Wau County, Western Bahr el-Ghazal State

DEMOGRAPHY

2008 NBS Census population: 151,320
2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 208,487
2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 320,752

Ethnic groups: Balanda (Viri, Bor), other ‘Fertit’ groups**, Luo/‘Jur Chol’, Rek Dinka***

Displacement Figures Q3 2022: 26,390 IDPs (-20,165 Q1 2020) and 175,728 returnees (+26,718 Q1 2020)

IPC Food Security: November 2022 – Crisis (Phase 3); IPC Projections: December 2022 to March 2023 – Crisis (Phase 3); April to July 2023 – Crisis (Phase 3)

ECONOMY & LIVELIHOODS

Wau County is located in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State. It borders Raja County to the west and Jur River County to the east. It also borders Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State (Aweil Centre County) to the north and Western Equatoria State (Tambura and Nagero counties) to the south.

The county falls within the western plains groundnuts, sesame and sorghum livelihoods zone (FEWSNET 2018). The FAO and WFP (2017) estimated that 57% of households in Wau relied on subsistence farming as their main livelihood activity in 2016, increasing to 65% by 2021. In 2021, gross cereal yields were estimated to be 1.35 tonnes per hectare, declining slightly to 1.3 tonnes per hectare in 2022 (FAO/WFP 2023). Fishing and livestock rearing were also identified as key livelihoods within the county. The most popular crops are cassava and sorghum, closely followed by groundnuts. Vegetables, sesame (simsim), and maize are also cultivated to lesser degrees. Other livelihoods activities include producing charcoal, and selling small goods such as second-hand clothes, cooking oil, salt and sugar. Imported goods from neighbouring countries are also available, particularly from Sudan and Uganda, due to trade routes that run through the county. Wau town has a major market in the central area of town, as well as a number of smaller markets that serve the local population. It lies along historical trade and transportation routes, and as a result communities in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and Warrap rely on Wau town as a feeder market for goods.

Sustained insecurity around Wau County impacted the ability of farmers to maintain their crops, particularly during key planting and harvesting periods. As a result, this has led to a change in food insecurity levels in the county. The IPC projected the county as being at a crisis (IPC level 3) level of food insecurity in November 2022, with conditions projected to persist at the same level until at least July 2023.

INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICES

The headquarters of Wau County is currently located in Baggari Payam, although Wau town is the capital of Western Bahr el-Ghazal State. As the state capital, Wau also hosts many government institutions that are critical for the functioning of the state. Although the county capital was moved from Wau to Baggari in late 2012, government institutions are still located in Wau town to maintain accessibility for the local population. The decision to move the county capital was highly contested and is discussed in the section on ‘conflict dynamics’ below.

The county has several churches and mosques present in the area, reflecting its mixed religious composition and historical linkages to Sudan. In addition to Wau Airport, one of only four tarmacked airstrips in the country, the town also contains hubs for inter-state public transport.

Wau County is home to thirty-four (34) Early Childhood Development centres, one hundred and twenty-three (123) primary schools and thirty-six (36) secondary schools (one of which is located in Baggari Payam, with the remainder located throughout Wau North and Wau South payams).**** Wau’s reputation as a centre of learning mean that its secondary schools and university draw students from across the county, state and country. Wau County is home to Mbili Girls National Teacher Training Institute located in Wau South Payam. The county also hosts the University of Western Bahr el-Ghazal, which is one of a handful of public higher education institutions in South Sudan.

Wau County was reported to have fifty-one (51) health facilities including thirty-seven (37) functional health facilities, among them nineteen (19) PHCUs, fourteen (14) PHCCs and four (4) hospitals in 2022. This means that there were an estimated 0.80 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 1.72 PHCCs per 50,000 people according to the WHO. Wau Teaching Hospital and the Daniel Comboni Hospital were reported to be moderately functional, while the and the Wau Military and Police Hospitals were reported to be operating at limited functionality.

OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023 estimates that there are over 182,800 people with humanitarian needs in the county (down from 197,800 in 2021), which is equivalent to nearly 57% of the estimated population for Wau County reported in the HNO. Humanitarian need is particularly acute in the areas of protection, gender-based violence, child protection, shelter and non-food items.

The spread of conflict between government and opposition forces to Western Bahr el-Ghazal in 2016 led to a large number of IDPs fleeing to Wau Town. As a result of the insecurity and displacement, UNMISS created and supported a Protection of Civilians (PoC) site in Wau town. In September 2020 UNMISS began to progressively withdraw its troops and police from the Wau PoC site as part of a wider redesignation of PoC sites to become IDP camps under the jurisdiction and protection of the government. Assessments conducted in Wau PoC between 2015 and 2019 indicated that many people in the camp suffered from persistent experiences of cumulative distress, mourning and grieving of multiple losses, acculturative stress, loneliness, anxiety, loss of self-esteem, strain and fatigue from cognitive overload and perceptions of inability to function completely in current circumstances.

CONFLICT DYNAMICS

Within the context of the Sudanese and then South Sudanese civil wars, conflict in Wau County has come to centre on the balance of power between various communities based in the area. Deteriorations in community relations have tended to overlap with periods of political change or military contestation affecting the area, creating conditions for political disputes to assume an ethnic inflection. In recent decades, conflict has increasingly converged on claims relating to community representation or ownership of Wau town itself.

Despite indications of historical cooperation, contemporary tensions between parts of the Dinka and ‘Fertit’** communities in Wau are partly rooted in the distinctive experiences different communities faced during periods of colonial and post-colonial administration. These also stem from experiences dating to the first Sudanese civil war (1955-1972) – which reverberated through Wau in the mid-1960s (Rone 1999) – alongside perceptions of unfavourable representation and employment prospects after the first civil war had ended. These tensions occurred in a context where ethnic politics had become more embedded in Southern Sudan, and would be exacerbated by administrative redivision during the inter-war years (Blocq 2014, pp.713-14; Thomas 2010, pp.106-7, 111, 115). Divisions were then further sharpened by co-occurring political polarisation and ethnicised violence during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005), as is discussed further below.

Tensions have been exacerbated by the perceived affiliation of parts of the communities that have links to Wau with government and opposition forces active in the area during the various civil wars. Meanwhile, conflict and famine have also played important roles in driving patterns of displacement to and from Wau town. Population movements have at points altered the ethnic composition of the town, and contributed to fears of marginalisation on the parts of some communities (Rone 1999). Moreover, actual or proposed changes to political boundaries or the location of administrative headquarters have become flashpoint issues. In recent years, administrative changes have tended to be perceived to favour particular communities at the expense of others, reviving dormant tensions that have sometimes re-escalated into conflict (Thomas 2010, pp.105-7).

Conflict and peacemaking in Wau during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005)

During the second civil war, Wau served as a government garrison and a hub for pro-government militia forces, while also fulfilling an important function as a staging ground for military offensives into SPLM/A-held areas (HRW 1993). Due to the political and economic significance of the town and the concentration of military, opposition, and militia forces in the county, predation and attacks by armed groups in the Wau area were common during the conflict, and resulted in significant displacement (Koop 2001, p.31).

In the mid-1980s, SPLM/A activity around Wau – alongside attacks on ‘Fertit’ villages – prompted the formation of a ‘Fertit’ militia known as Jesh al-Salam (Africa Watch 1990, pp.100-101; Amnesty International 1989, p.6; Blocq 2014, p.716), that is sometimes referred to as Qwat Salam (Vuylsteke 2018, fn.22). Tensions and attacks were reported in and around Wau between parts of the Dinka and Luo/‘Jur Chol’ communities (who were perceived to support the SPLM/A) and the ‘Fertit’ community (largely perceived as supporting the Sudan Armed Forces, SAF), escalating into a series of attacks across July and September 1987 that reportedly killed over 1,000 people.

During this period, alleged killings of Dinka and Luo civilians by ‘Fertit’ militia and SAF personnel alongside alleged killings of ‘Fertit’ civilians by other branches of the security services (including the predominantly Dinka police and wildlife forces) culminated in fighting in Wau town in September 1987 (Africa Watch 1990, pp.67-69, 157-58; Amnesty International 1989, p.6, 13, 26). In 1988, a local peace agreement was brokered, which included an amnesty for previous attacks, and steps to address perceived imbalances in the allocation of administrative positions (Blocq 2014, p.717).

Despite the agreement, periodic violence involving the SPLM/A, SAF, and affiliated militias continued over the following years (Amnesty International 1989, p.14, 26, 31), though the SPLM/A reportedly made inroads in building a support base among parts of the ‘Fertit’ community after 1991 (Vuylsteke 2018, p.6). Wau was besieged by the SPLM/A for much of the period between the mid-1980s and early 1998, when an unsuccessful SPLM/A operation to capture Wau and retaliatory attacks by the government and associated militia contributed to the displacement of many civilians (especially Dinka) and a significant change to the ethnic composition of the town (Rone 1999). Intermittent clashes between government and opposition forces would continue over the following years around Wau.

Wau during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and early independence years (2005-2011)

Following the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), a peace and reconciliation conference was held in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State to begin addressing outstanding tensions between the communities of the state, and legacies relating to the concentration of military and militia forces in and around Wau. In addition to encouraging forgiveness and a more optimistic vision for inter-ethnic co-operation in Wau, the conference sought to repair the economic damage wrought by the isolation of Wau town from its surroundings, and encourage the return of IDPs from Wau who had been displaced to Western Equatoria State (PACT Sudan 2006, p.182). Despite the conference being regarded as successful, the Small Arms Survey reported that some parts of the ‘Fertit’ community had concerns regarding their perceived lack of representation at the conference relative to some other communities (Vuylsteke 2018, p.6). Although tensions may have persisted, these did not deteriorate into violence during the CPA era, with Wau County being among the more stable areas of the country prior to independence in 2011.

In 2012, tensions would quickly escalate in Wau, drawing in various branches of the security sector. Following consultations in 2011, the governor of Western Bahr el-Ghazal decreed that the headquarters of Wau County would be relocated from Wau town to the village of Baggari in October 2012. Although the move was justified by the governor as being necessary to relieve the pressure on Wau’s administrative infrastructure (with the town serving as both the county headquarters and state capital) – while bringing development to the rural area of Baggari – the decision polarised relations between communities in Wau, and resulted in demonstrations and subsequent violence over the course of December 2012.

Amid reported politicisation of the issue, elements of the ‘Fertit’ community interpreted the move as a means of weakening ‘Fertit’ claims to Wau town relative to the Dinka community, through severing the connection between the ‘Fertit’ and Wau town (Amnesty International 2013, p.11; Jok 2012, pp.2-3; Vuylsteke 2018, pp.6-7). Protests against the relocation of the county headquarters took place in December 2012, with youth and politicians from the ‘Fertit’ community associated with the demonstrations (HRW 2013). As is detailed in a report by Amnesty International (2013, pp.6-13), demonstrations escalated following a number of interventions by security forces that resulted in several protesters being killed. Tensions further increased after reports emerged that several Dinka farm workers were allegedly killed at Farajallah village near Wau, resulting in reprisal attacks against members of the ‘Fertit’ community in Wau, and the torching of a significant number of dwellings. Following the violence, a number of arrests were made, with Human Rights Watch reporting that those arrested were largely from the ‘Fertit’ community (HRW 2013).

National conflict and R-ARCSS (2013-present)

Following the outbreak of the national conflict in December 2013, tensions gradually increased in Wau, with conflict occurring over several stages, and taking different forms. In particularly, localised conflicts relating to cattle became enmeshed in a brewing subnational conflict involving government and opposition forces, as increasingly sensitive issues relating to claims regarding ownership of Wau town were revived.

In April 2014, active conflict broke out between Nuer and Dinka soldiers and recruits at the SPLA training centre at Mapel in Jur River County in disputed circumstances, generating displacement to the Wau Protection of Civilians (PoC) site in the town (Small Arms Survey 2014). This was followed by a heightened security presence in Wau that resulted in a number of prominent ‘Fertit’ elites fleeing the town, including individuals linked to the ‘Fertit’ militia from the second civil war (Vuylsteke 2018, p.7). In 2015, the movement of mostly Dinka pastoralists into southern areas of Wau County contributed to violence between some pastoralist and agriculturalist communities (Vuylsteke 2018, p.8; Small Arms Survey 2023). Armed groups – some under the banner of the ‘Fertit Lions’ – aligned with the SPLA-IO, and recruited from some communities who had been affected by the clashes with pastoralists (Vuylsteke 2018, p.8).

In May 2015, clashes were reported between SPLA-IO and SPLA forces in the Bazia area south of Wau. Clashes reportedly continued following the signing of the 2015 peace agreement between the government and opposition (Radio Tamazuj 2015). Alongside these events, security forces increased their presence in affected rural areas, and also in Wau town itself. Human Rights Watch (2016) reported attacks by SPLA soldiers in rural areas south of Wau in late 2015 and early 2016, with attacks also reported in Wau town. In February 2016, tensions between parts of the Dinka and ‘Fertit’ communities escalated within Wau town, with the violence drawing in military personnel.

In June 2016, a series of attacks were reported against the ‘Fertit’ community in Wau town, alongside widespread looting. These attacks resulted in mass displacement to the PoC site and to church compounds, with others fleeing to SPLA-IO held areas in the south of the county (IOM 2016; HRW 2017; Vuylsteke 2018). This was followed by sporadic conflict between the SPLA-IO and SPLA, and further alleged attacks of civilians (HRW 2017). Defections from the opposition forces in 2017 and the subsequent proliferation of different armed factions operating in Wau County deepened instability.

Fighting between government and opposition forces intensified in mid- and late 2018, before and after the signing of the 2018 R-ARCSS, and was concentrated in the Mboro and Baggari areas. This led to the destruction of local markets and occupation of humanitarian infrastructure in the affected areas, and drove displacement to Wau town. Prolonged insecurity in Wau County has also contributed to increasing food insecurity in the area, particularly in the outlying payams. This was exacerbated by the inability of humanitarian organizations to access the impacted areas to conduct assessments and provide assistance. The Small Arms Survey reports that the various waves of displacement have led to significant changes in the composition of Wau town and surrounding areas (Vuylsteke 2018, p.10). Additionally, land disputes have reportedly increased within Wau town (Saferworld 2021). Conflict in neighbouring Jur River and Raja counties has also impacted Wau County, with Wau often receiving significant number of IDPs from these areas (FSL Cluster 2019; REACH 2018; Saferworld 2019).

The security situation in Wau County stabilized in early 2019. Soldiers began moving into assigned cantonment sites in preparation for the formation of the new government, which contributed to the decrease in clashes. The cantonment process and defection of a prominent SPLA-IO General in February 2020 contributed to limited clashes and movement restrictions around Baggari. Although the new county headquarters at Baggari were inaugurated in 2014 (Eye Radio 2014), ongoing disputes between the government and SPLA-IO mean that Wau town continues to serve as the de facto county headquarters (Eye Radio 2022; Radio Tamazuj 2021; Radio Tamazuj 2023). Recent tensions within the SPLA-IO relating to resources – alongside defections from the SPLA-IO to the government – have also created insecurity in the Baggari area and the surrounding road network (Small Arms Survey 2023, pp.4-5).

Separately, in December 2016 the Marial Bai Agreement was reached between communities from Warrap and Western Bahr el-Ghazal states to reduce tensions and insecurity relating to cattle migration and grazing, with representatives from Wau being involved in some subsequent re-negotiations of the agreement. However, some communities from Wau County reportedly rejected the resolutions from the 2022 forum on the Marial Bai Agreement (Radio Tamazuj 2024). In April 2024, clashes involving pastoralists were reported in Besselia Payam, though accounts of the violence and the affected parties are currently disputed (Radio Tamazuj 2024).

ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS

Payams: Baggari (County Headquarters), Besselia, Kpaile, Wau North, Wau South

UN OCHA 2020 map of Wau County: https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-wau-county-reference-map-march-2020

Roads:

• The state capital, Wau, has several primary road connections to regional towns of importance, including Aweil (Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State), Kuajok (Warrap State), Tambura (Western Equatoria State) and Rumbek (Lakes State). Wau also connects to neighbouring Raja County’s Deim Zubeir and Raja towns. All of these roads were designated as being passable during both the rainy season of 2022 and dry season of 2023, with the exception of the road to Tambura, which was deemed “passable with difficulties” across the same time period.
• An additional primary road runs north-east from Wau to Lunyaker in Gogrial East County. The condition of this road is unknown. A secondary road forks from this road in eastern Jur River County, running to Warrap town in Tonj North County. The condition of this road is also unknown.
• A tertiary road network runs in the far north of the county, and in the far north-east of the county covering villages surrounding Wau town. The condition of this road network is unknown.

UNHAS recognised Heli and Fixed-Wing Airplane Airstrips: Wau

REFERENCES

Africa Watch. (1990). Denying “the Honor of Living”: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

Al Arabiya. (2009). Angry protesters torch Sudan ruling party offices. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

Amnesty International. (1993). Sudan Human Rights Violations in the Context of Civil War, December 1989. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive 22 February 2024.

Amnesty International. (2013). Civil Unrest and State Repression – Human Rights Violations in Wau, Western Bahr El Ghazal State. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

Blocq, D. (2014). ‘The Grassroots Nature of Counterinsurgent Tribal Militia Formation: The Case of the Fertit in Southern Sudan, 1985–1989.’ Journal of Eastern African Studies, 8 (4), 710–24. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

DTM. (2019). South Sudan – Event Tracking: Jur River. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Eye Radio. (2014). Update: Kiir visits Wau, opens its headquarters. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

Eye Radio. (2022). Political row forces Wau commissioner to rule Wau remotely. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

FAO/WFP. (2023). Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan. Retrieved 31 July 2023. See equivalent versions of the CFSAM report online for data from previous years.

FEWSNET. (2018). Livelihoods Zone Map and Descriptions for the Republic of South Sudan (Updated). Retrieved 10 July 2023.

FSL Cluster. (2019). FSL cluster coordination mission report to Wau (former WBEG state): 3-7^th June 2019. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

HRW, Human Rights Watch. (1993). Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. Retrieved 22 September 2023.

HRW, Human Rights Watch. (2013). South Sudan: No Justice for Protester Killings. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

HRW, Human Rights Watch. (2016). South Sudan: Civilians Killed, Tortured in Western Region. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

HRW, Human Rights Watch. (2017). South Sudan: New Spate of Ethnic Killings. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

IOM. (2016). Humanitarian Needs Spike for 83,000 Displaced in Wau, South Sudan. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Jok, J.M. (2012). Clashes in Wau: A Testament to Fragility of Ethnic Relations in South Sudan. The Sudd Institute. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

Koop, M. (2001). Grass Roots Regional Assessments – Government Controlled Areas of Sudan. IGAD Partners Forum Working Group. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive 24 February 2024.

OCHA. (2019). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2020. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

OCHA. (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2021. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

PACT Sudan. (2006). Sudan Peace Fund (SPF): Final Report October 2022 – December 2005. USAID.

Radio Tamazuj. (2015). SPLA soldiers killed in Bazia attack reach four. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2021) SPLA-IO detain Wau County Commissioner. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2023). Wau county commissioner unable to discharge duties over dispute. Retrieved 4 January 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2024). CEPO condemns ongoing violence in Wau County. Retrieved 16 April 2024.

REACH. (2018). Situation Overview: Greater Bahr el Ghazal, South Sudan. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Rone, J. (1999). Famine in Sudan: The Human Rights Causes. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

SIHA Network. (2016). Update on Wau State. Retrieved 4 January 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2014). The Conflict in Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal States: Describing events through 10 October 2014. Retrieved 4 January 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2023). All Alone in the Governor’s Mansion: Sarah Cleto’s Travails in Western Bahr el Ghazal State. Retrieved 4 January 2024.

Thomas, E. (2010). The Kafia Kingi Enclave: People, politics and history in the north–south boundary zone of western Sudan. London: Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

UNSC. (2014). Report of the United Nations Hugh Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in South Sudan. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

REPORTS on WAU

Antoni, D. et al. (2020). Working to Achieve Sustainable Development Goals Through Enhancing Women’s Access to Land in Post Conflict Context: The Case of Wau State in South Sudan. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Boyong, C. S. J., et al. (2018). Dynamics of tuberculosis in Wau, South Sudan during a period of armed conflict. Journal of clinical tuberculosis and other mycobacterial diseases, 12, 54-65. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Deng, D.K. (2019). Housing, Land and Property Disputes in South Sudan: Findings from a survey, Nimule, Torit, Wau and Yei. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

IOM (2019). Displacement and Return in Wau, South Sudan. International Organisation for Migration. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

IOM (2019). Disability and Inclusion Survey, Wau PoC AA. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Kühhas, B., Taaka, J., & Bragin, M. (2017). Development of participatory psychosocial well-being indicators for IOM-MHPSS programming in Wau, South Sudan. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Luedke, A. (2020). Violence, Crime and Gender in South Sudan: Reflections from the Field on Militias and Gangs. LSE Conflict Research Programme. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

PACT. (2005). Report on the Cross Line Peace Recovery and Reconciliation Conference Between The Sudanic Group (Fertit), The Luo (Jur) and The Dinka of Marial Wau (Marial Bai) Ethnic Communities of Western Bahr el Ghazal State, 1 April 2005. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive 24 February 2024.

Saferworld. (2019). Addressing peace and safety concerns in Wau, South Sudan. Retrieved 4 January 2024.

Saferworld. (2021). Enhancing people’s resilience to resolve conflicts in Western Bahr el Ghazal state. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

SIHA Network. (2019). Caught in the middle: Gender inequality and rampant SGBV in Wau, South Sudan. Retrieved 4 January 2024.

South Sudan Council of Churches and UK Peacebuilding Opportunities Fund. (2020). The Impact of Logging Activities on Local Communities. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Ukelo, D. (2019). The War of Destiny: Triggers of Insurgent Evolution. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse.

Vuylsteke, S. (2018) Identity and Self-Determination: The Fertit opposition in South Sudan. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.

** Note: The name ‘Fertit’ is often used as an umbrella term for a number of distinct ethnic groups based in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State, including the disputed Kafia Kingi enclave. Some communities who are regarded as being ‘Fertit’ have historical roots in Darfur and the Central African Republic, and practice a range of religions, from traditional faiths to Christianity and Islam. Although the term has pejorative origins and connotations, some groups now self-identify as ‘Fertit’ as a form of inter-group solidarity (Thomas 2010, ch.4). However, members of larger groups such as the Balanda (especially those in Western Equatoria) or Kresh tend to prefer use of their own names, while some parts of other groups (such as the Shat/Thuri) may identify as being part of the Luo/’Jur Chol’ (Thomas 2010, p.42). Some of the established ‘Fertit’ communities based in Wau County include the Bai, Gollo, and Ndogo, with the Sere also based along the north-western border with Jur River County.

*** Note: The majority of Dinka residents of Wau and Jur River counties are from the Rek Dinka clan. However, these communities may self-identify as being Dinka Marial Bai and/or Dinka Marial Wau. The use of Marial Bai is a geographical designation that refers to Marial Bai Payam in the north-east of Jur River County, which is sometimes named ‘Marial Wau’ in order to differentiate the area (and community who reside there) from other locations named Marial Bai (for instance, Marial Bai in Warrap Sate’s Tonj East County, or Marial Bai in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State’s Aweil West County).

**** Note: SAMS enrolment data from 2022 indicates that there is a disproportionately large number of schools in Western Bahr-el Ghazal State which have fewer than ten pupils enrolled.