Abyei Administrative Area

DEMOGRAPHY

2008 NBS Census population: 52,883

2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 133,958

2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 250,000

Ethnic groups: Ngok Dinka; with significant presence of Misseriya (notably Mezaghna, Awlad Kamil and Awlad Umran sections) during seasonal migration during the dry season

Displacement Figures Q4 2022: 87,282 IDPs and 480 returnees

FEWSNET Food Security**: February 2023 – Emergency (Phase 4); February to May 2023 – Emergency (Phase 4)

ECONOMY & LIVELIHOODS

Abyei is its own Administrative Area claimed by the governments of both South Sudan and Sudan. It borders Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State (Aweil East County) to the south-west, Warrap State (Twic County) to the south, and Unity State (Abiemnhom County) to the south-east. It also borders East Darfur State and West Kordofan State of Sudan to the north-west and north, respectively.

According to FEWSNET (2018), Abyei falls within the western floodplain sorghum and cattle livelihoods zone, and the Ngok Dinka, the principal residents, are agro-pastoralists. The Misseriya, a nomadic pastoralist group from Sudan, migrate annually into and through the region (to access South Sudan’s Greater Bahr-el Ghazal and Unity states). While the Misseriya tend to reside in the northern part of the area, the Ngok Dinka primarily inhabit the southern region of Abyei. The FAO/WFP estimated in 2016 that sorghum comprised 95 percent of the main harvest in Warrap State and Abyei (reported together), with groundnut, pearl millet and maize making up the remainder (FAO/WFP 2016). 65% of Abyei’s households engage in farming, with gross cereal yields reported to be 0.75 tonnes per hectare in 2021 (FAO/WFP 2022), increasing to 0.9 tonnes per hectare in 2022 (FAO/WFP 2023).

In February 2023, Abyei was projected to be at emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of food insecurity, which was the most severe in Sudan at the time of the projection (FEWSNET 2023a). New projections released in the form of a November 2023 update show Abyei to remain at emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of food insecurity, with multiple localities in Sudan now placed at the same level, particularly in Darfur (FEWSNET 2023b). The same update projects that for February 2024 to May 2024, Abyei will improve to crisis (IPC Phase 3) levels of food insecurity, though with the caveat that the area would “likely be at least one phase worse without current or planned humanitarian food assistance”.

The region is also home to significant livestock populations, with plentiful pasture and water sources. In addition to cattle, Dinka residents also raise goats and sheep, and some keep horses and donkeys. Fishing takes place along the region’s major water points, including the rivers Kiir, Ngol and Nyamora, and there is also potential for beekeeping. Sorghum from Abyei is exported to regional markets, including in Unity State’s Bentiu and Mayom towns via porters, cars and small trucks.

Following the 2009 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling on the region’s borders, Abyei was left with only one oil field. The Diffra field lies towards the region’s north, and is a relatively small field within the context of the oil-rich region (Sansculotte-Greenidge 2011). Nonetheless, Sudan has continued to draw revenue from the field in recent years, due to a 2012 agreement to share the proceeds with South Sudan. The establishment of oil exploration in the area has reportedly both created jobs and led to problems such as pollution and reduction of pastoral and agricultural land.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES

South Sudan’s headquarters for Abyei is located in Abyei town. The boundaries of Abyei have been contested since South Sudan became independent in 2011, and lacks a formally recognized governance system. Due to the lack of government oversight in the area, the development of infrastructure and key services has been limited, including in areas such as healthcare and education. Despite this, the Amiet market has become an increasingly important economic hub between Sudan and South Sudan, although it has also become a locus for tension to emerge between traders from different communities. The area also serves as a key transit point for those travelling between South Sudan and Sudan.

According to OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023, there are nearly 212,000 people with humanitarian needs in Abyei, which represents nearly 85% of the estimated population for Abyei reported in the HNO.

In February and April of 2021 Amiet market experienced large fires which destroyed over 800 shops combined, with the tightly spaced stalls and concentration of flammable materials make further fires likely. The market also experienced a shortage of goods in as a result of the Sudanese unrest following the 25 October 2021 coup, though cargo and goods from Khartoum had resumed deliveries to Amiet market within three weeks (Radio Tamazuj 2021). More recently, prices of essential commodities have soared in Abyei following the outbreak of conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces in April 2023 (Radio Tamazuj 2023a). As of mid-July 2023, nearly 6,000 people fleeing the Sudanese conflict have registered in Abyei since the conflict began (UNHCR/ION 2023).

While some aid organizations operate in the area, they maintain responsibility either for Sudan or South Sudan, without maintaining a presence for the whole area. The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), maintains responsibility to protect UN property and staff, protect civilians, as well as support law enforcement capacities, facilitate the delivery of aid, and provide assistance in de-mining the area (UNISFA 2020). Local resources face additional pressure due to the ongoing conflict in South Sudan, due to IDPs fleeing to Abyei from neighbouring states such as Warrap and Unity.

Abyei is home to twenty-nine (29) primary schools and four (4) secondary schools (located in the areas of Abyei and Agok towns). There are currently no Early Childhood Development centres in the area.

Abyei was reported to have thirty-two (32) health facilities including twenty-two (22) functional health facilities, among them fifteen (15) PHCUs, five (5) PHCCs and two (2) hospitals in 2022, both of which are reported to have limited functionality.

CONFLICT DYNAMICS

Abyei has been part of a long-standing dispute over control of the area, dating back to 1905 when nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms in the Abyei area were administered as part of Kordofan in northern Sudan instead of southern Sudan (Sansculotte-Greenidge 2011). Violence affected the area during the first Sudanese civil war (1955-1972), as relations between the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya leadership began to break down (Keen 1994/2008, pp.40-41). Tensions persisting during the 1970s, while the disempowerment of customary authorities – alongside the introduction of mechanised farming – had negative repercussions for pastoralist communities on the northern Sudanese side of the transition zone that runs through the north-south border. By 1977, insecurity intensified following raids against Ngok Dinka settlements from parts of the Misseriya community, prompting the eventual formation of the Abyei Liberation Front opposition group, who would later merge with the SPLM/A (de Waal 1993; Johnson 2010, pp.34-35).

The majority of Ngok Dinka sided with the SPLM/A during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005), with the area continuing to be affected by serious raiding at various stages of the conflict. The status of Abyei was a key sticking point during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) negotiations. The CPA included an agreed ‘1/1/56’ boundary line for separating Sudan and South Sudan – intended to reflect boundaries at the time of Sudan’s independence from the Anglo-Egyptian condominium – which left the Ngok Dinka territory north of the line. In response, the Abyei Protocol was agreed and designated Abyei as a special administrative area, and set out a process for resolving the dispute. The CPA stipulated that a referendum on the area’s status was originally meant to take place alongside South Sudan’s self-determination referendum held in January 2011, but the referendum in Abyei did not take place. Conflict returned to Abyei in May 2011 after Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) personnel seized Abyei town following South Sudan’s vote for independence, ultimately withdrawing from the disputed area a year later (Craze 2014). In June 2011, the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) was established, which replaced the former United Nations Mission in Sudan that had been responsible for peacekeeping duties in the area.

Abyei has subsequently remained a separate administrative region, with central and southern areas de facto governed by a Ngok Dinka administration and northern areas controlled by Sudanese forces (Craze 2023, p.2). An African Union proposed referendum planned for 2013 was postponed because of disagreement over who was eligible to vote as residents of the administrative area. Sudan’s government argued the Misseriya should be counted as residents and be able to vote, while South Sudan’s government argued they were seasonal migrants and thus not eligible (Small Arms Survey 2015). An informal referendum was organised and held by the Abyei Referendum High Committee in October 2013 amid local frustration at delays, despite a boycott from Misseriya groups and warnings from UN and AU (Craze 2014). While a majority of voters supported Abyei becoming part of South Sudan, neither the Sudanese nor South Sudanese governments recognized the results of this referendum.

Abyei continues to be contested by both the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya, leading to longstanding tensions over cattle movements, local governance disputes over the administration of Abyei, and diplomatic disputes between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan (Small Arms Survey 2015). The presence of the Diffra oil field in the area has also contributed to the lack of a resolution to the dispute. Conflict – including cattle raids – between migrating Misseriya and Dinka historically occurred towards the end of dry season as the Misseriya return north (with migration beginning around November and ending around May). Conflict had previously been addressed through traditional dispute resolution mechanisms at seasonal meetings between Misseriya and Ngok Dinka leaders. These agreement and routes have in some cases been assured by UNISFA. However, cattle-related conflict has been exacerbated by political tensions in recent years, and has reduced the effectiveness of these traditional measures. The Small Arms Survey concludes that Misseriya raiding in recent years has extended beyond traditional clashes along migratory routes and have taken on a political dimension relating to population and territorial control that UNISFA is currently unable to prevent (Small Arms Survey 2015). Prior to the informal 2013 referendum, relations had further deteriorated between the communities following the assassination of the Ngok Dinka paramount chief in May 2013.

In January 2020, fighting – allegedly between the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka – took place in Kolom village north of Abyei town. The violence resulted in the deaths of at least 33 people, with many civilians being injured, homes being burned, and 4,800 people being displaced to Abyei town (OCHA 2020). Further conflict was reported in early 2021, whilst in March 2022 clashes reportedly killed 27 people near to Abyei town (Radio Tamazuj 2022). Intra-Misseriya clashes have also been reported in Abyei and adjoining areas of Sudan’s West Kordofan State, including serious fighting in September 2016 that reportedly killed 43 people (SUDO UK 2016, p.12).

Historically, the Ngok Dinka have had generally good relations with the Twic Dinka community of Warrap State’s Twic County, with high levels of intermarriage and living in shared spaces. The Twic Dinka community have also hosted displaced Ngok Dinka fleeing insecurity in Abyei. However, serious conflict broke out along the Twic-Abyei border since early 2022. Prior to the conflict, disputes (often linked to rivalries during the second Sudanese civil war or the Comprehensive Peace Agreement-era) among some elite from both areas had been reported, though were supposedly resolved (Deng 2017).

Intensifying political rhetoric over a new claim to territory under the control of the Ngok administration escalated into violent conflict in February 2022. Recurrent attacks and arson displaced approximately 70,000 people from the newly disputed area around Agok and Aneet and led to the suspension of most NGO services in the area. Approximately 30,000 individuals were displaced north into Abyei town (mostly Ngok, but also Nuer and other Dinka sub-sections) while around 30,000 moved south into Twic County (mostly from the Twic Dinka), and others moved across to Aweil (including Malual Dinka returnees) and smaller numbers to Wau.

Violence continued between February and October 2022, killing and wounding significant numbers of people from both communities. Various interventions by senior elites in 2022 and early 2023 have not stopped the violence, which continued across early 2023 and escalated once again in autumn 2023 (Radio Tamazuj 2023). The increase in incidents coincides with the return of Ngok Dinka to disputed areas south of the Kiir River, from which they were displaced during the conflict. Serious cross-border attacks were reported in late November 2023 (Radio Tamazuj 2023c), while the deputy chief administrator of Abyei killed in a road ambush at the end of December (Radio Tamazuj 2024). Serious clashes were also reported in various parts of the Abyei area in early 2024 (Eye Radio 2024; The Radio Community 2024). The SSPDF has been increasingly drawn into the conflict, with military personnel reportedly targeted by Ngok Dinka militia, with Twic Dinka youth restricting SSPDF movement (Craze 2023, p.4; Eye Radio 2023). Security forces from both Sudan and South Sudan are reported to have a presence within the Abyei area, according to the UN Security Council (2023, p.2), though there is no indication that Sudanese forces are involved in the Ngok-Twic Dinka conflict.

Behind the conflict are a set of claims advanced by some representatives from the Twic community that all areas south of the Kiir River (a.k.a. Bahr al-Arab) along the disputed border with Sudan are part of Twic County, which includes Agok town and the Aneet area. While this is framed as a land dispute, this is more likely a conflict over economic resources (Craze 2023). Agok became a significant humanitarian hub in recent years, with the sizeable hospital employing hundreds of employees and, with a dozen other NGOs based in the town. Moreover, a significant border market was established in Aneet, on Abyei’s southern-most border. Taxation from both Agok and Aneet has been payable to the Abyei administration, with significant taxes also being made on from checkpoints approaching it. Moreover, organisations based at Agok would solicit services from Ngok business and landowners, further increasing the areas value. Additionally, claims that land south of the Kiir River is more fertile and receptive to cultivation than land in Twic County are advanced by Ngok stakeholders, although these have not been validated. The Twic community is made up of various sub-sections: within the Ngok-Twic conflict, the Ajak-Kuac Twic community have been one of the most involved groups, and it is this sub-section that specifically claims the area of Agok and view it the area as part of Twic County’s Ajak-Kuac Payam.

ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS

Payams: Abyei (South Sudan AAA Headquarters), Alel, Ameth-agouk, Rumameer, Mijak

UN OCHA 2021 map for the Abyei area: https://reliefweb.int/map/sudan/sudan-abyei-area-reference-map-may-2021

Roads:

• There is a primary road running from Abyei town to neighbouring Ruweng Administrative Area’s Abiemnhom. This road was considered impassible during both the rainy season of 2022 and dry season of 2023.
• Another primary road runs from Abyei to the border town of Agok, and eventually to Warrap State’s Wunrok, Gogrial and Kuajok (also the state capital) and to Wau in Western Bahr-el Ghazal. Northern sections of the road (between Abyei and Wunrok) were considered impassable during the rainy season of 2022, and “passable with difficulties” in the dry season of 2023. The remainder of the road down to Wau was deemed passable throughout the year.
• A primary road also runs north-west out of Abyei town into Sudan, whilst two secondary roads run parallel to the north. Road conditions within Abyei are reportedly extremely poor during the rainy season, and there is no information regarding the conditions of these roads.
• A primary road (note that one map shows this as a secondary road) runs south-west to Malualkon in Northern Bahr-el Ghazal State. The condition of this road is unknown.

 UNHAS-recognised Heli and Fixed-Wing Airplane Airstrips: Agok

REFERENCES

Craze, J. (2023). Attacked from Both Sides: Abyei’s Existential Dilemma. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 13 July 2023.

Eye Radio. (2023). 5 killed as bandits raid SSPDF base in northern Warrap. Retrieved 24 October 2023.

Eye Radio. (2024). 53 killed, 64 wounded in multiple attacks on Abyei: Official. Retrieved 29 January 2024.

FAO/WFP. (2016). Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Suan. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

FEWSNET. (2018). Livelihoods Zone Map and Descriptions for the Republic of South Sudan (Updated). Retrieved 10 July 2023.

FEWSNET. (2023a). Conflict and high food prices drive high food assistance needs in 2023. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

FEWSNET. (2023b). Conflict and below-average harvests sustain high needs during the harvest season. Retrieved 3 January 2024.

 Johnson, D.H. (2010). When Boundaries Become Borders: The impact of boundary-making in Southern Sudan’s frontier zones. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 28 February 2024.

Keen, D. (1994/2008). The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine & Relief in Southwestern Sudan 1983-2005). Oxford: James Currey.

OCHA. (2020). Situation Report, 27 Jan 2020. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2021). Goods start arriving Abyei after Sudanese coup. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2022). Over 20 killed in fresh Abyei attacks. Retrieved 4 January 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2023a). Abyei dwellers decry soaring commodity prices. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2023b). 11 killed, 14 wounded in attack on Abyei’s Nyinkuec Market. Retrieved 24 October 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2023c). UN urges government to probe killing of 75 civilians in Abyei. Retrieved 4 January 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2024). Juba: MPs want inquest into Abyei administrator’s killing. Retrieved 4 January 2024.

Sansculotte-Greenidge, K. (2011). Abyei: From a Shared Past to a Contested Future. ACCORD. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Small Arms Survey (2015). Updates on Abyei. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

SUDO UK. (2016). Human Rights Abuses in Sudan over the Month of September 2016. Retrieved 4 January 2024.

The Radio Community. (2024). Over 2,000 people seek UN protection in Abyei. Retrieved 6 February 2024.

UNHCR/IOM. (2023). Population movement from Sudan to South Sudan. Interactive dashboard last accessed 18 July 2023.

UNISFA. (2020). Demilitarizing and monitoring peace in the disputed Abyei area. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

UNSC, UN Security Council. (2023). Situation in Abyei: Report of the Secretary-General, S/2023/777. Retrieved 4 January 2024.

de Waal, A. (1993). ‘Some Comments on Militias in the Contemporary Sudan’ in Daly, M. and Sikainga, A.A. (eds.) Civil War in the Sudan, pp.144–51. London: British Academic Press.

REPORTS on ABYEI

Craze, J. (2011). Creating Facts on the Ground: Conflict Dynamics in Abyei. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Craze, J. (2014). Contested Borders: Continuing Tensions over the Sudan-South Sudan Border. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Craze, J. (2023). Attacked from Both Sides: Abyei’s Existential Dilemma. Retrieved 13 July 2023.

Deng, F. (2017). Abyei Dialogue: Bottom Up and Top Down. The Sudd Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Deng, F. (2022). A Personal Perspective on the Ngok-Twic Conflict in Abyei. The Sudd Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Deng, L. (2009). ‘Social Capital and Civil War: The Dinka Communities in Sudan’s Civil War’, African Affairs 109 (435), 231-50. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Deng, L. (2014). ‘Political violence and the emergence of the dispute over Abyei, Sudan,1950–1983’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 8 (4), 573–589. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

FAO. (2017). Linking community-based animal health services with natural resource conflict mitigation in the Abyei Administrative Area. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Furukawa, M. (2019). Social Capital Across Agro-Pastoral Assets in the Abyei Area with Reference to Amiet “Peace” Market. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Gebrekidan, G.Z. (2021). Tribal Conflict over Natural Resources on the Sudan – South Sudan Border: The Case of the Abyei Territory. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Jansen, B.J. (2018). Humanitarianism as buffer: displacement, aid and the politics of belong in Abyei, Sudan/South Sudan. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Johnson, D. (2008). ‘Why Abyei Matters: The Breaking Point of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement?’ African Affairs, 107 (426), 1–19. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Johnson, D. (2012). ‘The Heglig oil dispute between Sudan and South Sudan’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 6(3), 561-569. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Kuol, D. (2020). Grains As Life: The value of sorghum and millet amongst the Abyei Dinka. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Lino, M.O. (2020). Local Peace Agreement in Abyei: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Small Arms Survey (2015). Updates on Abyei. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.

** Note: The Abyei Administrative Area is not included in the IPC country analysis for South Sudan mentioned in the Methodological Note, but is included in the FEWSNET analysis reported in February 2023 here and in November 2023 here. The FEWSNET figures – which are considered ‘IPC-compatible’ – are therefore presented in this profile instead.