Kajo-Keji County, Central Equatoria State

DEMOGRAPHY

2008 NBS Census population: 196,387
2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 86,973
2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 233,099

Ethnic groups: Kuku, Nyepo, Kakwa

Displacement Figures Q3 2022: 21,653 IDPs (+4,380 Q1 2020) and 53,109 returnees (+19,438 Q1 2020)

IPC Food Security: November 2022 – Crisis (Phase 3); IPC Projections: December to March 2023 – Crisis (Phase 3); April to July 2023 – Crisis (Phase 3)

ECONOMY & LIVELIHOODS

Kajo-Keji County is located in Central Equatoria State. It is bordered by Juba County to the north, Lainya County to the west, Magwi County (Eastern Equatoria State) to the east, and Uganda to the south. The Nyiri mountains and hills in the eastern part of the county separates Kajo-Keji from the White Nile.

According to FEWSNET (2018), Kajo-Keji County falls within the equatorial maize and cassava livelihoods zone. Subsistence farming (39%) and livestock rearing (39%) are the dominant livelihoods, with a small group also engaging in fishing (6%), according to a 2013 IOM assessment. The county has significant amounts of arable land and high potential for agricultural development. The most popular crops grown are cassava, sorghum, groundnuts and maize. Conflict and insecurity since 2016 have significantly impacted the livelihoods and economic stability of the county, increasing the vulnerability of the population.

IPC projections put Kajo-Keji county at crisis (IPC level 3) in November 2022, with food insecurity conditions projected to persist at the same level until at least mid-2023. An estimated 50% of the county’s population engaged in farming, with a gross cereal yield of 1.4 tonnes per hectare in 2021 and 2022 (FAO/WFP 2022; FAO/WFP 2023). A 2020 REACH assessment found Kajo Keji residents dealing with food insecurity in a variety of ways. Residents in 32% of assessed settlements reported coping with a lack of food by only having children eat, 18% reported consuming wild foods known to make people sick and residents in 21% of settlements reported their hunger to be severe or the worst it can be. Residents in 21% of assessed settlements reported having no physical access to a functional market at the time of the assessment. This is a marked change in food security levels since early 2016 when arable land, proximity to the international market,Since this time the area has been characterized by increased displacement, food insecurity, and decreased levels of resilience. However, a 2022 REACH assessment showed a decrease in the severity of food insecurity across a number of indicators.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES

The headquarters of Kajo-Keji County is in Lire Payam. Prior to the outbreak of conflict in 2016, Kajo-Keji was considered a model county in terms of its development and stability, with strong support from the diaspora to build its infrastructure, and Kajo-Keji town hosted schools and healthcare facilities. Since the outbreak of conflict in 2016, much of the infrastructure has been damaged or deserted and will require significant rehabilitation to adequately serve the population. In 2019, Kajo-Keji was highlighted as one of the key border towns in South Sudan targeted to receive access to electricity sources powered by a dam in Uganda, funded by the African Development Bank. While the relative stabilization of the security and political situation in South Sudan had led to the resumption of some development initiatives since 2018, the status of this project was not publicly available as of early 2020.

Kajo Keji is currently home to twelve (12) Early Childhood Development centres, fifty-eight (58) primary schools and four (4) secondary schools.

Kajo-Keji County was reported to have fifty-two (52) health facilities, 50 of which are reported to be functional (albeit with almost all functioning facilities having only limited functionality). Among the health facilities are thirty-seven (37) PHCUs, twelve (12) PHCCs and one (1) hospital in March 2021. This means that there were an estimated 2.39 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 2.58 PHCCs per 50,000 people according to the WHO. Kajo-Keji Civil Hospital is reported to have limited functionality.

According to OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023, there are nearly 176,000 people with humanitarian needs in Kajo-Keji (up from 137,400 in the 2021 HNO), which is about 75% of the estimated population for Kajo-Keji County reported in the HNO. This large figure is driven by high reported health, food security and protection needs among the non-displaced population.

Kajo-Keji County was identified as among the most under-assessed locations in the country, in part because of the physical constraints imposed by the terrain and access challenges arising from violence and bureaucratic impediments (OCHA 2021, p.84).

CONFLICT DYNAMICS

Conflict dynamics in Kajo-Keji County have been historically – and increasingly – intertwined with those of northern Uganda, and particularly Moyo District in the latter’s Northern Region. During the second Sudanese civil war, the town of Kajo-Keji exchanged hands multiple times between the SAF and SPLM/A, with the town becoming the SPLA Tactical Headquarters and the area hosting the West Nile Bank Front – a now defunct Ugandan armed opposition group supported by the Sudanese government – during the mid-1990s (HRW 1995; Madut-Arop 2006, p.313; Africa Confidential 1997). As a result, much of the predominantly Kuku population of Kajo-Keji were displaced into northern Uganda (where many remain to this day), while members of the Madi community residing in Uganda have been displaced into Kajo-Keji during times of conflict in Moyo (Leonardi and Santschi 2016, pp.18-19).

Although this displacement has provided opportunity for deepening the close and long-established social, familiar and economic ties between the Kuku/Kakwa and the Madi, the associated movement has also brought competition over resources and administrative areas. In particular, a dispute over the ambiguous border between South Sudan and Uganda rapidly escalated into displacement and cross-border attacks between the two communities in September 2014, after a Ugandan census team and a local official were arrested by South Sudanese security forces (Leonardi and Santschi 2016, p.42). The events have contributed to a hardening of ethnic identities, whilst reports of incursions along the common border have continued to drive tensions in the area, most recently in 2023 (Eye Radio 2023b; Eye Radio 2023c) and again in February 2024 (Eye Radio 2024).

The county has since been the site of periodic tensions between established communities from Kajo-Keji and returnees on the one hand, and SPLA soldiers and predominantly Dinka IDPs on the other (Fegley 2009). In 2008, Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) activity was reported in Kajo-Keji, including an alleged massacre by LRA forces in early February. This massacre was variously described as having killed between 4 and 141 people, with the lower estimate being provided by the SPLA. Both the identity of the attackers and the true casualty figures are unknown, though reports indicated that South Sudanese authorities had downplayed the severity of the incident due to alleged involvement of disgruntled soldiers and the ongoing peace mediation with the LRA that was taking place in Juba (Schomerus 2021, Ch.7).

Tensions have also increased between the local community and Dinka Bor pastoralists, escalating as the national conflict spread to the county since 2016 (discussed below). In March 2021, eight people were killed by unknown pastoralists close to the Ugandan border (VOA 2021). In February 2023, and following escalating tensions and attacks between local residents and Dinka Bor pastoralists, at least 27 people from both communities were killed in two attacks (Eye Radio 2023a; UNMISS 2023; UN Panel of Experts 2023). Approximately 19,750 people were reported to have been displaced as a result of the violence (Protection Cluster 2023).

While Kajo-Keji was largely spared from the large-scale violence resulting from the national conflict in 2013, it was significantly impacted by the second wave of violence that spread from Juba in 2016. Following several months of tension and low-level violence, fighting started in Kajo-Keji in June 2016 when suspected opposition forces attacked an SSPDF barracks, reportedly resulting in dozens of fatalities (Sudan Tribune 2016). After the attack, the government launched a counter-insurgency campaign in the area that contributed to the displacement of a significant portion of the county’s population to Uganda (UN HRC 2018). Human Rights Watch documented the cases of 47 civilians alleged to have been killed during this violence in Kajo-Keji County between June 2016 and May 2017, including indiscriminate shooting on civilian targets in markets and several cases of enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention of children (HRW 2017). Soldiers and mostly Dinka cattle keepers allegedly looted possessions, including livestock, as they occupied areas deserted by the civilian populations (HRW 2017). Meanwhile, SPLA-IO forces had established a presence in Kangapo II and Liwolo payams to the west of the county. The UN Human Rights Council (2018, p.8) also reported abuses by the SPLA-IO against the civilian population (including torture, theft, and sexual violence) after the outbreak of hostilities.

The establishment of the National Salvation Front (NAS) in March 2017 as a predominantly Equatorian rebellion split the population between those that supported the SPLA-IO and those supporting NAS. By October 2017, NAS engaged in fighting with both the SPLA and SPLA-IO in Kajo Keji, with intermittent fighting occurred between the SPLA-IO and NAS alongside more limited skirmishes against the government forces over the subsequent two years. Meanwhile, clashes between the military and SPLA-IO continued into 2018, briefly escalating in September as the R-ARCSS was being finalised. Between September and December 2020, serious clashes were reported in the Mangalotore area between the SPLA-IO and forces loyal to a commander who had defected to the military on 21 September (UN Panel of Experts 2020, p.14). More recently, relations between the local population and the SSPDF were once again strained following the alleged killing of three civilians by SSPDF soldiers in May 2022, as reported by Human Rights Watch (2023).

ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS

Payams: Lire (County Headquarters), Kangapo I, Kangapo II, Liwolo, Nyepo

 UN OCHA 2020 map of Kajo-Keji County: https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-kajo-keji-county-reference-map-march-2020

 Roads from Kajo-Keji town:

• A primary road running northward to Juba County was deemed to be “passable” during the dry season in 2022 and is designated “passable with difficulties” in the rainy season of 2023. The condition of the primary road southwards to Uganda is passable according to local actors.
• The road conditions for the primary road running west to Yei County is unknown.
• A secondary road runs east to Eastern Equatoria State, with the closest town being Pageri, Magwi County. The road conditions are unknown.

 In late 2021, road conditions in Kajo-Keji county were deemed so poor that Chamber of Commerce representatives report that no goods are coming to Kajo-Keji via Juba due to the poor road conditions, and cited transport conditions as a major factor in driving high commodity prices (Radio Tamazuj 2021).

UNHAS-recognised Heli and Fixed-Wing Airplane Airstrips: Kajo-Keji

REFERENCES

Africa Confidential. (1997). Museveni’s backyard. Retrieved 17 October 2023.

Eye Radio. (2023a). Update: 27 confirmed dead in Kajo-Keji violence. Retrieved 20 July 2023.

Eye Radio. (2023b). Woman killed, 3 abducted by Ugandan army in Kajo-Keji – MPs. Retrieved 17 October 2023.

Eye Radio. (2023c). Kajo-Keji Chief calls for reopening of Uganda-South Sudan border. Retrieved 17 October 2023.

Eye Radio. (2024). Uganda’s army trespasses into Kajo-Keji again, says local official. Retrieved 14 February 2024.

HRW. (1995). Human Rights Watch World Report 1995 – Sudan. Retrieved 17 October 2023.

HRW. (2017). “Soldiers Assume We Are Rebels” Escalating Violence and Abuses in South Sudan’s Equatorias. Retrieved 13 July 2023.

HRW. (2022). South Sudan: Submission to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. Retrieved 17 October 2023.

IOM. (2013). Village Assessment Survey: County Atlas. Retrieved 21 July 2023.

Leonardi, C. and Santcshi, M. (2016). Dividing Communities in South Sudan and Northern Uganda: Boundary disputes and land governance. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 17 October 2023.

Protection Cluster. (2023). Kajo-Keji County/Central Equatoria State Protection Response February 2023. Retrieved 20 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2021). Residents of Kajo-keji complain of rising commodity prices. 29 October 2021.  Retrieved 13 July 2023.

REACH. (2020). Integrated Needs Tracking (INT) County Profile – Kajo-keji County. Retrieved 13 July 2023.

REACH. (2022). Integrated Needs Tracking (INT) County Profiles. Retrieved 13 July 2023.

Schomerus, M. (2021). The Lord’s Resistance Army: Violence and Peacemaking in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sudan Tribune. (2016). Rival forces clash in South Sudan’s Central Equatoria state. Retrieved 17 October 2023.

UN Human Rights Council. (2018). Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, A/HRC/37/71. Retrieved 17 October 2023.

UNMISS. (2023). UNMISS strongly condemns deadly violence in Kajo-Keji Central Equatoria State. Retrieved 20 July 2023.

UN Panel of Experts. (2020). Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted

pursuant to resolution 2521 (2020). Retrieved 17 October 2023.

UN Panel of Experts. (2023). Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2633 (2022). Retrieved 20 July 2023.

 VOA. (19 March 2021). 8 Killed in Suspected South Sudan Revenge Attack. Retrieved 13 July 2023.

REPORTS on KAJO-KEJI

Fegley, R. (2009). Local Needs and Agency Conflict: A Case Study of Kajo Keji County, South Sudan. Retrieved 13 July 2023.

Global Rights Compliance. (2022). No Choice but to Flee: Starvation and Displacement in Central Equatoria, South Sudan. Retrieved 13 July 2023.

Human Rights Watch. (2017). “Soldiers Assume We Are Rebels” Escalating Violence and Abuses in South Sudan’s Equatorias. Retrieved 13 July 2023.

Ladu, J. L. C., Athiba, A. L., Demetry, P. L., & Babi, M. L. A. (2019). ‘Environmental Impact Assessment of a Proposed Small-Scale Cement Mining Operations in Kigwo Boma, Kangapo 1 Payam, Kajokeji County, Central Equatoria State, Republic of South Sudan’. Environmental Sciences, 7(2), 66-73. Retrieved 13 July 2023.

Leonardi, C. and Santcshi, M. (2016). Dividing Communities in South Sudan and Northern Uganda: Boundary disputes and land governance. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 17 October 2023.

Leonardi, C. (2007). ‘The Poison in the Ink Bottle: Poison cases and the moral economy of knowledge in 1930s Equatoria, Sudan’. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 1 (1), pp. 34-56. Retrieved 3 November 2023.

Leonardi, C. (2020). Patchwork States: The Localization of State Territoriality on the South Sudan-Uganda Border, 1914-2014. Retrieved 17 October 2023.

The New Humanitarian. (2017). The war in Equatoria: A rare look inside South Sudan’s spreading conflict. Retrieved 13 July 2023.

UNMISS. (2019). Conflict-related Violations and Abuses in Central Equatoria, September 2018—April 2019. Retrieved 13 July 2023.

* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.