Canal/Pigi County, Jonglei State

DEMOGRAPHY

2008 NBS Census population: 99,068
2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 29,720
2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 106,626

Ethnic groups: Padang Dinka (Paweny/Paneru, Thoi, Rut, Luac); Gawaar Nuer; Lou Nuer; Shilluk

Displacement Figures Q3 2022: 41,256 IDPs (+34,420 Q1 2020) and 8,144 returnees (+2,381 Q1 2020)

IPC Food Security: November 2022 – Emergency (Phase 4); IPC Projections: December 2022 to March 2023 – Emergency (Phase 4); April to July 2023 – Emergency (Phase 4)

ECONOMY & LIVELIHOODS

Canal/Pigi County is located on the northern edge of Jonglei State. It is bordered by Nyirol and Ayod Counties to the south, Fangak County to the west, and Panyikang County (Upper Nile) to the north. It is situated at the confluence of the Sobat and Nile Rivers just south of Malakal town. Additionally, the Atar River meanders through the county’s western region and the with the Fulus River tracking the eastern border. Areas immediately around the rivers are characterized by swampy vegetation of papyrus, reeds, Napier grass and bush scrub. Areas further out from the rivers transition into low, flood plains and bush. Some parts of the county are only accessible by foot, at times even traveling through swamps by boat during the rainy season.

Canal/Pigi County is part of the eastern plains, sorghum and cattle livelihood zone (FEWSNET 2018).  The primary livelihoods in this county include agriculture, rearing livestock, fishing, and foraging. A 2018 report from FAO and WFP estimated that 15% of households engage in agriculture, which had declined to 10% by 2021. Gross cereal yields were reported at 0.6 tonnes per hectare in 2021 and 2022 (FAO/WFP 2022; FAO/WFP 2023). The main crops are sorghum and maize, as well as onion, okra, pumpkin, cowpeas, sesame, groundnuts, beans and vegetables. Some households keep cattle, goats, and sheep. Lou Nuer cattle owners from neighbouring Nyirol County typically travel northwest towards Canal/Pigi so their herds can access a reliable water source during the dry season. Floods are a significant livelihood hazard as they can limit fishing activities and reduce crop, livestock, and wild foods production. Additionally, even prior to the 2013 conflict, Canal/Pigi County was characterized by lack of development, poor physical infrastructure and periodic low-level conflict from cattle raiding and militia activity.

All of these factors contributed to underlying vulnerability to resource and livelihood shocks (IRNA 2014), leading to gradual increases in food insecurity. IPC projections for Canal/Pigi are at Emergency levels (IPC Phase 4) of food insecurity as of November 2022, and are project to remain at Emergency levels until at least July 2023. Food insecurity has been exacerbated by serious seasonal flooding. In 2021, Canal/Pigi was identified by the Emergency Response Coordination Centre as a flood-affected country and by OCHA as a county with over 25,000 flood affected persons.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES

The name and HQ of Canal/Pigi County has been historically contested and is reflected in the discussion of conflict dynamics below. The name ‘Canal’ comes from the Jonglei Canal that runs through the county. Construction of the canal began in 1978, but was the source of significant grievances, ran massively over-budget and posed severe disruptions to local livelihoods and ecosystems. While the project was designed to facilitate irrigation and enhance trade opportunities for Sudan and Egypt, it could mean diminished water supplies for South Sudanese communities on the downstream path. Additionally, the construction of the canal disrupted cattle movements and agricultural patterns – the extent of this impact is unknown to date. The construction of the canal ultimately became one of the proximate triggers for the outbreak of the second civil war with Sudan in 1983, and the area was bombed until construction ceased in 1984.

Canal/Pigi is home to one (1) Early Childhood Development centre and ten (10) primary schools located throughout the county. There is one secondary school in Canal/Pigi.

Canal/Pigi County was reported to have nineteen (19) health facilities including eleven (11) functional health facilities, among them eight (8) PHCUs and three (3) PHCCs in 2022. This means that there were an estimated 0.85 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 1.41 PHCCs per 50,000 people according to the WHO. No hospitals were reported in Canal/Pigi County.

According to OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023, nearly 101,300 people in the county have humanitarian needs (up from 83,100 in 2021), which accounts for 95% of the projected population of the county reported in the HNO. Conditions have been worsened by fighting and shelling in the port towns of Diel and Atar in the third quarter of 2022 that followed in the wake of the split in the Sudan People’s Liberation Army – In Opposition (SPLA-IO) Kitgweng faction (discussed below), which displaced thousands (MSF 2022). Additionally, OCHA’s 2021 HNO report indicates that the county is among the eight counties in the country with the highest severity of WASH related needs. Canal/Pigi County also has one of the highest levels of explosive remnants of war (ERW), which has impeded access to services for the civilian population.

Geographical barriers, poor road networks, intermittent fighting and prevalence of ERW have made it difficult for humanitarian organisations to deliver critical services and rehabilitate infrastructure since 2013. There has been minimal investment in telecommunication infrastructure, making it difficult to verify conflict events and the humanitarian needs of the local population. Canal/Pigi remains one of the most isolated and hard-to-service counties in South Sudan.

CONFLICT DYNAMICS

A remote though strategically located area, Canal/Pigi occupies a crucial riverine location at the forefront of cooperation and conflict between the Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk communities. While singular and exclusive land claims have accelerated with the formation of the South Sudanese state, the trajectory towards exclusive ethnic administrative areas has been a cause of tension in the area for many years. The Shilluk communities to the north-west have laid claim to areas around the towns of Canal and Khorfulus in the north of the county. Lou Nuer reside to the east and south of the county, and the Gawaar Nuer to the west and south. Widespread and long-term displacement of these communities during the second Sudanese civil war presents an obstacle to assessing these historical claims to land and control. These tensions have been reflected in disputes over the name of the county (changing from Khorfulus to Canal/Pigi in 2009), its assignment to mostly Dinka-controlled Central Upper Nile State between 2015-2020, and the location of the county headquarters (Craze 2019).

Indeed, the displacement of parts of the Shilluk community from Canal town – seen by many Shilluk as an act of deliberate targeting – and the destruction of the market in 2010 was a major factor in the rebellion of local trader, Johnson Olonyi, and underscores the Shilluk narratives of land grabbing amidst perceived Dinka dominance. Many Dinka living in the area do not disagree that the Shilluk had settlements there in the 1980s, but claim that the Shilluk then left during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005) due to fear of conflict. The return of many members of the Shilluk community in the period of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005-2011) was linked to clashes in 2008 and opened up questions regarding the right of return. The history of displacement is thus closely tied to the history of land claims (Craze 2019).

In 2010 a Padang Dinka native of the area, George Athor, rebelled against the government following the appointment of Kuol Manyang as governor of Jonglei State (Small Arms Survey 2011). As a former high ranking SPLA officer trained as an engineer, he quickly proved his operational capabilities as a commander as his forces gained ground across northern Jonglei state, preventing humanitarian access and gaining local support that proved useful in eluding the SPLA’s subsequent counterattacks. Athor was also able to draw support from other key anti-government forces in Greater Upper Nile with David Yau Yau’s Murle and Johnson Olonyi’s Shilluk forces fighting in concert with Athor’s Padang Dinka and even some Nuer white armies from northern Jonglei joining the cause. Athor was killed in contested circumstances during negotiations in late 2011 (Small Arms Survey 2013). Yau Yau and Olonyi continued their rebellions and integration negotiations independently.

Following the outbreak of fighting in December 2013, widespread violence between the Dinka and Nuer communities in northern Jonglei was largely avoided, due to a prior local agreement between the groups to stave off fighting. The Padang Dinka of Canal/Pigi are a distinct ethnic group from the Dinka communities living in central and southern Jonglei, and have their own set of grievances with the South Sudanese government, which include their experiences of SPLA operations in the area in 2011. While some Padang Dinka in Canal/Pigi County did take up arms with the opposition (or provided support in the form of food to its fighters or to displaced Nuer), many residents also fled north to Dinka-majority areas and some joined the SPLA. The multiple alliances of the area are a product of its location and the differing political and security views of the population.

Despite these local agreements and distinctive ethnic politics placing certain limits on violence, Canal/Pigi County was nonetheless badly affected by the national conflict (2013-2018), particularly during fighting in and around the Upper Nile state capital of Malakal. A significant tactical threat on Malakal comes from bases along the Canal/Pigi axis, with fighting during the second Sudanese civil war (as well as during the 2006-2010 period) concentrated at Khorfulus and into the Doleib Hills of neighbouring Panyikang County. This remained the case during the national conflict, with the SPLA-IO launching assaults on the Doleib Hills from their bases at Canal and Khorfulus in late 2013 and in 2014. Government forces (with support from Olonyi’s Agwelek militia, then aligned to the government) regularly pursued the SPLA-IO into Canal/Pigi, with Olonyi successfully defending the area from the SPLA-IO until his defection and subsequent alliance with the SPLA-IO in 2015. The conflict resulted in significant displacement from Canal/Pigi to the Malakal Protection of Civilians site (Deng et al. 2015, p.5).

In 2015, the SPLA launched a major attack on SPLA-IO forces, now including Olony’s Agwelek faction. Rather than trying to maintain control of Malakal, SPLA-IO and Agwelek forces withdrew from the city, with the SPLA-IO withdrawing to Nagdiar and Atar in Canal/Pigi and the Agwelek withdrawing to Warjok on the west bank of the White Nile (Small Army Survey 2016). As the organised offensives of the national conflict receded, Canal/Pigi continues to face the longer-term consequences of decades of militarization and unresolved political grievances. This includes tensions over the county headquarters and the presence of different factions in the county. The SPLA-IO maintains its operational headquarters at Diel and controls most of the county, whilst the Agwelek faction controlled Atar until 2022 (discussed below). Meanwhile, the government controls Canal, Khorfulus, and Kaldak.

In 2022, Canal/Pigi was heavily affected by the large-scale violence that resulted from the split of the SPLA-IO Kitgweng faction that emerged in mid-2022. Initial fighting pitted Olony’s Agwelek forces against Kitgweng forces in Upper Nile’s Panyikang County. This intra-factional fighting was soon transposed onto a broader canvas, with the Agwelek involved in a series of clashes against a broader oppositional Nuer force composed of the SPLA-IO, white army militias, and the Kitgweng faction in north-western Jonglei and south-western Upper Nile.

By mid-August the conflict spilled over into Diel, Dor (Canal/Pigi), and New Fangak (Fangak County), with fighting focused on the control of strategic strongholds along the White Nile. Control of specific strategic locations alternated as violence escalated in late August, with the Agwelek forces taking temporary control of New Fangak and Diel, and the SPLA-IO seizing control of Atar. As reported by the UNMISS/UN OHCHR (2023), September 2022 saw offensives into Upper Nile which increasingly targeted civilians, which are discussed further in the profiles for Panyikang and Fashoda counties. Around 3,500 people were displaced from Fangak to Canal/Pigi during the fighting in early autumn 2022 (OCHA 2022), whilst around 16,000 people were displaced to Canal/Pigi due to insecurity relating to Murle-Nuer tensions in late 2022 and early 2023 (Protection Cluster 2023).

ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS

Payams: Alam, Atar, Belewach, Kaldak, Korwach, Mareng, Nyintharkmalual/Nyainthokmalual [county HQ contested]

UN OCHA 2020 map of Canal/Pigi County: https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-canalpigi-county-reference-map-march-2020

Roads:

• A primary road runs south from Canal town to Bor town (in Bor South County) via Ayod County. The conditions of the road running south to the junction in Ayod County are unknown, and is deemed impassable between the junction and Bor town in both the rainy season of 2022 and dry season of 2023.
• A tertiary road runs west from Canal town into neighbouring Fangak County. The condition of the road is unknown.
• A secondary road runs south-east along the county via Khorfulus, terminating in Waat town in Nyirol county. The condition of the road is unknown until Lankien town, whereupon it is deemed impassable to Waat, in both the rainy season of 2022 and dry season of 2023.
• A river route that runs through the north of the county, between Bor town or Manga (in Unity State) to Malakal and Renk. Additional routes run south from Canal town to Mahr in southern Ayod County along the Canal Corridor, and east along the Sobat River, forking at Jikmir in Luakpiny/Nasir County (where it runs south to Akobo town and east to Maker/Makier in Luakpiny/Nasir. Note that movement along the River Nile in Upper Nile State has been impaired following fighting involving SPLM-IO Kitgweng forces and allied militia since the summer of 2022, alongside unpredictable troop movements in the state.

 UNHAS-recognized Heli-Landing Sites and Airstrips: Kurwai

REFERENCES

Conflict Armament Research. (2015). Ammunition Airdropped to SPLA-IO Forces in South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Craze, J. (2019). Displaced and Immiserated: The Shilluk of Upper Nile in South Sudan’s Civil War, 2014-2019. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Deng, D.K., Pritchard, M. and Sharma, M. (2015). A War Within: Perceptions of Truth, Justice, Reconciliation and Healing in Malakal POC. South Sudan Law Society. Retrieved 31 March 2024.

FAO/WFP. (2023). Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan. Retrieved 31 July 2023. See equivalent versions of the CFSAM report online for data from previous years.

FEWSNET. (2018). Livelihoods Zone Map and Descriptions for the Republic of South Sudan (Updated). Retrieved 10 July 2023.

IOM DTM. (2023). South Sudan – Baseline Assessment Round 14. Retrieved 12 January 2024.

IRNA. (2014). IRNA Report: [Pigi/Canal, Jonglei State] [19-22 July 2014]. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

MSF. (2022). Conflict in Greater Upper Nile is impeding humanitarian aid to thousands of people already devastated by flooding. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

OCHA. (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2021. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

OCHA. (2022). South Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot September 2022. Retrieved 12 January 2024.

Protection Cluster. (2023). Protection Cluster Upper Nile/Jonglei – Internal displacement in Gokjak, Piji/Canal county (April 2023). Retrieved 12 January 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2022). Security situation tense in Pigi County after SPLA-IO Kitgwang factions clash. Retrieved 26 October 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2011). George Athor Rebellion, Jonglei State, Updated February 2011. Retrieved 12 March 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2013). Pendulum swings: The rise and fall of insurgent militias in South Sudan. Retrieved 12 March 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2016). The Conflict in Upper Nile State. Retrieved 26 October 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2023). Upper Nile Prepares to Return to War. Retrieved 26 October 2023.

UNMISS/UN OHCHR. (2023). Attacks against civilians in Greater Upper Nile, South Sudan: August to December 2022. Retrieved 5 January 2024.

REPORTS on CANAL/PIGI

Craze, J. (2019). Displaced and Immiserated: The Shilluk of Upper Nile in South Sudan’s Civil War, 2014-2019. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

REACH. (2021). Canal-Pigi County Rapid Assessment: Jonglei State, South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Small Arms Survey/HSBA. (2012). My Neighbor, My Enemy: Intertribal Violence in Jonglei. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.