLA battalion responsible for disarmament in Pibor was largely composed of Nuer and Dinka officers, who took the opportunity to take revenge for earlier cattle raids on their communities by members of the Murle community.[4] Reports of rape and torture further enraged Murle youth and drove them deeper into the bush; until communities are confident that the SPLA and the police will protect them they are unlikely to surrender their guns. Organisations raising concerns over human rights abuses against civilians were intimidated by the state and national government, which put pressure on them not to report abuses. An Investigations Committee formed to look into the causes of the violence and hold the perpetrators to account never became operational, ostensibly because of a lack of funding.

Peacebuilding efforts

Attempts to address insecurity and respond to its humanitarian consequences have had mixed results. In mid-2011 the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) launched a project to strengthen dialogue within and between Dinka, Nuer and Murle communities to address recent violence and prevent relations from deteriorating further. However, the process quickly unravelled as alleged political manipulation stoked perceptions of bias, and communities increasingly felt that dialogue was being used as a substitute for state intervention to protect lives. Following the Lou Nuer attack on the Murle at the turn of the year the government and the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) initiated the Jonglei Peace Process. Although this succeeded in bringing about a temporary cessation of violence, it did little to advance reconciliation and peacebuilding between the communities involved, and was seen by many in the Murle community as partisan

raiding. Meanwhile, in February 2012 the SPLA began a disarmament process across Jonglei. This proceeded peacefully everywhere except Pibor County, where there were reports of the rape and torture of Murle civilians by SPLA troops.[2] The following April Yau Yau defected again to Khartoum, and in August he re-established his militia in Pibor County. Insecurity in Pibor and surrounding counties increased significantly. Other communities are frustrated with the increased level of cattle raiding allegedly perpetrated by Murle youth and Yau Yau's militia, and the absence of state action to address this lack of security.

Box 1: George Athor and David Yau Yau

A general in the SPLA, George Athor rebelled against the government of South Sudan after running as an independent candidate for the position of Jonglei governor, which he lost to the SPLM candidate, Kuol Manyang. Citing irregularities in the election process, Athor formed the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/SSDA) in 2010, with logistical support from the Sudanese government. He died (under disputed circumstances) in December 2012.

David Yau Yau, a theology student, was appointed Relief and Rehabilitation Coordinator (RRC) for Pibor County in 2008. In 2010 he ran against Judi Jonglei Bioris, the SPLM candidate, for the Gumuruk-Boma Constituency seat in the Jonglei State Assembly. On losing he launched an insurgency against the Jonglei government, with links to Athor's SSDM. He entered negotiations with the government of South Sudan and was granted amnesty in 2011, but defected again in April 2012. He currently claims to be the commander-in-chief of the SSDM.

---

2 HRW, *South Sudan: End Abuses by Disarmament Forces in Jonglei – Urgent Need for Justice and Accountability*, press release, 23 August 2012.

3 Offering an amnesty is seen as politically expedient by many in the SPLA. A key concern is the rank that the incoming insurgents are offered. It has been claimed that Yau Yau defected again because he was not given the rank of Major-General. However, he had no military background and granting him that rank would have been highly unpopular among the rank and file of the SPLA.

4 HRW, *South Sudan: End Abuses by Disarmament Forces in Jonglei*.

SOUTH SUDAN AT A CROSSROADS

and promoting a Dinka Bor agenda. Other organisations working on peace, as well as local pastors, felt that the Anglican and Catholic Churches spearheading the initiative should have made greater efforts to ensure that Presbyterian leaders on the ground were fully engaged in the process. The Presbyterian Church is the main religious organisation in Lou Nuer and Murle areas, and Catholics and Anglicans have very little presence. Members of the Murle community felt marginalised, believing that they were being used as scapegoats for the raiding and political unrest in Jonglei State, and little has been done to implement resolutions related to services, security, protection, justice and accountability.

A number of other peace processes have been facilitated by local and international organisations, including AECOM, Pact South Sudan, Non Violent Peace Force, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). International organisations are working with UNMISS and Murle leaders to bring Yau Yau back into the SPLA, and UNMISS has provided logistical support to the government and humanitarian actors, particularly transport, during the rainy season, when many areas are cut off. However, overall the international community has failed to put pressure on either the South Sudan government or the government in Jonglei to meet their responsibilities for security and protection. No international body has condemned the attack on the Murle in 2011–12 or the abuses perpetrated during the disarmament process, and no internal or external investigation has been undertaken into the causes of the Murle attack.

The humanitarian response

Between January 2011 and September 2012 conflict in Jonglei State left more than 2,700 people dead and displaced more than 200,000. Akobo and Pibor counties have been particularly hard hit. Health, education and water and sanitation services have been disrupted or destroyed, and international organisations are unwilling or unable to increase their presence in insecure areas. Unusual weather patterns and flooding affected an additional 201,000 people in Jonglei during the rainy season in 2012. Food insecurity has increased dramatically across much of the state, with particularly severe effects in Akobo and Pibor.

Humanitarian actors face a number of challenges in responding to conflict-related needs. Few agencies are present in the affected area and their capacity to scale up the response is low. Prepositioning of stocks is difficult and response times have accordingly been slow. Staff turnover is high and staff presence sporadic, making it difficult to base responses on a good understanding of the context, and without proper Do No Harm analysis what activities are undertaken risk contributing to tensions between communities. For example, the provision of assistance to Murle communities targeted in recent raiding has caused resentment in neighbouring communities, who perceive that they have not received the same level of support. Given the high levels of need most organisations have had to focus primarily on crisis response, rather than support for conflict mitigation and prevention.

Very little development work is being done. AECOM[5] is supporting infrastructure development and livelihoods, and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) is providing livelihood support to pastoralists. CRS, in collaboration with Save the Children, is implementing a food security programme, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and others have supported state planning processes. One key area is the construction of all-weather roads to connect remote and isolated areas with centres of governance and economic activity. There is also scope to improve river transport. However, no organisations are focusing on this critical area of development because of the security risks and high costs involved. The creation of a buffer zone between Murle, Dinka and Nuer areas, with military and police based at regular intervals along it, would help to reduce cattle raiding between these communities, but this has been rejected by the government on grounds of cost, and in any case the SPLA is not willing to deploy troops in these remote areas.[6] Governance structures need strengthening at the county and *payam* level. Some progress has been made in bringing government institutions closer to the grassroots, but progress is slow and hampered by insecurity and logistical problems. Capacity-building, both in terms of training and logistical support, is sorely needed in security provision, and local civil society and traditional leaders should be supported to work with their communities to change attitudes and improve relations with local government actors.

Conclusion

Communities in Jonglei State have experienced conflict over a number of generations, and it will take many years to mend the rifts between them. Community reconciliation must be based on a comprehensive plan for development and rehabilitation. All of the communities involved are both victims and perpetrators of violence. The tendency to blame the Murle for the violence is unproductive and only fuels conflict. Peace in Jonglei State needs long-term commitment and a diversified approach that includes high-level political dialogue, grassroots consultation, the provision of rule of law and access to justice and the development of alternative livelihood and employment opportunities for the young. Given the level of insecurity and the logistical challenges in Jonglei State, this is a daunting, but not impossible, task.

Judith McCallum is an independent consultant. **Alfred Okech** works with Catholic Relief Services (CRS).

5 AECOM is a USAID contractor working in South Sudan.
6 The Pibor Commissioner made this recommendation in January 2012, and it was repeated in a letter sent to the President of South Sudan composed by the Murle community in March 2012.

Have we lost the ability to respond to refugee crises? The Maban response

Sandrine Tiller and Sean Healy

In November 2011, fighting in Blue Nile State in Sudan led to the flight of some 25,000 refugees to Maban County, in Upper Nile State in South Sudan, where they were settled in two refugee camps, first at Doro and then, from December, at Jamam. More continued to arrive over the subsequent months. Six months later, in May 2012, a second wave of 35,000 refugees arrived, in very bad condition with some dying of dehydration from their journey. After an initial period in transit camps en route, most of this second wave was moved to Jamam camp; new camps were established at Batil (in May) and Gendrassa (in July) for the new arrivals and to reduce the Jamam population.

Death rates were very high from the time of the second wave: data gathered by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Jamam camp in mid-June showed crude mortality rates at 1.8/10,000/day and under-five mortality rates at 2.8/10,000/day. In Batil camp in July the crude mortality rate was 1.75 and the under-five rate 4.2/10,000/day. Their poor condition on arrival, the difficulty of supplying water to all the refugees and rains, flooding and later a Hepatitis E outbreak all contributed to death and suffering among the refugee population. In Jamam, mortality only started to fall to acceptable levels after ten weeks, while in Batil it reached that point after 6–8 weeks.

In many ways the refugee emergency in Maban County was a 'classic' crisis – a sudden influx of a large number of refugees into distinct camps in a rural setting with a small host population. This article assesses the humanitarian response to the emergency. It is based on a review done by MSF, including key informant interviews with 14 organisations.

A difficult setting

The environment in Maban presented particular challenges to the emergency response. It is one of the most remote parts of South Sudan, and is very sparsely inhabited, with an estimated population of 36,000. For a large part of the year the area floods and roads are impassable. Logistics costs were very high as almost all materials had to be flown in, and it was difficult to find local staff. For MSF even frontline positions such as nurses had to be filled by international staff, drastically increasing costs. The refugees, who by June 2012 numbered over 100,000, had very few resources of their own, and were entirely dependent on external humanitarian assistance.

MSF's response

MSF first responded in November 2011, soon after the first wave of refugees arrived in Maban County. The agency

Refugees collecting water at the MSF water collection point in Jamam refugee camp

© Robin Meldrum / MSF

Map showing refugee camps in the border region between Sudan and South Sudan:
- Sudan
- South Kordofan State
- Blue Nile State
- Jamam camp c. 22,000 refugees
- Gendrassa camp c. 7,000 refugees
- K43
- K18
- Batil camp c. 32,000 refugees
- Doro camp c. 44,000 refugees
- Yida camp c. 55,000 refugees
- Unity State
- Ethiopia
- Jonglei State
- Upper Nile State
- South Sudan

Legend:
- ● Refugee camp
- ◇ Transit site
- Border crossing point
- International boundary
- Boundary between Sudan and South Sudan
- State boundary

initially set up a hospital with in- and out-patient services in Doro camp, followed by outreach clinics offering out-patient consultations, while a clinic in Bunj town run by the Ministry of Health and another partner organisation covered the needs of the host population and surgical cases. One of MSF's key interventions in Doro has been the provision of drinking water; more than a year after the start of the intervention, MSF is still supplying water for some 45,000 refugees.

MSF set up a hospital in Jamam in March, providing in-patient and out-patient services to 35,000 refugees. Initially MSF was providing more than 50% of the water in the camp. Nutrition support was set up through an intensive (ITFC) and an ambulatory (ATFC) therapeutic feeding centre, and vaccination campaigns were carried out in all of the camps. MSF also set up a field hospital in Gendrassa camp, which provides in-patient services, while International Medical Corps (IMC) provides out-patient consultations.

Batil camp, which was initially intended for refugees relocated from Jamam, was expanded to host the May influx of 35,000 refugees. MSF set up a clinic providing in- and out-patient care, nutrition and maternity and mental health services, supported by over 60 expatriates. MSF rented aircraft to supply these operations, with the Logistics cluster providing for some expatriate travel.

Refugees, not IDPs

A key feature of the emergency was that, with a new border between Sudan and South Sudan, these were refugees, not IDPs. This changed how the response was organised, as it was under the responsibility of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as lead agency and fell outside of the existing cluster system. UNCHR coordinated the response, and selected and funded partner agencies to lead in certain sectors. The principal responsibility for successes or failings must therefore lie with UNHCR. Apart from the World Food Programme (WFP), no other major UN humanitarian agencies were present, and the Humanitarian Coordinator only visited well after the emergency had begun. Not using the existing cluster system meant that a duplicate coordination structure was set up, and there was confusion with regard to standards and reporting lines.

For many NGOs, UNHCR's status as both donor and coordinator inhibited critical discussion; it was difficult to admit to mistakes, and there was pressure to share only good news. Some NGOs admitted to having taken on more commitments than they could handle. According to interviewees, even internally within NGOs there was little reporting of problems up the line to Juba, and there was little incentive to be open about gaps and failings or to address them in a collaborative manner. In general, there was a culture of blame and competition within the

humanitarian system. Once it became clear that some partners could not deliver, UNHCR asked other NGOs to step in and provide additional services, effectively 'doubling up' the number of agencies in each sector. This created a 'patchwork' of service delivery.

Water supply problems

The major issue plaguing the Maban emergency response was provision of water. In the area around Jamam there were serious problems in finding water sources and extracting and distributing adequate amounts of water. This was known by water and sanitation actors and communicated clearly by them as early as December 2011, but adequate water provision (to SPHERE standards) was only achieved by September 2012. The Hepatitis E outbreak in the camps was, in the view of MSF medical teams, mainly due to the lack of adequate water and sanitation facilities.

A key constraint for getting adequate water supplies to the camps was logistical: only three drills were on-site, one shallow and two deep, and they were in constant demand. Carrying out good-quality hydrogeological surveys to assess the sustainability of aquifers was particularly difficult. There also appeared to be a lack of senior technical staff with experience of responding in this kind of context. Agencies seem to have struggled to change gear from a development to an emergency approach, and suffered from a lack of urgency. Experienced staff were deployed late or not at all, and not in sufficient numbers. Development approaches, which prioritised long-term activities in resident communities and emphasised the use of local staff and contractors, were inappropriate in an emergency setting. This led to delays in the response. As the coordinator of the response, UNHCR took too long to assert leadership in the watsan sector. MSF initially counted on other agencies with the responsibility and expertise to respond to water needs. When capacity and supply constraints became clear, however, MSF began emergency water supply and distribution interventions in Doro, Batil and Jamam camps. Faced with alarming mortality statistics in Batil camp in July, MSF began advocating at senior levels with other humanitarian actors to intervene in water and sanitation. This 'wait and see' approach was criticised within MSF, with some saying that it delayed the agency's own response.

Lack of contingency planning and leadership in key sectors

Poor contingency planning slowed the response to the second wave of refugees in mid-May. While information from Blue Nile State, on the other side of the border, was certainly limited, this should not have prevented agencies from drawing up response plans. Humanitarian actors were caught out by the scale of the influx.

This was also the case with regard to water provision in the camps, especially in Jamam. It became clear as early as March that Jamam would not be able to cope even with existing numbers once the rains arrived. And yet it was only months later and after the second wave began

Humanitarian response in Yida refugee camp, Unity State, South Sudan, 2012

Pauline Busson, Audrey Landmann, Klaudia Porten and Vincent Brown

In July 2011, fleeing fighting and bombing in the Nuba Mountains, South Kordofan, a first wave of refugees crossed the border and settled in Yida, a small Dinka village in South Sudan. From April 2012, following increased violence and food shortages in the Nuba Mountains and the approach of the rainy season, the rate of new arrivals grew dramatically (up to 1,000 per day). By July Yida's population had quadrupled, reaching 64,000. While enough food was available, water and sanitation conditions were poor, leading to increased diarrhoeal diseases, which in turn contributed to severe acute malnutrition among children. This combination of factors in densely populated Yida led to global excess mortality; under-five mortality peaked at four deaths/10,000 per day in June and July, twice the emergency threshold. Admissions at MSF's field hospital doubled, and with many severe cases arriving late, hospital mortality jumped, exceeding 20% for three consecutive weeks in July, before falling back to 3% in August.

To tackle the complex emergency, humanitarian agencies on the ground scaled up their response, although with some delay. It took three months, from May to July, for the WASH situation to reach acceptable standards. The delayed humanitarian response can be explained by several factors. Yida's location – 12km south of the Sudanese border, a potentially dangerous spot – has limited longer-term investment; UNHCR has repeatedly tried to relocate refugees, and some donors have refused to fund assistance inside the camp. No mortality surveillance system was in place before June, and limited understanding of the situation in the Nuba Mountains meant that humanitarian actors were not prepared for such a large influx of refugees. Roads were inaccessible during the rainy season, further slowing the response. At the time of writing the humanitarian situation has stabilised, but remains precarious and new influxes of refugees are expected. Lessons learned during this emergency should help to ensure better responses in the future.

Pauline Busson is a consultant in the Evaluation Unit, MSF Operational Center Paris (OCP). **Audrey Landmann** is emergency coordinator at MSF-OCP and **Klaudia Porten** works in Epicentre (MSF Satellite). **Vincent Brown** is head manager of the Evaluation Unit at MSF-OCP. The authors would like to thank Patricia Kahn (MSF-USA) for her careful proof-reading.

that a third site, Batil, was made available. Precious time was lost in deciding where the refugees would finally be located. Once the decision was made in June, actual site identification and the moving of refugees went quickly – making the delay even more difficult to understand.

Intensive lobbying by MSF

Frustrated by what it saw as a slow and inadequate response, in February MSF began to lobby hard for others to deliver on their responsibilities. MSF became increasingly critical and vocal towards actors that it felt had not responded adequately to the challenges posed by Maban. MSF met UNHCR, WFP and OCHA to push for an improved overall response, particularly in water and sanitation, and shared its concerns with the Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos. In August, MSF met ICRC in Geneva and Juba, presenting the results of its mortality surveys. In response, ICRC sent out an assessment team, which eventually resulted in a short-term but large-scale intervention in Jamam, where the ICRC built a 15-kilometre water distribution pipeline, and in Batil, where it installed piping, storage tanks, tap stands and pumps.

MSF was attacked by some for the bluntness of its criticisms, and it appears that some relationships were strained. There was also the question of whether it should even be the role of an international NGO to push other agencies to fulfil their commitments. An 'insider/outsider' stance made it difficult for some other actors to anticipate MSF's response. Nevertheless, MSF's decision to publicly highlight these problems and demand improvements did have some positive impact in prompting greater urgency and effort and in bringing in new actors with greater capacity.

Conclusion

At the time of writing, the situation in the camps appears to have stabilised, at least in comparison to the desperate, muddy mess of June and July. This is in very large part due to the massive effort of many humanitarian actors. That said, the Maban crisis raises some uncomfortable questions about the humanitarian system's emergency response capacity. Given humanitarian capacities and the vast body of knowledge and practice, how can it be possible for a refugee camp to lack even the most minimum standards for survival? Why were agencies caught unprepared by eminently predictable events and problems? Why, even now, is this still a risk? Why did it prove so difficult for humanitarian agencies to reach acceptable levels of service delivery? Given that the emergency occurred in an area where large-scale operations had been conducted during Operation Lifeline Sudan, and many of the responding agencies have been present in the country for decades, has the humanitarian system lost some of its former capacity to respond quickly and effectively to this kind of 'classic' refugee emergency?

Sandrine Tiller and **Sean Healy** are humanitarian advisers working for MSF. The authors would like to thank the reviewers and field teams for their contributions to this article.

Using GIS as a planning and coordination tool in refugee camps in South Sudan

Clay Westrope and Emilie Poisson

In natural disasters and complex emergencies, access to high-quality, timely information is a critical precondition for effective aid delivery. Unfortunately, recent crises have exposed the shortcomings of the humanitarian community in rapidly gathering and effectively using information on the key needs and priorities of affected populations. Such shortcomings are largely due to the lack of dedicated interagency resources for the collection, analysis and dissemination of key information. As a result, post-emergency contexts are often characterised by significant gaps.

ACTED REACH team taking GPS coordinates to map Gendrasa refugee camp, Upper Nile

The first gap concerns the emergency phase of a crisis, when the supply of data is insufficient to meet demand. As data products become increasingly available in the weeks following the onset of an emergency, however, demand for them decreases as humanitarian actors increasingly focus on their operational priorities. The second gap lies in the recovery and development phases, when the availability of information products exceeds demand. This often leads to a decline in the regular supply of information products due to the lack of demand, resulting in a lack of preparedness once a new crisis occurs.

REACH in South Sudan

An interagency initiative of two NGOs (IMPACT Initiatives and ACTED) and a UN programme (UNOSAT), REACH was founded in 2010 to help meet information needs in the aftermath of a crisis. In partnership with UNHCR and the US Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM), REACH was deployed to the refugee crisis in South Sudan in 2012. Beginning in September 2011, fighting in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, combined with the destruction of crops and livelihoods, has resulted in the displacement of approximately 175,000 refugees (110,000 in Upper Nile State and 65,000 in Unity State). In response, UNHCR established four camps in Upper Nile State – Jamam, Gendrasa, Yusuf Batil and Doro – and two in Unity State, Pariang and Nyeel. In addition, the Yida settlement currently houses an estimated 63,000 refugees from South Kordofan. The security situation on the border between Sudan and South Sudan continues to deteriorate, and OCHA expects that emergency assistance will need to be provided to an estimated 150,000 additional new arrivals from South Kordofan and Blue Nile states during 2013.

The South Sudan refugee crisis has suffered from substantial information gaps, largely stemming from a lack of coordinated approaches to data collection and inadequate resources to operationalise such a data collection effort. In particular, shortcomings in the availability and reliability of data about patterns of refugee flows over the border, settlement area characteristics and overall social organisation have limited the speed and effectiveness of the humanitarian response. To address these gaps, REACH, in partnership with UNHCR, developed a simple methodology aimed at bringing together data from reliable sources and representing it in both text and geospatial formats, such as static and interactive webmaps. Figure 1 illustrates the process.

The methodology used by REACH combines a household-level unique identifier – or number that is assigned by UNHCR to each individual refugee household – with information on social group membership of each household and a geo-referencing of each household's shelter or tent. This is achieved in three steps.

First, by identifying a standard, common and unique UNHCR field of data – a ration card or registration number – that all refugee households receive, information from previously disparate sources can be linked in a simple database. Data on the demographics of each refugee household (from the UNHCR database), the physical location of that household (by GPS point) and its social profile (from REACH mapping assessments) are placed side by side in a database, allowing for queries between these fields. The second step of the methodology involves strong interagency cooperation and input. Each agency has a well-defined role in the camp linked to sectoral responsibility (for example

Figure 1: REACH Refugee Crisis Methodology

medical relief, water delivery and food distribution). The methodology capitalises on that specialisation by forming partnerships and agreements with other agencies for regular data delivery on sector-specific aid provision in a standardised format. By linking this data with the household-level unique identifier in the database, it can then be associated with the demographic, social and geographic data mentioned above. With this information, highly complex queries can be made from many different fields of data.

The third step applies spatial representation to the collected data, which has now been linked in the database. The database serves as the backbone of an interactive map that displays each asset and refugee household in the camp, overlaying high-resolution satellite imagery provided by UNOSAT. The map is then updated with additional information from assessments and other data fields collected by aid agencies, providing geo-referenced aid provision and planning data at the press of a button. Aid actors are able to track aid provision throughout the camp, while also creating custom-made, tailored analyses that drastically improve planning and coordination. In addition, the data is used to produce static maps as requested.

Impact

The database and maps (both static and interactive) make household-level data readily available for customised geospatial analyses and for informing aid planning and response. We will use Jamam refugee camp (Upper Nile State) to illustrate how this technology can be used for water provision, sanitation, community mobilisation,

medical care and aid tracking. In the first example, one of the agencies responsible for water supply has used static maps showing population concentrations and distances from current water supplies to plan new tap sites with more comprehensive coverage (see Figure 2). The agency has also used an offline version of the interactive map to measure how far distant populations are from the current pipeline system in order to plan new pipeline construction.

Also in Jamam, the social organisation information in the REACH database enabled UNHCR and ACTED to reorganise the camp by place and tribe of origin, enhancing community mobilisation and representation in the camp. An agency responsible for medical care has used static maps in planning a cholera vaccination campaign. REACH was also able to generate a random sample of households for a Centers for Disease Control survey. It has improved the accountability of aid by enhancing its traceability down to the household level, and has located individuals with specific needs to facilitate follow-up care. Figure 3 illustrates this through a static map showing food-recipient and non-recipient households and their locations.

Challenges

In an emergency as dynamic and remote as the South Sudan refugee crisis, REACH has faced two main challenges: first, standardised provision of sector-specific information and accessibility to consolidated data by all agencies; and second, the constant movement of refugees into, out of and within camps, necessitating regular updates of the information consolidated within the database.

Figure 2: Static map of Jamam water coverage

Figure 3: Static map of Jamam food distribution recipients and non-recipients

Using even simple technologies is a challenge. With limited internet access and low bandwidth, transferring data between agencies can be difficult. In an attempt to resolve some of these problems, REACH has developed an offline version of the interactive webmap that can be used without internet access. While this has been effective, providing regular access to data remains a challenge. REACH currently has a team in the field helping aid actors to adapt and customise their own databases to make them compatible with the REACH database. The team holds meetings with aid agency staff to stress the importance of receiving updated geographic data in a timely fashion and in a standardised format, so that it can be readily incorporated in the database and subsequent map products.

Timeliness of information has been the second key challenge. While geo-referencing data enables REACH to track population movements, these updates must be done on a very regular basis, putting time and resource strains on the field teams. Methods for streamlining this

process are being tested. It is critical that field teams establish a close relationship with the community liaison and mobilisation teams in order to monitor changes within these dynamic environments.

Conclusion

Recent natural disasters and complex emergencies have exposed the humanitarian community's shortcomings in gathering and effectively using information on the key needs and priorities of affected populations. REACH has begun to apply simple technologies to fill these gaps, and will continue to work with agency partners and other humanitarian actors to improve the methodology. REACH is using a customised version of the methodology employed in South Sudan in the Syrian crisis, filling a much deeper information gap there.

Clay Westrope is REACH Assessment Specialist. **Emilie Poisson** is ACTED South Sudan Country Director. The REACH website is www.reach-initiative.org.

Lessons on transition in South Sudan

George Conway

South Sudan remains chronically dependent on humanitarian assistance. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) period, from 2005 to independence in July 2011, saw various shifts between humanitarian and development funding, but on balance the bulk of assistance continued to be delivered through humanitarian modalities. So too in the first two years following independence, with annual humanitarian appeals hovering around $1 billion, as compared to approximately half that amount targeted for development programmes in the UN's first Development Assistance Framework for the new republic. This reliance on humanitarian assistance has much to do with continued insecurity and low government capacity. The new government has also been effectively absent from much of the territory of the country. Meanwhile, the decision in January 2012 to shut down oil production deprived the government of 98% of its revenue.

The relationship between 'relief', 'recovery' and 'development' has never been linear, despite early optimism in the CPA period that humanitarian assistance could be phased out and replaced with recovery and development programmes. The situation is rather one of balancing multiple priorities: meeting pressing humanitarian needs; maintaining frontline service delivery; building core state functions and capacities; and addressing the causes of insecurity. As donors revert to predominantly humanitarian modes of operation in the recent austerity context, and shift funds away from development and capacity development programmes, there is a risk of perpetuating exactly the conditions generating humanitarian needs in the first place. A number of major initiatives were implemented throughout the CPA period which sought to lay the ground for a 'transition' from relief to development. Lessons learned and evaluative evidence from many of these programmes highlight the challenges of transition in a low-capacity state with prevailing conditions of insecurity. These lessons can provide useful compass-points for prioritising assistance in South Sudan.

Lessons from transition and recovery programmes during the CPA period

A common theme across many evaluations of CPA-era recovery programmes was the degree to which development partners underestimated the state-building challenge in South Sudan, and overestimated the capacity of the government and how soon it would be able to take on responsibility for service delivery.[1] This resulted in over-ambitious and unrealistic programmes. The mid-term and final evaluations of the Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP), implemented in five states from 2005 to 2010, highlighted numerous challenges in this respect.[2] The RRP was explicitly designed as a transitional programme, combining quick recovery impacts with the institutional development of local government. While the evaluations noted that sizable outputs were achieved, particularly in service delivery infrastructure, they found that the programme was less effective in institutional development. As a result, service delivery outputs were not sustainable and there was insufficient capacity to maintain them after the programme ended.

Another recurrent evaluation finding relates to a failure to fully take on board the trade-offs between rapid delivery to demonstrate 'peace dividends' and efforts to strengthen national ownership and capacity. This has been highlighted, for instance, in evaluations of the South Sudan Recovery Fund (SSRF), established in 2008 to bridge the 'recovery gap in the transition from humanitarian to development assistance'.[3] The first round of the SSRF allocated $20 million to rural livelihoods initiatives. An evaluation found that, while the SSRF Round I programme delivered immediate, household-level impacts, it also suffered from sustainability problems, with NGO implementing partners outpacing the local government's capacity to participate meaningfully in projects.[4]

Part of the challenge highlighted by evaluations of the RRP and SSRF relates to the orientation and approach of NGO implementing partners. Owing to the long history of humanitarian-oriented responses, partners generally continued to operate with a 'relief mentality'.[5] The RRP mid-term evaluation also suggested that this 'relief mode' persisted amongst beneficiaries accustomed to many years of humanitarian aid, and an 'expectation among communities and local Government authorities of relief and handouts rather than development cooperation'. Yet if results are not seen as coming from the government, but rather from international partners and NGOs, the objective of expanding the presence and visibility of the state is not met. One evaluation found that there 'is evidence that, in some situations, recovery projects may have undermined the credibility of the State'.[6]

Approaches to transition: the 'security–governance–recovery' nexus

Building on experience and lessons from these programmes, other approaches have been applied that have sought to put state-building and peace-building more squarely at the forefront of transitional initiatives. One such approach is the Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC)

1 J. Bennett et al., *Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005–2010*, ITAD Ltd., 2010.

2 The RRP was a €57 million programme funded by the European Commission, administered by UNDP and implemented through NGO consortia. Mid-term and final evaluations are available at UNDP's Evaluation Resource Center: http://erc.undp.org.

3 South Sudan Recovery Fund (SSRF) Terms of Reference, http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/SRF00. The SSRF is funded by the governments of the UK, Netherlands and Norway.

4 UNDP, *Southern Sudan: Crisis Prevention and Recovery Programme Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation Programme Period: 2009–2012*, Scanteam, Oslo, June 2011, p. 9.

5 *Sudan: Post-Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP) – Mid-term Review*, 2008.

6 *UNDP Southern Sudan: Crisis Prevention and Recovery Programme Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation Programme Period: 2009–2012*, 2011, p. 27.

Locals and refugees discuss livestock grazing in Maban County, South Sudan

programme, led by the Ministry of Interior's Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control, with support from the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UK, Canada, the European Union, Japan, the Netherlands and Norway. The programme, which began in pilot form in 2008, covered five states and 55 of the country's 78 counties by the end of 2011. The programme is continuing and the next phase is currently being designed.

The initiative takes as its starting point that the government must understand and be seen to be responding to community needs around insecurity. In order to do so, UNDP supported the national, state and local governments to undertake community consultations on the causes and dynamics of insecurity, employing a conflict analysis methodology and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) approach. Between 2009 and 2011, consultations were undertaken in the 55 counties, involving thousands of community members, including women, youth and traditional authorities.[7] There was a remarkable degree of convergence in perceptions of the causes of insecurity. Community members cited a range of factors related to competition over resources (particularly water and grazing land), cattle rustling, the proliferation of small arms and lack of productive activities for youth. A recurring factor in poor security was the absence or weakness of the state. Community members 'frequently cited a "weak," "biased" or "absent" civil administration as a determining factor in the perpetuation of conflict and insecurity'.[8] Based on the results of these consultations, the programme provided

local governments with resources to implement projects to address the security priorities identified by communities. An independent evaluation found advantages in this approach:

The extended consultation process around design has contributed to, and benefited from the gradual expansion of State capacity to the state and local levels. In turn, the consultation and implementation processes have strengthened the State's presence in rural areas. This is a virtuous circle that will create benefits outside of the boundaries of the project.[9]

Building on these results, the SSRF revised its approach. The SSRF Round 3 State Stabilization Programmes, implemented in four of South Sudan's most insecure states, were based on a more robust analysis of causes of insecurity, building on the CSAC consultations and focusing in particular on the absence of effective state authority and legitimacy in insecure areas. The Stabilization Programmes assisted state security actors to identify major stabilisation priorities, most commonly focusing on increasing accessibility to insecure areas through security access roads and increasing the number of police stations and courts, accompanied by support for deployment and training of rule of law personnel and building strategically placed water points in areas where competition over water was a chief source of conflict.

Evidence on the impact of these programmes thus far is positive. Both the CSAC and SSRF Round 3 programmes have enhanced the presence, authority, visibility and

7 The full Community Security Consultation Reports are available at http://www.ss.undp.org/content/south_sudan/en/home/library/county_consultationsummaries.

8 *Community Consultation Report – Lakes State, South Sudan*, p. 7.

9 *UNDP Southern Sudan: Crisis Prevention and Recovery Programme Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation*, p. 5.

SOUTH SUDAN AT A CROSSROADS

perceived legitimacy of the government. A mid-term outcome evaluation of the CSAC programme assessed that it has effectively 'integrated security, governance and recovery activities in a unified conceptual and programme framework', and found 'evidence of a reduction in violent conflict' in some of the areas where the programme is being implemented.[10] Similarly, reviews of the SSRF Round 3 Stabilization Programmes have found evidence that they have helped to expand the presence and capacity of the state and reduce competition over natural resources.[11] Overall, the Round 3 programmes have proved much more effective than Round 1 in 'bridging support between humanitarian assistance, recovery and development'.

Conclusion

The OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States assert that state-building must be the central objective. If not, engagement risks hindering the transition from fragility. However, it has also been argued that state-building cannot be pursued at the expense of humanitarian principles, particularly in contexts where the government does not have the capacity to take on responsibility for service delivery.[12] A number of reviews and analyses throughout the CPA period highlight the degree to which these different principles may be in conflict, and call for a better understanding of the trade-offs involved, including between directly delivering services and developing capacity, and between delivering a rapid peace dividend and state-building.[13]

These analyses suggest that the absence of a peace dividend risked undermining faith in the CPA process, creating new conflict risks. However, rapidly delivered benefits that cannot be sustained, or that collapse once a project ends, can have even worse negative impacts, eroding the credibility of an already fragile government and undermining the already weak relationship between the state and society. The SSRF lessons learned review

argued that a *rapid* peace dividend is not the same as an *effective* one, and called for a reconceptualisation of what 'peace dividends' mean in a context such as South Sudan: delivering benefits that are tangible and sustainable, strengthening state systems, enhancing state presence and visibility, moving in tandem with the government's leadership capacity and understanding that this process will take time, and managing expectations accordingly.[14]

The first years of the post-independence period have seen international partners once again reverting to predominantly humanitarian modes of operation in South Sudan. Stakeholders interviewed as part of the recent SSRF lessons learned exercise, however, identified the importance of continuing stabilisation and recovery activities, despite the current fiscal crisis and unresolved CPA issues between Sudan and South Sudan. In a context of declining global aid allocations, the trade-offs now are harder than ever. There are clear risks of backsliding on state-building and peace-building in South Sudan, and of losing the investment and progress made during the CPA period in extending state authority, promoting stability and reducing conflict. This is not the time to backtrack on peace-building and state-building efforts in South Sudan, but rather precisely the time to reassert them.

Despite some positive results of programmes such as CSAC and the SSRF Round 3, the broader peace-building and state-building context in South Sudan remains deeply problematic. Worrying trends have been reported since independence in the conduct of the security forces, protection of human rights and corruption. The extension of state authority must be accompanied by clear measures to ensure state accountability, responsiveness and inclusivity, areas that have received less donor attention in South Sudan, and where there have been fewer positive results. If the political commitment to reverse these trends does not materialise, the prospects for the transition in South Sudan are troubling indeed.

George Conway is Strategic Advisor with the UN Development Programme (UNDP)'s Regional Bureau for Africa. He served as UNDP's Head of Programmes in Southern Sudan from 2007 to 2011, and as UNDP's Country Director for the first year following South Sudan's independence.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 34.

11 *South Sudan Recovery Fund – Lessons Learned Report*, 2012, p. 6.

12 European Report on Development, *Overcoming Fragility in Africa*, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 2009, p. 97.

13 Anita Haslie and Axel Borchgrevink, *International Engagement in Sudan after the CPA: Report on the Piloting of OECD/DAC's 'Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States' for the Case of Sudan*, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2007. See also *Aiding the Peace*, p. 96.

14 *South Sudan Recovery Fund – Lessons Learned Report*, p. 6.

Double dividends? Exploring how Tearfund's water, sanitation and hygiene programmes in South Sudan can contribute to peace- and state-building

Sarah Pickwick

Fragility, conflict and processes of state transformation can be challenging contexts for basic service provision by humanitarian agencies. Globally, practitioners are becoming more concerned with understanding the impact of service delivery on conflict, fragility and state-building – for example through the application of the 'Do No Harm' framework or forms of conflict analysis. Policymakers and donors increasingly ask whether service delivery programmes can do more to help build peace and the capacity of the state in the longer term. However, while many contributions are asserted, there is little rigorous evaluation to test the impact of service delivery on peace-building and state-building outcomes.[1] In light of this, Tearfund, with funding from the UK Department for International Development (DFID), decided to explore the implications for its water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) work of wider processes of peace- and state-building in two projects in South Sudan.

The research findings point to the need to challenge the assumption that the delivery of WASH services *per se* will contribute to positive peace-building and state-building effects. Drivers of these processes are complex and often reflect historic legacies and systemic features not easily shaped by any one intervention. In the project sites visited, water, sanitation and hygiene conditions were not a central driver of conflict, and the provision of WASH services did not have the same perceived state-building benefits as other services such as education. That said, there is considerable scope to improve *how* these services are delivered, in order to take much better account of wider peace-building and state-building processes.

Research approach

Tearfund was funded by DFID to implement a five-year programme (2007–12) to improve access to WASH services by increasing the capacity of Tearfund teams, partner projects and local government departments across seven countries, including South Sudan. Peace- and state-building objectives were not included in the formal project design, but some positive results were nevertheless observed at the end of the programme. These included increased community cohesion, enlarged capacity for local conflict resolution and improved capacity for collective action by state and non-state actors.[2]

---

1 N. Mason, *Relationships Between Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Service Delivery and Peace-building and State-building: A Review of the Literature*, ODI Working Paper 362, December 2012; S. Carpenter, R. Slater and R. Mallet, *Social Protection and Basic Services in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations*, Working Paper 8, Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (London: ODI, 2012).
2 M. Burt and B. J. Keiru, 'Strengthening Post-conflict Peace-building through Community Water-resource Management: Case Studies from Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan and Liberia', *Water International*, 36:2, 2011.

> **Box 1: Definitions**
>
> **Peace-building:** The notion of 'positive peace', which is 'characterised by social harmony, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and social and economic development … supported by political institutions that are able to manage change and resolve disputes without resorting to violent conflict'. This implies that peace-building must tackle 'structural forms of violence, such as discrimination, underlying grievances or lack of avenues for challenging existing structures in a peaceful way'.
>
> **State-building:** 'Concerned with the state's capacity, institutions and legitimacy and with the political and economic processes that underpin state–society relations.' It is therefore a long-term, historically rooted endogenous process, and can be driven by a range of local and national actors.
>
> From: DFID Practice Paper, *Building Peaceful States and Societies*, 2010.

In light of this, at the end of the project, and in response to UK government policy commitments, DFID funded research in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), carried out by Tearfund and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), to further analyse these elements. The overall purpose of the research was to produce evidence of the peace- and state-building role of WASH service delivery in fragile and conflict-affected states, and to explore whether there were opportunities to include explicit peace- and state-building objectives in future WASH programming.

Following an initial literature review, potential dimensions and areas through which service delivery *could* impact on peace- and state-building were identified (see Figure 1). Processes of peace- and state-building are long-term, and shaped by a wide range of historical and contextual factors. There is no 'one size fits all' trajectory. However, some plausible links between service provision and peace- and state-building can be made, for example perceptions of who is included or excluded, potential conflict risks (where conflict is based on perceptions of marginalisation), perceptions around who is visible and capable to deliver services and processes of institutionalisation linked to state-building. Breaking these down into different dimensions is a useful way of thinking through the practical implications for programming, although no causal or automatic links can be assumed. These dimensions include:

1. Opportunity: Identifying entry points where broader links can be made to enable economic or other opportunities.

2. Visibility: Examining the relative visibility of different stakeholders delivering services, and assessing the risks where non-state actors are more visible than the state.

3. Collective action: Identifying capacities for collective action and collaboration between and within different groups for the delivery of services.

4. Inclusion: Mapping groups that are prevented from accessing or using services and identifying resulting conflict risks.

5. Accountability: Mapping the nature of accountability relationships for service delivery between different groups (including local leaders).

Three analytical methods were then used in conducting the research in South Sudan, to further explore the utility of these dimensions for thinking through political and programming choices:

• Political economy analysis – analysing key institutions, actors and incentives for peace- and state-building, as well as the drivers of conflict.

• Modality of WASH service provision – assessing the what, who and how of WASH service delivery in the project sites.

• Routes for potential impact on peace- and state-building – investigating the potential relationship between WASH service delivery and peace- and state-building through the five dimensions set out above.

WASH programmes in South Sudan

Two Tearfund field sites in South Sudan were visited for this research. In the first, in Yei River County (part of Central Equatoria), Tearfund has worked with and through an NGO called Across to facilitate its Church and Community Mobilisation approach, which supports communities to collaborate and address their needs, including WASH.

In the second, in Aweil (Northern Bahr el Ghazal, on the border with Sudan and with higher ongoing insecurity), Tearfund is a direct provider of WASH services, and works with government partners in site selection and programme reporting. Where there were conflict risks, these were driven primarily by issues of marginalisation rather than specific issues around access to water points or related WASH activities. However, the study identified a number of ways in which these programmes could better impact broader peace- and state-building processes.

Inclusion

In some cases, there was scope for programmes to address perceptions of marginalisation and unequal access. The research identified practical ways to deal with these issues, including being more systematic and thorough in involving beneficiaries in site selection; improving community training in maintenance; and increasing awareness of the community's own role in service provision, alongside conflict analysis to track and monitor local risks. This helped increase transparency in terms of who benefits and gave communities a greater stake in delivering or helping to deliver these services. It also seemed to help address perceptions of marginalisation and tensions within and between communities.

Collective action and collaboration

There can be particular collective action problems for water and sanitation provision, where the costs, for example of maintaining boreholes or latrines, may be seen as too high for communities to be able to meet these needs themselves.[3] Collective action can be further weakened where aid is provided in ways that undermine a community's own agency.

3 C. Mcloughlin with R. Batley, *The Effects of Sector Characteristics on Accountability Relationships in Service Delivery*, ODI Working Paper 350 (London: ODI, 2012).

Figure 1: Potential dimensions for service delivery and peace- and state-building

Maduany transition camp on the outskirts of Aweil town, South Sudan

Tearfund's projects in Aweil recognised these challenges but did not always adequately address them. For example, in one returnee camp Tearfund reportedly found it difficult to bring residents together to help implement the project and maintain services and infrastructure. Tearfund was asked to repair a broken hand pump, even though tools and training had been provided to community committees. Similarly, latrines were not maintained and some were subsequently non-functional. By contrast, another returnee community led by an engaged headman contributed labour and community members were reportedly committed to maintaining services. This highlights the importance of understanding the underlying conditions likely to determine where there is capacity for collective action.

One of the core strengths of Tearfund's approach is using faith-based groups to facilitate collective action and collaboration within communities. Such groups can be important convenors for communities where the state has historically had a limited presence, and can strengthen societal structures, build the capacity of communities to meet their own immediate needs and establish links with other local actors. There is potential to support local processes of state- and society-building by bringing together different groups (inside and outside the state) around shared service delivery problems. This seems to be a particularly valuable approach where capacity and resource constraints are significant.

Visibility

Another key issue was whether the greater visibility of NGOs in service provision, relative to the state, undermines state legitimacy and therefore the sustainability of services in the longer term. Respondents interviewed uniformly identified NGOs rather than the government as their service delivery providers, and reported problems with provision to NGOs rather than local authorities. This is not necessarily surprising given low levels of capacity and resourcing for local government. But it does pose a challenge for organisations like Tearfund, which are seeking to support the development of local institutions and build local authority capacity.

In Aweil, the benefits of Tearfund's WASH programme were clearly credited to Tearfund (rather than to the government, Tearfund's partner in site selection and programme reporting). One village leader said that he used to go to the *payam* office to request services, but nothing ever came of these requests. The *payam* authority was perceived as unresponsive to local needs ('why continue to ask for something that will never come?' was the reported response). As state structures evolve there may be greater opportunities to support forms of joint delivery which can bring communities and local government actors together, but these may need to be more visible to local populations if they are to convince people that the government should be responsible for service provision. Other suggestions include removing some of the 'branding' of programmes, for example signs highlighting Tearfund support, co-branding with the government and increasing the involvement of *payam* and county leaders, for example in workshops and programme handover ceremonies.

Conclusion

This research has provided extremely useful insights for Tearfund WASH programming. It has revealed a number of key areas where policy commitments are not yet being fully realised in practice, and where there is greater scope to take better account of a range of peace- and state-building dynamics in decisions on programme design and implementation. This will require a shift in culture and working practices, greater understanding of peace- and state-building and increased monitoring of local political and conflict dynamics (and

recognition of where humanitarian programmes fit within this). For technical WASH advisers and programmes, this could be achieved by partnering with organisations that specialise in conflict analysis or peace- and state-building and pursuing more joint work with other NGOs.

This research aims to help stimulate Tearfund to look at how its WASH programming can incorporate peace- and state-building most effectively. But equally it is hoped that some of the findings will also resonate across other organisations and service sectors.

Sarah Pickwick is a Policy Officer at Tearfund. This article draws on research carried out by the Overseas Development Institute and reports written by Leni Wild, Michelle Kooy and Nat Mason (*Tearfund WASH Service Delivery in South Sudan: Contributions to Peace Building and State Building and Examining the role of WASH Services within Peace and State Building Processes*, both ODI, 2012) and by Sue Yardley (*Double Dividends: Exploring How Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Programmes Can Contribute to Peace- and State-building*, Tearfund, 2012).

Comparing the efficiency, effectiveness and impact of food and cash for work interventions: lessons from South Sudan

Manfred Metz, Melha Biel, Henry A. Kenyi and Anastasia Guretskaya

While recent years have seen a shift towards alternative food assistance instruments in emergency and transition situations, hard evidence on their performance is limited. To help fill this gap, the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and in collaboration with researchers from the University of Juba, South Sudan, conducted a comparative study on the efficiency, effectiveness and impact of food for work (FFW) and cash for work (CFW) interventions. Analysis of the data reveals that, irrespective of differences in livelihoods among the respondents, CFW performs better than FFW on indicators such as cost-efficiency, expenditure autonomy, dietary diversification, quality of works and participants' preferences.

Project setting and hypothesis: does the socio-economic context matter?

The evaluation took place in the context of a BMZ-funded Transitional Aid Project in Magwi and Morobo counties in South Sudan, with an FFW component and a subsequent CFW component. The main focus of the project is livelihood support for returning refugees and local inhabitants. For the purpose of the study, two rounds of household surveys with a total sample size of 332 respondents were conducted: a first round in autumn 2010, to collect baseline data, and a second round in spring 2011.

One question about the performance of CFW and FFW relates to their feasibility and suitability in different socio-economic contexts. Since cash transfers are only successful if the money can be used to purchase goods and services, it is often assumed that CFW is less suitable in very early post-conflict scenarios, where people are still displaced, markets are disrupted and infrastructure is damaged. A livelihood analysis conducted as part of the study led to the initial hypothesis that FFW was more appropriate in Magwi than in Morobo. While food consumption scores in both Magwi and Morobo counties were very poor, with the vast majority of respondents reporting having suffered food shortages in the past, the overall situation in Morobo appeared more consolidated than in Magwi, and a higher number of Morobo households had been settled or returned for longer. Families in Morobo were bigger on average, and had more land and assets. Moreover, markets in Morobo appeared to be better supplied than those in Magwi: 47% of interviewees in Morobo reported occasional shortages of basic food items on local markets, compared to 73% in Magwi. Given that food needs were likely to be greater in Magwi and cash of less use because markets were not functioning properly, FFW was expected to perform better.

Comparative analysis

The overall aim of the research was to compare the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of the CFW and FFW projects in Magwi and Morobo. Effectiveness was defined as the extent to which the interventions' immediate objectives were achieved, measured by the timeliness of payments and the targeting of individuals most at risk. Efficiency was measured by the relation of project inputs and outputs (i.e. cost-efficiency). Finally, impact relates to the wider effects of the intervention, such as the contribution of CFW/FFW to household income and the impact on food consumption, local markets and the work mentality of participants.

Effectiveness: beneficiary targeting and timeliness of payments

Targeting the poorest section of the community through a mix of self-targeting and administrative criteria was relatively successful: 72% of participants in Magwi and 90% in Morobo assessed their own livelihood situation as being either destitute or poor. In both counties, around 60% of the participants cultivated 1–3 *feddan*, while the share of non-participants with land of over three *feddan* was significantly higher than that of participants.[1] On the other hand, the share of non-participants cultivating less than one *feddan* was higher than among participants. What is more, participants in Magwi indicated owning more household assets and livestock than non-participants. There was also some

1 One *feddan* = 60 x 70m.

Cash in South Sudan

during critical months when there is a lack of alternative income and employment opportunities. Based on income at poverty-line level (SDG 72.9 per capita per month) and an average household size of 7.5, the CFW/FFW participants could receive, on average, up to 55% of the monthly income required to reach the poverty line, if they were paid for 20 working days per month. Owing to the repeated suspension of works, on average income amounted to 41% of monthly poverty line income.

With CFW payments, beneficiaries were able to buy what they chose. While many FFW participants usually sold part of the food ration to generate cash for other expenditures (despite in many cases not achieving the full market price for their sales), the majority of CFW participants spent a major portion of their payments on buying food. CFW therefore provides greater autonomy of choice for beneficiaries.

evidence that working group chairs played an important role in selecting participants, especially in Magwi, where the supply of workers was higher than the demand for them.

According to the results of the first survey, around half of the FFW participants did not receive payments on time, partly due to difficulties in procuring food items from Uganda. CFW payments were generally received on time or with only minor delays.

Efficiency: cost, value and time
Overall, the project costs for FFW rations (including procurement, transport and handling) were some 20% (SDG 3) below the local market value of the FFW rations in 2010, i.e. less than the money needed to buy the same food basket on local markets. Even so, FFW cannot definitely be described as cost-efficient since the costs for project staff could not be included in the calculation, and FFW rations were of poorer quality than food sold on the markets. Due to the low quality of the food distributed, FFW rations fell short of the value of CFW payments (which were based on the market value of food baskets). This meant that CFW recipients could buy more and/or better food.

In terms of time expenditure, FFW appears to be less attractive since managing logistics, coordinating food transport from Uganda and distributing rations absorbs a large amount of time. Project staff report that handling cash is much less demanding.

Impact: household income, markets and consumption
CFW and FFW interventions do not provide a full income, but rather a complementary source of household revenue

Both FFW and CFW participants reported changes in their household food consumption habits, mainly in the form of more meals per day or more food per meal. However, only CFW participants stated that they also ate different types of food, an indicator of increased food diversity.

The research was not able to provide evidence that CFW or FFW had had any significant impact on the local food market since the volume of food rations and cash payments made under the programme was too small to affect aggregate supply and demand. Also, impacts on the availability of some seasonally sold food items could not be measured by the surveys. It is likely that local markets would respond to increased demand should CFW, and consequently the availability of cash, be expanded.

In terms of participants' preferences and attitude to work, project staff and beneficiaries alike report that CFW has a positive impact on work mentality and on the quality of the work done. While communities tend to view FFW as a charitable operation, CFW is considered an employment opportunity. This positive work attitude also reflects a preference for CFW revealed by the surveys. Although this preference was observed when FFW alone was being offered by the project, far more community members expressed an interest in participating when CFW activities started. Interestingly, a higher percentage of female than male participants declared a preference for FFW or a combination of CFW and FFW.

SOUTH SUDAN AT A CROSSROADS

Table 1: A preliminary set of conditions favouring or precluding alternative transfer modalities

Condition	FFW	CFW	FFW/CFW mix	Vouchers	eVouchers /eCash
Absence of local food markets	XX	– –	– –	– –	– –
Emerging local food markets	X	X	XX	X	o
Functioning local food markets	–	XX	X	X	o
Food surpluses in programme area	–	XX	–	XX	o
Food shortages in programme area	XX	–	–	–	–
Functioning cash economy	–	XX	X	X	X
Financial infrastructure in place	–	X	X	o	o
Local food market outlets	–	XX	–	XX	X
High food price inflation	XX	–	X	XX	o
Volatile food prices	XX	–	X	X	o
Mobile phone network coverage	o	O	o	o	XX
Logistical and management capacities for food procurement and distribution	X	O	X	o	o
High levels of corruption/weak control	X	– –	–	X	X
High criminal threat to security	X	–	–	XX	X
Cost-efficiency	–	XX	–	X	XX

Key: XX = favourable, X =feasible, – = not favourable, – – = precluded, O = undetermined

Lessons

The main message from the study is clear and precise: to shift, as much and as rapidly as possible, from FFW to CFW in Morobo and Magwi counties. Even in Magwi, despite the difficult socio-economic conditions, the wider application of CFW is justified. The strong preference among participants for cash calls for an expansion of activities in and beyond these two counties, the identification of additional resources, public works and alternative payment modalities and better targeting approaches in view of the high demand for CFW. Early and repeated analyses of local food markets, cost-efficiency aspects and beneficiaries' preferences may be difficult in transitional settings, but they are clearly indicated when choosing a suitable method of food assistance or expanding a specific intervention.

While the South Sudan analysis is not directly transferrable to other countries and scenarios, the following general lessons can be drawn from it. First, cash instruments should not be dismissed in the planning phase simply on the basis of preliminary assumptions about livelihoods. Rather, an early, and possibly repeated, analysis and review of food assistance instruments applied in transition situations should be the standard approach. Such an assessment will have to consider current and changing needs, the market situation, cost-efficiency, the institutional infrastructure, management capacity and beneficiaries' preferences. If changes are observed, project strategies and instruments will need to be adjusted accordingly. Table 1, informed by the results of the study and other research conducted by the authors, lists the issues that should be considered when deciding on suitable food assistance instruments and payment modalities.

The second lesson from Magwi and Morobo is that participants' preferences are just as important as an analysis of markets and infrastructure. The analysis shows that beneficiaries' satisfaction contributes to the success and quality of the work done. In this regard, it is not advisable to implement a combination of FFW and CFW, or parallel implementation in different sites, if one option is clearly favoured over the other. Given the growing consensus that interventions in early transition scenarios should contribute to capacity-building and coping, insights about participants' expenditure autonomy, preferences and work mentality indicate important advantages of CFW over FFW – and probably not just in South Sudan. The risk with FFW is not only that it might hamper and distort local food markets, but that it might also make it harder for beneficiaries to achieve independence and resilience. Experience in Magwi and Morobo shows that following community preferences will attract more participants. Consequently, whichever instrument is chosen, targeting has to be adjusted to local demands and needs, as well as to gender differences.

Manfred Metz and **Anastasia Guretskaya** are consultants. **Melha Biel** and **Henry A. Kenyi** are members of the University of Juba.

Maintaining NGO space in South Sudan: the importance of independent NGO coordination in complex operating environments

Nick Helton and Ivor Morgan

The South Sudan NGO Forum is widely recognised as playing a key role in humanitarian coordination in South Sudan. This article identifies key precedents, principles and modalities which may be useful in strengthening NGO coordination in other situations, while recognising that the unique context in South Sudan has shaped the evolution of the Forum.

The South Sudan NGO Forum and Secretariat

Although the history of the NGO Forum can be traced back to the early 1990s, when it was established to improve NGO representation within Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the mechanism in place today has changed considerably with the addition of a formal membership application process, membership fees and a full-time Secretariat, including specialised positions in policy, access, information management and national NGOs, funded with money from government donors and through membership fees. Operating under a clear set of statutes and a Scope of Services document setting out the services the Secretariat provides to its members, the Secretariat facilitates information sharing and representation for the majority of international NGOs in South Sudan and an estimated one-third of national NGOs. The Forum is guided by a 12-member Steering Committee of elected NGOs, including two representatives from the national NGO community, which also has its own Steering Committee.

The need for independent NGO coordination

The context in South Sudan has changed dramatically in the last five years. While there has long been a need to ensure the coherent representation of NGO interests in South Sudan, the nature of that representation has evolved significantly since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. The number of international NGOs in the country has increased considerably, and there is a growing community of national NGOs and civil society organisations involved in the provision of assistance and active in areas such as advocacy and governance accountability.

Greater attention to development issues has resulted in a proliferation of UN, donor and government-led coordination frameworks and funding mechanisms, including Budget Sector Working Groups, the South Sudan Recovery Fund and the former Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), with which NGOs have had to learn to engage. The government of South Sudan at both central and state level has taken greater interest in regulating the work of NGOs in the country, especially since independence in July 2011. However, inconsistencies between state and federal regulatory frameworks and responsibilities, and differences in the way they are interpreted and implemented, have at times disrupted NGO programmes and contributed to an increasingly restrictive operating environment for NGOs. Ensuring the safety and security of NGO personnel and their access to populations in need has also become more challenging. Addressing these problems has required robust and unified advocacy from NGOs, both directly with the government and with donors, diplomats and the UN. The South Sudan NGO Forum provides NGOs with a credible, strong, consistent and objective voice when engaging with governments, donors and UN agencies. The Secretariat is able to rapidly develop positions and briefs on critical time-sensitive issues related to humanitarian space and humanitarian funding.

Principles, precedents and practices

From its beginnings in the mid-1990s, the Forum has played a key role in representing NGOs in coordination meetings with the UN, donors and Southern Sudanese counterparts. This significantly contributed to enshrining formal NGO involvement in national humanitarian coordination frameworks, including the new Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and the cluster system. Although the majority of the Secretariat's funding comes from one institutional donor, it has maintained its independence and neutrality, and the long-term and flexible nature of current funding arrangements helps to ensure greater continuity of Secretariat staff and sustained engagement on important issues. NGO membership fees provide additional financial resources, and the flexibility to respond to new or emerging issues. National NGOs pay a flat annual fee and international NGOs are on a sliding scale, amounting to approximately 0.01% of their budget. The Secretariat can waive fees for organisations not able to pay, and no NGO has ever been turned away because it could not afford the fees.

Membership of the Forum has increased from approximately 65 international NGOs in 2007 to 136 at the start of 2013, and 92 national NGOs, both as a result of an increased influx of international NGOs and the emergence of national organisations after independence. The broad range of actors in the Forum – international and national NGOs involved in both humanitarian and development work – adds significant credibility to Forum messaging.

The Forum's services to its members and its activities are guided by five 'main aims': communication/information sharing, engagement, policy development, national NGO capacity development and security information management. The Secretariat represents Forum members on a wide range of issues, including funding, humanitarian space, development policy, safety and security and the regulatory environment. Secretariat staff maintain a comprehensive overview of the situation in South Sudan, and provide relevant analysis and advice to NGOs on a wide range of topics. Forum members participate in thematic working groups which inform the Secretariat and provide a consultation mechanism for policy development. Critical to the success of the Secretariat is ensuring systematised

SOUTH SUDAN AT A CROSSROADS

NGO Secretariat Policy Focal Point in a panel discussion with university students in Juba

and safe information sharing to NGOs and relevant and regular information sharing to external stakeholders. For example, the Forum website (www.SouthSudanNGOForum. org) contains publicly accessible information about South Sudan, as well as a wealth of material that is only available to Forum members.

The Secretariat also ensures NGO representation at key meetings and forums in South Sudan, including the HCT, the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) Advisory Board and the South Sudan Recovery Fund (SSRF) Steering Committee, as well as at external events such as the ICVA annual conference and the NGO Coordination Dialogue, an external annual meeting of NGO coordination platforms facilitated by InterAction. It also provides technical input in working groups, including the Civil–Military Advisory Group (CMAG), the Humanitarian Access Working Group and the Security Cell, which reports to the Security Management Team (SMT), on which the Secretariat is also represented. Wherever possible, the NGO Forum seeks to have at least two representatives at all meetings, one from the Secretariat and one elected from NGOs.

Although NGO membership on some committees is well-established, in other cases it can be a struggle to ensure that NGO representatives are included as integral members of committees, or are invited to relevant meetings. It is also important to ensure that NGO representatives are well-informed, understand NGO perspectives on the topics under discussion and are able to contribute constructively to the meeting. This can be a challenge if meetings are called at short notice or without clear agendas, making it difficult to consult the NGO community in advance. Sustaining the means to hire and retain experienced staff, able to effectively dialogue with national-level government

Box 1: NGO engagement in the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)

The CHF for Sudan was established in 2006. Although it was a country-wide fund, it included a regional envelope for South Sudan, which was allocated through a Juba-based mechanism. Based on experiences gained through the allocation and management of this regional envelope, NGOs were able to engage in the design of the South Sudan CHF, which was established after independence in 2011. The NGO Secretariat consolidated NGO comments on the draft Terms of Reference (ToR) for the CHF, and provided additional insights based on discussions with NGO participants in the CHF and a review of briefing papers prepared in 2011 on developmental funding mechanisms. Many of the recommendations made by NGOs were included in the final ToR, and have proved an important point of reference when discussing implementation of the new fund.

NGOs are represented on the CHF Advisory Board by a Secretariat representative (representing the entire NGO community), and a representative elected from the NGO community (who is able to speak on behalf of their constituency, and address in detail any challenges faced by NGOs). The technical clusters all include an NGO 'co-lead' (although the precise terminology for this role varies), who is fully involved in the CHF allocation process, and the cluster Peer Review Teams (PRTs), which review and recommend projects for CHF funding, have at least two more NGO representatives, including at least one representative from a national NGO (if any national NGOs have applied for funding from that cluster). Despite the inevitable challenges when limited resources need to be allocated under significant time pressures, these arrangements are generally seen to be functioning reasonably well.

HUMANITARIAN
exchange

officials and participate in national-level coordination meetings, is critical. As the Secretariat staff are full-time representatives and often external interlocutors' first point of contact with the NGO community, the calibre of staff has a huge impact on the quality of engagement and the credibility and reputation of the Forum. The staffing structure of the Secretariat reflects its five main aims and focal points are assigned to and asked to monitor and engage in areas where they have specific expertise (such as security or policy development). In most cases, Secretariat staff have significant field experience with NGOs in South Sudan or similar contexts, which ensures contextual understanding and provides credibility both when dealing with NGO members, and when representing the interests of NGOs to other actors.

Conclusion

While there are a unique set of reasons why the Forum and Secretariat have grown influential and credible, the driving principles behind the Forum and precedents set through progressive coordination models (for example, the recent agreement with UNHCR regarding an NGO co-coordinator position for the refugee response) are allowing for broader dialogue on NGO coordination, and resourcing for younger coordination platforms in other countries. The Secretariat increasingly participates in global discussions on NGO coordination (e.g. the NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project) and engages with the Humanitarian Reform/ Transformative Agenda by providing advice and pushing

principles to maintain consistent NGO representation on national and sub-national coordination fora.

The South Sudan NGO Secretariat may serve as a useful model for NGO coordination and representation in other contexts. The Forum and Secretariat have grown out of a long history and firm establishment, gaining the approval of the government and a strong reputation amongst the UN and donor communities. This has allowed for a progressive and innovative approach giving the NGO community a strong foothold in humanitarian and development coordination decision-making.

Value comes from the way the structure has developed, which has been responsive, proactive and relevant to issues that NGOs collectively find important, through working within and influencing existing mechanisms. Staffing the Secretariat with credible individuals respected by members and external actors ensures inclusiveness and active participation from members and credibility in the eyes of external actors. The premise is to encourage cooperation and information-sharing from a consolidated position, and build on acceptance and credibility in forums and groups.

Nick Helton and **Ivor Morgan** work with the South Sudan NGO Forum Secretariat. The views expressed in this article should not necessarily be ascribed to any individual member of the Forum.

Managing acute malnutrition at scale: a review of donor and government financing arrangements

Jeremy Shoham, Carmel Dolan and Lola Gostelow
Network Paper 75, April 2013

Since it was first piloted in Ethiopia in 1999, community-based management of acute malnutrition (CMAM) has been adopted in over 65 countries; in 2011, just under two million children under five years of age were admitted to CMAM programmes. Yet this represents just a fraction of the global caseload of severe acute malnutrition. Levels of financial investment in nutrition interventions are extremely low, and aid is not necessarily directed to the countries where most of the world's undernourished children live.

This Network Paper looks at the financing arrangements for the community-based management of acute malnutrition at scale. It covers humanitarian financing, as well as financing through transitional and development channels; country-level experiences of CMAM financing, with a particular focus on Kenya, Ethiopia, Malawi and Nigeria; the sustainability of CMAM programming; and the appropriate division of roles between the main UN agencies involved. The lessons drawn from this review are specific to current efforts towards achieving CMAM programming at scale. However, they may also have relevance to scaling up nutrition programming in general, and may be of relevance to other sectors.

Humanitarian Practice Network

The Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) is an independent forum where field workers, managers and policymakers in the humanitarian sector share information, analysis and experience.

HPN's aim is to improve the performance of humanitarian action by contributing to individual and institutional learning.

HPN's activities include:

- A series of specialist publications: *Humanitarian Exchange* magazine, Network Papers and Good Practice Reviews.
- A resource website at www.odihpn.org.
- Occasional seminars and workshops bringing together practitioners, policymakers and analysts.

HPN's members and audience comprise individuals and organisations engaged in humanitarian action. They are in 80 countries worldwide, working in northern and southern NGOs, the UN and other multilateral agencies, governments and donors, academic institutions and consultancies. HPN's publications are written by a similarly wide range of contributors.

HPN's institutional location is the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), an independent think tank on humanitarian and development policy. HPN's publications are researched and written by a wide range of individuals and organisations, and are published by HPN in order to encourage and facilitate knowledge-sharing within the sector. The views and opinions expressed in HPN's publications do not necessarily state or reflect those of the Humanitarian Policy Group or the Overseas Development Institute.