As pressure to support facilitated population movements and returns increases, Leslye Rost van Tonningen, CSRF Director, assesses some of the conflict sensitivity risks and opportunities that the aid community must account for during this process.

 

As the implementation of the peace process slowly moves forward, five out of the six Protection of Civilians[1] sites that have been in place since 2013 have now transitioned to IDP camps, managed by the government. Meanwhile, planning for the census and subsequent elections has begun, and there is increased discussion around durable solutions and facilitating population movements for returns or resettlement within both the government and the aid community. As these changes gather pace, it is important to recognise and account for the fact that population movements and returns have the potential to exacerbate tensions between communities, be co-opted by political interests, and/or destabilise a fragile situation.  All aid agencies and donors are committed to contributing to sustainable peace in South Sudan – systematically looking at conflict sensitivity considerations within decision making, planning for and implementation of the returns process is a key step in achieving this.

 

Population movements, returns and conflict sensitivity

To put the scale of the challenge in perspective, we can reflect on the number of people who may be returning to their areas of origin or habitual residence, or to areas where they would like to permanently resettle.  Currently, there are an estimated 3.8 million South Sudanese outside of their areas of origin or habitual residence – 2.2 million refugees and 1.6 million IDPs. The CSRF’s paper South Sudan’s Demography: Looking to 2050 estimated that South Sudan’s population was just under 12 million people by 2018, with the current population estimated at just over 12 million people. This means that this process could involve approximately 25% of South Sudan’s population, based on 2018 estimates. It would be safe to say that population movements for returns/resettlement, even those that happen over an extended period, have the potential to destabilise already tense situations in parts of the country, such as Upper Nile, Unity, Jonglei and parts of the Equatorias.

As many colleagues and agencies regularly point out and as outlined in the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions – all returns or resettlements should be voluntary, safe, dignified and informed, and adhere to international standards. We believe that they should also be conflict sensitive. This means seeing them in the context of the broader impact that conflict-related displacements and occupations have had on changes to land ownership or administrative control, as can be seen places like Yei, Nimule, Wau and other parts of the country. Decision makers within donors and aid agencies need to have a nuanced understanding of the factors that can make the resolution of these issues challenging and consider how population movements have and could impact on contested claims to land or potentially bolster contested administrative control over resources. Any decision making, planning or programming to facilitate population movements should take these types of issues into consideration and be adjusted to minimize potential negative consequences, actively monitor for unintended consequences, and adjust as needed to maximise positive impact. Finally, pushing to address certain humanitarian needs now without due consideration for conflict sensitivity could result in conflict that could create greater humanitarian needs in the future. Gaps in service provision or in the aid community’s response to meeting the humanitarian needs of IDPS in areas where they have been displaced to should not be used to justify supporting population movements, if analysis finds that supporting such movements risks contributing to future conflict or violence.

A conflict sensitivity analysis can help to unpack some of these issues. It should seek, at a minimum, to answer the questions below:

What do we want to knowHow can we find out
Why is there conflict? Who drives it and can stop it? Who is affected by it?Conduct an analysis of conflict causes and drivers, actors and dynamics/ systems, taking into account local, national and regional levels.
So what? What does it have to do with our work?Review how our political positions, country strategies, programmes/ projects and operational practices are fuelling conflicts or contributing to peace; and are addressing conflict impacts.
What should we do about it? Is there need to change the way we work?Discuss and make decisions to adapt policies, strategies and programmes/ projects so that they do not fuel conflicts or empower conflict actors; and if possible, contribute to peace

 

As outlined in the CSRF’s Conflict Sensitivity Analysis in the Malakal and Bentiu Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites and the Protection Risk Assessments in those same PoCs (unpublished) – concerns about the peaceful resolution of outstanding housing, land and property (HLP) issues are a key consideration for individual decision-making, particularly where changes in the ownership or control of land due to the displacement of populations has benefitted national, sub-national or local elites. Fundamentally, however, these concerns tend to reflect broader conflict between groups or interests over access to and administrative control over land and resources, and agencies should resist the urge to see them as technical housing, land and property issues that need to be or can be resolved at an individual level. As noted by an agency active in developing durable solutions – Of key importance in South Sudan is to consider where requisite support to returning, relocating, or integrating populations may be politically motivated or instrumentalised by armed or political groups or may be delivered in a way that would affect particular groups over others. 

 

Planning for the Census

There are plans to hold a census in 2022 and the aid community should expect the government to ask agencies and donors to actively facilitate the return of refugees or IDPs to their areas of origin or habitual residence as part of this. This is understandable – having an accurate population count will be critical with regards to decisions on electoral representation, as well as the longer-term planning for services and other critical infrastructure. In preparation for this, UNFPA and the National Bureau for Statistics is conducting a remote population estimate, with preliminary results expected in July.

However, the aid community also needs to ask if “returns” for this specific purpose can be classed as voluntary or informed, or if they really can be seen as a durable solution. Ensuring that there is as accurate a population count as possible throughout the country should not override other considerations. The issues outlined in CSRF’s December 2019 briefing paper Returns and Peace in South Sudan: Challenges, opportunities and the way forward are still relevant today, and considering how the potential return, relocation or resettlement of almost a quarter of South Sudan’s population could affect relations between communities, residents and new arrivals or bolster other considerations with regards to the control over land and other natural resources by various conflict or political actors will be critical.

We should also recognise that there are interests among all R-ARCSS signatories (and non-signatories) with regards to population counts, which are also intertwined with historical resentments, tensions and feelings of marginalisation between groups or communities in South Sudan. Only by regularly assessing and reflecting on how facilitated population movements or returns could increase or minimise these tensions or contribute to potential conflicts will donors and agencies ensure that support to returns is provided in conflict sensitive ways.

 

The way forward?

In 2019, it was noted in the paper Returns in complex environments: the case of South Sudan and elsewhere, that the situation in South Sudan was not conducive to facilitated population movements or returns under conditions of safety and dignity. Today, while there may be parts of the country where this is feasible, before decisions are made the situation needs to be assessed on a location-by-location basis. To be clear no one, as far as we know, is calling for or suggesting the wholescale halting of facilitated population movements to areas where conditions on the ground are found to be conducive. Nor have there been calls for an exhaustive, country-wide assessment of conflict sensitivity risks and opportunities to be conducted before decisions are made – this type of exercise could take months and be out of date as soon as it is published.

The onus, rather, must be on the aid community to ensure there is effective coordination on facilitating population movements for returns or resettlement, and demonstrate that the situation on the ground is conducive to such movements. According to the IASC Framework, a ‘return’ is considered only to be suitable when there is a realistic possibility of reintegration at the place of origin/habitual residence.  Furthermore, the Framework notes ‘Humanitarian and development actors have to analyze the linkages between conflict and displacement to understand how peace processes can strengthen the potential for durable solutions (and vice versa)[2]. This means that the decision making on facilitated population movements needs to consider more than the logistics of moving people from one place to another, but importantly to take into account the longer-term considerations with regards to reintegration and conflict dynamics.

Conducting ongoing and smaller scale analysis and assessments that are publicly shared and discussed at both the sub-national and national levels before any decision is made would be a first step of assessing suitability. Any assessments of potential areas of facilitated population movements for return or resettlement should use a conflict sensitivity lens and include (at a minimum) a review of the history of tensions in the specific area that would be impacted by this. It should also consider whether humanitarian support risks enflaming tensions, could result in implicitly supporting the claim of one group over another, or entrenching elite interests. It is also important that these assessments also consider the history of conflict in the wider area and any local, sub-national or national interests that either support or oppose the movement of people. None of these considerations run counter to the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, independence and humanity, however, they will require donors and agencies to ask tough questions with regards to whether facilitating movements of IDPs to meet or address immediate needs could result in longer-term negative consequences.

 

Conclusion

By considering conflict sensitivity opportunities/risks early in the process, and continuously monitoring and re-evaluating the impact, the aid community will be better able to inform its decision-making, as well as allow for evidence-based discussions with the government and authorities at the national, state and county levels. This should ultimately allow us to make better decisions about where and when our support for population movements or returns may or may not be appropriate. In the absence of this, the aid community risks inadvertently contributing to conflict in South Sudan.

Recommendations for donors and aid agencies:

  • Consider giving the national level Advisory Group on Solutions responsibility for reviewing and endorsing proposed facilitated population movements and returns to ensure conflict sensitivity is adequately considered. The Advisory Group on Solutions provides a useful forum for aid agencies to discuss potential conflict sensitivity issues. It should continue to hold regular meetings that involve key humanitarian stakeholders, with conflict sensitivity considerations a standard agenda item to regularly monitor and assess the impact of both potential population movements/returns AND the actual impact of these, recommending adjustments to plans/programmes as needed. It could then provide regular updates on and endorsements for facilitated population movements and returns to the ICCG, HCT and HCT+.
  • Decisions to support returns should be based on assessments that explicitly include, and document, a conflict sensitivity component. Assessments conducted AFTER the decision has been made to support returns risks confirmation bias and are of little value for the decision-making process. Furthermore, an ahistorical, snapshot approach to assessments that only engage with the departing or receiving communities risks being blind to conflict sensitivity risks, and should not be used to justify or support returns. Tools will be made available in the future on the CSRF website and technical support to incorporate conflict sensitivity into this process is available from the CSRF through our HelpDesk.
  • Assessing conflict sensitivity should be seen as an ongoing process, as opposed to a ‘one off’ event. At each step of the process – decision making, assessing, planning, implementing – the potential for the aid community’s actions to fuel conflict or tensions should be assessed. This could be included in standard operating procedures (SOPs) at the national level for all agencies involved in facilitating population movements or returns. As part of the SOPs wider remit for ‘due diligence’, they should include how and when conflict sensitivity and protection assessments are conducted, how the aid community should respond to government and community requests for returns and how to prevent them being co-opted. Revitalising the HCT+ guidance and strengthening it from a conflict sensitivity perspective, as well as providing clarity on the decision-making process, would be a good first step. Agencies that do not include conflict sensitivity or identify and consider conflict risks in their assessments should be held to account by their peers and donors through an HCT+ level monitoring mechanism.
  • Donors should require agencies to provide evidence that conflict dynamics have been considered as part of any facilitated population movement or returns process. Ultimately, donors are best placed to hold their implementing partners accountable for incorporating conflict risk and conflict sensitivity considerations into their planning and implementation activities. Donor governments are actively seeking to hold the Government of South Sudan accountable for the implementation of the revitalised peace agreement and ensuring that South Sudan’s future is peaceful. They should be holding those they fund accountable for ensuring programmes are not inadvertently undermining this.

 

 

[1] Juba (2), Bentiu, Wau and Bor PoC sites have all transitioned, while the sixth PoC, in Malakal, has not yet been transitioned.

[2] IASC (2010), Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, Brookings Institute, April, pg 24.