Ezo County, Western Equatoria State

DEMOGRAPHY

2008 NBS Census population: 80,861
2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 49,341
2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 132,997

Ethnic groups: Zande

Displacement Figures Q3 2022: 58,996 IDPs (+53,841 Q1 2020) and 32,352 returnees (+9,222 Q1 2020)

IPC Food Security: November 2022 – Crisis (Phase 3); IPC Projections: December 2022 to March 2023 – Stressed (Phase 2); April to July 2023 – Crisis (Phase 3)

ECONOMY & LIVELIHOODS

Ezo County is located in Western Equatoria State. It borders Tambura County to the north-west, Nagero County to the north and Nzara to the south-east. It also borders Warrap State (Tonj South County) to the north-east, Lakes State (Wulu County) to the east. The town of Ezo is near the joint border of South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR).

The county is part of the equatorial maze and cassava livelihoods zone (FEWSNET, 2018). Similar to the rest of Western Equatoria, Ezo County forms a part of South Sudan’s lush greenbelt, which makes it an ideal area for cultivation for a variety of crops. In 2016, FAO estimated that half (50%) of the county’s population were farmers. However, in 2018 that proportion had reduced to 40% (FAO 2018), likely due to insecurity and outwards migration. By 2021, the percentage of farmers was estimated to have increased to 65% (FAO/WFP 2022) with a gross cereal yield of 1.7 tonnes per hectare in 2021, increasing to 1.8 tonnes per hectare in 2022 (FAO/WFP 2023).

Ezo County’s proximity to borders with CAR and DRC allows for residents to engage in cross-border trade, both as consumers and vendors, and has led to the establishment of markets that thrive during times of stability. These cross-border markets supplement the economic activities of Ezo market in the main town. It also provides a supply of food produce when insecurity in South Sudan impacts the prices and supply of food and other goods in the market delivered from Juba but is also vulnerable to outbreaks of insecurity in the restive neighbouring states. There is also a thriving illicit cross border economy which includes trade in bush meat, poaching, and forestry. The diamond mining area between Ezo and Tambura towns also provides a valuable source of income. The limited road networks and poor accessibility of Ezo County have inhibited its integration into the wider South Sudanese economy and increased its dependence on these cross-border linkages.

In November 2022, Ezo was classified as experiencing a Crisis (IPC Phase 3) level of food insecurity. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) level conditions were predicted to continue until March 2023, whereupon the projections revert to Crisis-level conditions until July 2023. A 2020 REACH assessment found residents in 3% of households were consuming foods that are known to make people sick to cope with food insecurity, but no residents were going days without eating or describing their hunger as severe or the worst it can be. Residents in 17% of settlements were selling livestock to cope with a lack of food while at least some residents in every assessed settlement reported they did not possess or have access to livestock.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES

The county’s headquarters is located in Ezo Town in Ezo Centre Payam. Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) attacks prior to independence prevented much development in the area, limiting the maintenance and development of infrastructure and services. Insecurity during the civil war made access to the area difficult for humanitarian organizations seeking to serve the local population, further hindering the development of local infrastructure and services. Displacement in the area has also contributed to increased pressure on local resources, notably following the outbreak of conflict in neighbouring Tambura County in 2021.

Ezo County is home to seven (7) Early Childhood Development centres, forty-three (43) primary schools and four (4) secondary schools.

Ezo County was reported to have thirty-three (33) health facilities including thirty-two (32) functional health facilities, among them twenty-seven (27) PHCUs, four (4) PHCCs and one (1) hospital in 2022. This means that there were an estimated 3.05 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 1.51 PHCCs per 50,000 people according to the WHO, which ranks Ezo as among the ten counties with the highest ratios of PHCUs/person in South Sudan. Ezo Hospital was reported to be moderately functional.

According to OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023, there are 81,114 people in the county with humanitarian needs (up significantly from around 43,200 in 2021), which represents approximately 60% of the estimated population of Ezo County reported in the HNO. Around 53,000 of those with significant needs in 2023 were IDPs or returnees. In 2021 Ezo was one of fifteen counties designated by the HNO as having ‘high resilience’, with households having a greater ability to deal with shocks and stressors than many counties in South Sudan. However, large-scale displacement to Ezo County following outbreak of sub-national violence in Tambura County has placed this resilience under significant strain.

CONFLICT DYNAMICS

Bordering the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic (CAR), Ezo County has been exposed to attacks from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA); cross-border violence involving Congolese armed groups and refugee flows; and – since the conclusion of the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005) – to fallout from conflict in nearby areas of Western Equatoria State. The SPLM/A seized Ezo in 1992, though relations between the Azande community and the SPLM/A (particularly Dinka soldiers) have at times been strained, and have been exacerbated by reported tensions between parts of the local community and Dinka pastoralists who were displaced to parts of Western Equatoria during the war (Allen 2007). In November 2005, fighting between parts of the Azande and Dinka communities (including elements of the SPLA) that began in Yambio spread to Ezo County, killing at least ten civilians and an unknown number of SPLA soldiers (UNMIS 2005; Sudan Tribune 2005). Parts of traditionally agriculturalist Azande community have also had intermittent tensions with Mbororo-Fulani pastoralists who cross between the CAR and Western Equatoria, and whose presence in the state has been the subject of politicisation (Schomerus and Allen 2010, p.66).

Since late 2005, the LRA was active in parts of Western Equatoria (including Ezo County) near to the Congolese border, and made incursions into Ezo town close to the Central African border. Intermittent violence (including abductions) occurred in Ezo County during the 2006-2008 Juba peace talks between the LRA and the Ugandan government, though escalated following the collapse of the talks in mid-2008, prompting the formation of ‘Arrow Boys’ in Azande-inhabited areas of Western Equatoria (Schomerus and Rigterink 2016, p.17). The Arrow Boys are a community protection force (who include female members) that were initially established in eastern areas of the state in 2005, and have enjoyed periods of popular and local political support for their role in countering the LRA, and resisting perceived encroachments by pastoralists. After a lull in LRA activity from late 2010, LRA attacks in Ezo were reported in 2013 and 2014 (Sudan Tribune 2013; Eye Radio 2014), while Arrow Boys (operating in conjunction with security forces) were reported to have clashed with Mbororo-Fulani pastoralists in 2014 (Radio Tamazuj 2014).

During the national conflict (2013-2018), Western Equatoria was initially spared the worst effects of the violence. However, political tensions between elements of the state leadership and the government mounted over 2014, building upon existing discontent among some Zande elites at perceived marginalisation, and a lack of support from Juba for the Arrow Boys (Small Arms Survey 2016). By early 2015, several emerging dynamics in the state would reinforce political discontent, including an uptick in alleged incursions by Dinka pastoralists into Azande land and subsequent clashes; increased SPLA deployments and repression, including harassment of Arrow Boys; and the government’s decision to sack and imprison Western Equatoria’s elected governor, Joseph Bakosoro, in September 2015 (Boswell 2017; ICG 2016). These developments in turn shifted some Western Equatorian communities’ position in the national conflict, with some local elites coming to see the SPLA-IO (who were harnessing ambiguities in the cantonment provisions of the 2015 ARCSS to engage in recruitment outside of their strongholds in Greater Upper Nile) as a vehicle for challenging the government, triggering renewed mobilization among the Arrow Boys.

A large-scale recruitment drive into the Arrow Boys took place immediately following the signing of the ARCSS in August 2015, amid allegations of forced recruitment (Schomerus and Taban 2017, p.12). Heavy fighting between the Arrow Boys and the SPLA was reported in Ezo in November 2015, with the county being put under martial law (Small Arms Survey 2016). Much of the fighting was clustered in the south of the county, particularly around Andari Payam. In November 2015, the Arrow Boys (which by this point included an increasing number of military defectors, notably in leadership positions) were formally integrated into the SPLA-IO as ‘SPLA-IO Sector 6’, and their main leader Alfred Futuyo was appointed Major General (Boswell 2017). In addition to the changes in composition and political alignment, the Arrow Boys had become largely divided into two factions, one of whom was under the command of Alfred Futuyo, and the other linked to the (now defunct) South Sudan National Liberation Movement (SSNLM) opposition group, alongside some non-aligned Arrow Boys (ICG 2016).

Despite a Church-led mediation effort limiting violence in Ezo, fighting resumed in early 2016, and further SPLA operations against Futuyo’s forces in June 2016 resulted in Futuyo’s forces blocking the road to Ezo in response. Meanwhile, the SSNLM integrated into the SPLA’s Division 6 following an April 2016 peace deal (Small Arms Survey 2016), though were reported to have operated as a separate unit as of early 2023. Fighting restarted in November 2016, after Futuyo’s troops launched an assault on Yambio, displacing hundreds of residents in Ezo (Boswell 2017, p.11; Sudan Tribune 2016). The merging of the Arrow Boys with the SPLA-IO has contributed to a widening gap between the security interests of local communities and the activities of their former community protectors, amid reports of alleged attacks and looting of locals by former Arrow Boys to compensate for a lack of material support and consistent supply from SPLA-IO (Schomerus and Taban 2017, pp.15-16).

The signing of the R-ARCSS in September 2018 brought a degree of relative calm to Western Equatoria; however, the defection of a prominent opposition commander to the government and the new R-ARCSS cantonment process contributed to reports of renewed recruitment throughout 2019 and 2020 with the political and security context simmering towards renewed insecurity (McCrone 2020; Craze 2023). Ezo has been exposed to the increasing political turbulence in the state; in February 2021, six ex-combatants were reportedly killed in Ezo Centre Payam, and when clashes broke out in neighbouring Tambura later in the year (discussed further in the Tambura County profile) tens of thousands fled to Ezo County. A commander with connections in Ezo County who was linked to the conflict was alleged to have recruited 500 youth from Ezo, who were transported to Tambura in September 2021, raising tensions in the area (UNMISS/UN HRD 2021, p.8). Additionally, insecurity increased within Ezo in the wake of the violence – including an incident in which a Zande businessman was reportedly abducted by suspected members of the Balanda community in February 2022 – while attacks and criminality increased on the road between Tambura and Ezo counties (Eye Radio 2021). Finally, a high-level meeting was held between the Zande King and President Kiir in May 2023 to address insecurity relating to Mbororo-Fulani pastoralists, including in Ezo County, though it is unclear what effects this may have on improving local relations (Eye Radio 2023).

ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS

Payams: Ezo Centre (County Headquarters), Andari, Bagidi, Bariguna, Naandi, Yangiri

UN OCHA 2020 map for Ezo County: https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-ezo-county-reference-map-march-2020

Roads:

• A primary road connects Ezo via Naandi to the major road that runs from Wau (Western Bar el Ghazal State) via Tambura and on to Yambio and Juba (Central Equatoria State). During the rainy season of 2022, the section of the road running north to Wau was designated ‘passable with difficulties’, whereas the eastern parts of the road were also deemed ‘passable with difficulties’ until Maridi, and thereafter passable all the way to Juba. The same road was considered passable during the dry season of 2023, excepting the stretch of road running north between Tambura and Wau, which was designated ‘passable with difficulties’.
• Secondary roads head west from Naandi into the Democratic Republic of Congo and northwest along the county’s border with the Central African Republic to Tambura via Source Yubu. The condition of these roads is unknown.

UNHAS-recognized Heli-Landing Sites and Airstrips: None

REFERENCES

Allen, T. (2007). ‘Witchcraft, Sexuality and HIV/AIDS among the Azande of Sudan’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 1 (3), pp.359-396. Retrieved 22 November 2023.

Boswell, A. (2017). Spreading Fallout: The Collapse of the ARCSS and New Conflict along the Equatorias-DRC border. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Craze, J. (2023). Jemma’s War: Political Strife in Western Equatoria. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 4 December 2023.

Eye Radio. (2014). LRA abducts 6 in Ezo. Retrieved 22 November 2023.

Eye Radio. (2021). Ezo-Tambura road attack leaves 1 dead, 2 abducted. Retrieved 22 November 2023.

Eye Radio. (2023). Kiir and Azande King discuss solutions to Ambororo violence. Retrieved 22 November 2023.

FAO/WFP. (2023). South Sudan 2022 Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) Summary of findings. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

FEWSNET. (2018). Livelihoods Zone Map and Descriptions for the Republic of South Sudan (Updated). Retrieved 10 July 2023.

ICG, International Crisis Group. (2016). South Sudan’s South: Conflict in the Equatorias. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

OCHA. (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2021. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2014). Armed horsemen cross from Central Africa into Ezo County. Retrieved 22 November 2023.

REACH. (2020). Integrated Needs Tracking (INT) County Profile – Ezo County. Retrieved 13 July 2023.

Schomerus, M. and Allen, T. (2010). Southern Sudan at odds with itself: dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace. Retrieved 17 November 2023.

Schomerus, M. and Taban, C. (2017). ‘Arrow boys, armed groups and the SPLA: intensifying insecurity in the Western Equatorian states’. Chapter 2 in ‘Informal Armies: Community defence groups in South Sudan’s civil war’, Saferworld. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Sudan Tribune. (2005). Sudan’s W. Equatoria governor calls for calm after Clashes. Retrieved 22 November 2023.

Sudan Tribune. (2013). 3 killed in LRA attack on South Sudan. Retrieved 22 November 2023.

Sudan Tribune. (2016). Six killed, hundreds displaced in S. Sudan’s Ezo county. Retrieved 22 November 2023.

UNMIS. (2005). United Nations Sudan Situation Report 13 Dec 2005. Retrieved via Relief Web 22 November 2023.

UNMISS/UN HRD. (2021). Attacks on Civilians in Tambura County: June – September 2021. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

REPORTS on EZO

Braak, B. (2016). Exploring Primary Justice in South Sudan: Challenges, concerns, and elements that work. Leiden University/Cordaid. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

 Danish Refugee Council. (2013). Armed Violence and Stabilization in Western Equatoria: Recovering from the Lord’s Resistance Army. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Kindersley, N. and Øystein, R. (2017). Civil War on Shoestring: Rebellion in South Sudan’s Equatoria Region. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

McCrone, F. (2020). Hollow Promises: The Risks of Military Integration in Western Equatoria. Small Arms Survey. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Rigterink, A., Kenyi, J., and Schomerus, M. (2014). Report JSRP Survey in Western Equatoria, South Sudan,

First round, May 2013. Justice and Security Research Programme: LSE. Retrieved 22 November 2023.

Rigterink, A., Kenyi, J., and Schomerus, M. (2016). Report JSRP Survey in Ezo and Tambura counties, South Sudan, Second round, February 2015. Justice and Security Research Programme: LSE. Retrieved 22 November 2023.

Schomerus, M. and Rigterink, A. (2016). Non-state security providers and political formation in South Sudan: the case of Western Equatoria’s Arrow Boys. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.