Longochuk County, Upper Nile State

Demographics

2008 NBS Census population: 63,166

2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 44,205

2022 OCHA population estimate*: 74,591

2024 UN OCHA population estimate*: 44,205

2024 IPC population estimate: 76,828

2025 UN OCHA population estimate*: 80,526

Ethnic groups: Eastern Jikany Nuer (Gaat Jaak/Gajaak) and Koma

Displacement Figures as of September 2024: 2,953 IDPs (+2,953 Sept. 2023) and 48,242 returnees (+25,457 Sept. 2023)

November 2022 IPC Food Security Projections: November 2024 – Crisis (Phase 3); December 2022 to March 2025 – Crisis (Phase 3); April to July 2025 – Emergency (Phase 4)

Economy & Livelihoods

Longochuk County (sometimes spelled Longechuk or Longochok County) is located in Upper Nile State. It borders Maiwut County to the southeast, Luakpiny/Nasir to the south-west, Baliet County to the north-west and Maban County to the north. The county also shares international borders with both Sudan and Ethiopia in the east, and several rivers flow through the county including the Adar and Daga.

The county is part of the Eastern flood plains livelihood zone, characterized by grasslands, forests, and swamps. It is an agro-pastoral area, with livelihoods tied to agriculture, raising livestock, and fishing. A 2016 Cordaid report noted that artisanal gold mining occurs in some eastern parts of the county (Cordaid 2016, p.18). An estimated 70% of households are engaged in farming (FAO/WFP 2019). This number of households engaged in farming has been maintained as of 2021. Gross cereal yields were reported at 0.5 tonnes per hectare in 2021 and 2022 (FAO/WFP 2022, FAO/WFP 2023). Unlike most other parts of South Sudan, the staple cereal in Longochuk (and some neighbouring counties) is maize. All agriculture is rain fed, with harvests generally occurring in March. Other crops grown include sorghum, cow peas, pumpkins, and okra. The main livestock reared are cattle, goats, and some chickens. Fish is mainly consumed during the dry season, supplementing diets during the lean months. Longochuk also traditionally sees seasonal livestock movement into the county from neighbouring counties and Sudan.

IPC projections for Longochuk are at crisis levels (IPC Phase 3) of food insecurity as of November 2024, where they are projected to remain through March 2025 before deteriorating to Emergency levels (IPC Phase 4) through at least July 2025. By December 2023, 25% of households in the county are projected to be meeting 25-50% of their caloric needs through humanitarian assistance, and these conditions are expected to last until at least July 2023.

In 2021 Longochuk was identified as a flood-affected county by the Emergency Response Coordination Centre. An October 2021 IRNA found that extreme rain destroyed crops, household latrines, drinking water facilities and livestock throughout the county. A total of 30,585 individuals across 6,117 households were affected throughout the county.

The county has historically relied on trade routes with Ethiopia, however access to these trade routes tend to be reduced during the rainy season and insecurity has further hindered access in recent years..

Infrastructure & Services

The county HQ is Mathiang. The main markets are in Mathiang and Udier. Even prior to the 2013 conflict, Longochuk possessed minimal infrastructure, and experienced little development, whilst the road network is skeletal. The challenges of limited infrastructure were compounded by returnees to the area in preparation for independence. Additional pressure was placed on local infrastructure on services in 2020, when the county received 4,000 IDPs fleeing clashes in Maiwut. Furthermore, Longochuk County serves as an important transit area for IDPs and returnees from refugee camps in Gambella in Ethiopia, with Mathiang and Udier the most common travel routes. In 2024, long-suspended plans to revive the county’s road network were reportedly restarted (Radio Tamazuj 2024a).

Longochuk County is home to thirteen (13) Early Childhood Development centres, fifty-seven (57) primary schools, and six (6) secondary schools, including Longochuk Secondary in Longochuk Payam.

In December 2024, the WHO reported that Longochuk County had sixteen (16) health facilities, of which sixteen (16) were functional. These functional facilities included eleven (11) primary health care units (PHCUs), five (5) primary health care centres (PHCCs), and no hospitals. This means there were approximately 2.05 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 3.1 PHCCs per 50,000 people in the county at that time. Limited healthcare facilities may have been a contributing factor to the 2019 measles outbreak in the county.

According to OCHA’s 2025 Humanitarian Needs Overview, there are an estimated 70,622 people in need in Longochuk County, which represents approximately 88% of the county’s total population reported by OCHA for 2025. For comparison, in 2024, OCHA reported that there were an estimated 60,150 people in need in Longochuk County, of whom 29,424 were non-displaced people, with the remainder comprising IDPs and returnees. According to OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2020, Longochuk County had one of the lowest resilience capacities of counties in South Sudan. In 2023, OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023 identified that approximately 59,600 people in the county were considered to have humanitarian needs (up from 43,600 in 2021), which represented approximately 80% of the estimated population for the county reported in the HNO. In 2020, the need for GBV services was listed as “extreme” in Longochuk County by the HNO. In 2021, OCHA identified Longochuk as one of the five counties which experienced high access constraints in 2020 related to active hostilities, constant violence against humanitarian personnel and assets and the physical environment.

Conflict Dynamics

Longochuk County is surrounded by several conflict-affected parts of Upper Nile State alongside Blue Nile State in Sudan. These areas have each experienced distinctive conflict dynamics, which have at points filtered through into Longochuk and influenced conflict within the county. Longochuk County was also associated with Anya-Nya 2 forces during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005), with the Eastern Jikany Nuer’s Gajaak section affected by fighting between the SPLM/A and Anya-Nya 2 during the early stages of the war (PACT Sudan 2006, pp.116-17). Although Anya-Nya 2 forces largely merged with the SPLM/A in 1988, these forces subsequently sided with the SPLM/A-Nasir faction after the 1991 SPLM/A split, and most ultimately realigned to the government as the 1990s progressed. This resulted in a number of pro-government militias having an established presence in the county, with several commanders from these groups continuing to exert an influence in Longochuk after the conclusion of the conflict.

During the latter half of the second civil war, Longochuk experienced localised conflicts (WFP 1999; OLS 1999) as well as spillover effects from conflicts originating in nearby areas. During the long-running conflict between parts of the Lou and Eastern Jikany Nuer clans that escalated along the Jonglei-Upper Nile border in 1993, Longochuk experienced raiding from parts of the Lou Nuer community, albeit to a lesser extent when compared to counties to the south of Upper Nile (Stringham and Forney 2017, pp.189, 199). The Lou-Eastern Jikany Nuer conflict is discussed further in the profiles for Ulang and Luakpiny/Nasir counties. Additionally, northern parts of Longochuk were embroiled in the violence that saw government and pro-government militia attempt to clear populated areas south of the Adar oil field in the early 2000s. The violence was linked to efforts to expand the government presence in the area, and identify potential sites for further oil exploration, and resulted in significant displacement in northern Longochuk (Africa Confidential 2001; ECOS 2006, p.23). Further context for these events can be found in the profile for Melut County.

By the end of the second civil war, Longochuk was largely controlled by factions that were part of the pro-government South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) umbrella group (ISS 2004, p.8), many of whom had links to the Military Intelligence branch of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). After the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the 2006 Juba Declaration – which resulted in the integration of much of the SSDF into the SPLA – some SSDF militia in Longochuk did not integrate into the SPLA, reportedly due to lingering personal disputes and disagreements over seniority (ECOS 2006, fn.97). However, in March 2006 a prominent SSDF commander from Longochuk (who was associated with the depopulation of villages in northern Longochuk) entered talks to join the SPLA, prompting SAF Military Intelligence to revive links with local SSDF militia in Longochuk, who were supplied with arms (ICG 2006, pp.13-14). Shortly afterwards, heavy fighting between the SSDF and SPLA broke out in the county in April 2006, following an alleged assassination attempt against the local SPLM county commissioner (Arnold 2007, p.494).

Detailed information is limited with regards to conflict(s) affecting Longochuk in the latter parts of the CPA era. However, community consultations published in 2012 noted that cross-border cattle raiding (allegedly involving communities from Luakpiny/Nasir County, as well as parts of Jonglei State and adjoining areas of Ethiopia) and localised conflicts were impacting the county, with competition over access to water points during the dry season being identified as a priority issue by surveyed residents (UNDP 2012, pp.21-23). Following independence, low-level clashes with Fulani (‘Fallata’) pastoralists crossing from Sudan were reported in and around Longochuk County (Concordis International 2012a, p.74), while efforts were made to pre-empt tensions and encourage peaceable relations between the migrating and host communities during a 2012 cross-border migration conference (Concordis International 2012b). Meanwhile, eastern parts of Longochuk also hosted refugees fleeing escalating conflict in Sudan’s Blue Nile State, reportedly placing strains on local resources (UNMISS 2012).

Longochuk was enmeshed in the early stages of the national conflict (2013-2018), with much of the local population supporting the opposition and providing recruits (Craze 2019, p.37), and a number of former SSDF commanders defecting to the SPLA-IO at the outset of the conflict. Fighting was initially concentrated in Guelguk Payam to the north of the county (Radio Tamazuj 2014a), driving displacement to Maban County (Radio Tamazuj 2014b). Meanwhile, white army** forces from the Eastern Jikany community reportedly overran Mathiang town in the early stages of the conflict (Young 2016, p.43).

The SPLA advanced into Longochuk in 2015, while a number of clashes were reported in and around the county during the first half of the year (Small Arms Survey 2015; Sudan Tribune 2015). After the collapse of the 2015 ARCSS in July 2016, a number of commanders from Longochuk aligned themselves with the Taban Deng faction of the SPLA-IO in December 2016 (Sudan Tribune 2016), as the SPLA-IO’s military strength in Upper Nile began to wane. In July 2017, and after advancing across much of Longochuk County over the previous two months, the SPLA were able to retake Mathiang town from the SPLA-IO and affiliated white army forces. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights alleges that the SPLA offensive into Longochuk was linked to significant displacement and attacks on civilians, with damage reported to education, health, and humanitarian assets in Mathiang, and unexploded ordnance reportedly placed in a number of watering points (UN OHCHR 2018, pp.102-3, 110).

Longochuk was relatively stable in the period following the signing of the R-ARCSS in 2018. However, low-level clashes were reported between the SPLA-IO and SSPDF in Guelguk Payam in early 2021, while the county has been affected by violence relating to defections from the SPLA-IO to the military since September 2021 (UNSC 2021, p.4). Instability increased in February and March of 2022 as fighting broke out in several parts of the county (Eye Radio 2022; The Radio Community 2022; Sudans Post 2022), with the UN Panel of Experts (2022, p.9) reporting that the fighting involved SPLA-IO forces and former SPLA-IO forces who realigned with the government the previous year. Further clashes between SSPDF and SPLA-IO forces took place in Mathiang town in June 2023 (Radio Tamazuj 2023).

In addition to tensions between government and opposition forces, clashes were also reported in early 2024 between an alleged group of armed youths and SPLA-IO forces, amid local political tensions (Radio Tamazuj 2024b). Additionally, Longochuk is reported to have experienced resource constraints linked to the arrival of several thousand returnees in the county. This includes people fleeing the ongoing conflict in Sudan, as well as the recent turbulence (and temporary suspension of food aid) in Ethiopia’s Gambella Region, amid fighting involving parts of the Nuer and Anyuak communities in Gambella (Radio Tamazuj 2024c).

While Longochuk has often been associated with its Eastern Jikany Nuer community, the county is shared with members of the Koma ethnic group (based in eastern areas of the county), while Longochuk’s Nuer community have important links with the Mabanese community from neighbouring Maban County. Periodic conflict involving groups from parts of Longochuk’s Gajaak section and Mabanese communities has occurred since the 1960s, and escalated in the latter years of the second civil war. This was the subject of a 2005 peace conference, which sought to address mounting tensions (Mulla 2005; PACT Sudan 2005, p.16). Since this time, there have been no reports of conflict involving the two communities within Longochuk County, while there are close linguistic and marriage ties among communities from Longochuk and Banashowa Payam in southern Maban County. As is noted by the Small Arms Survey, these linkages formed the basis through which parts of the southern Mabanese community were integrated into the SPLA-IO (Hassan 2020, pp.32-33).

Longochuk was also affected by the shift from the 10 states system to the 28/32 states during the second half of the national conflict. After Latjoor State was sub-divided into Latjoor (comprising Ulang and Luakpiny/Nasir counties) and Maiwut State (comprising Longochuk and Maiwut counties), divisions emerged within parts of the Koma community (who are also based in neighbouring Maiwut County) as to whether to remain within Maiwut State or merge with Northern Upper Nile State, which encompassed Maban, Renk, and Melut counties (Eye Radio 2017; Radio Tamazuj 2017a). Following a meeting hosted by the presidency, representatives from the Eastern Jikany Nuer and Koma communities agreed to cooperate in the running of Maiwut State, with the Koma community granted the deputy governorship of the (now defunct) state (Radio Tamazuj 2017b). Since the reversion to 10 states, parts of the Koma community have called for a new county within Upper Nile State to be created to reverse perceived community marginalisation (Eye Radio 2023).

Administration & Logistics 

Payams listed in Government and UN documents: Longochuk (County HQ), Dajo, Guelguk, Malual, Pamach, Wudier

Alternative list of payams provided by local actors: Mathiang (County HQ), Dajo, Guelguk, Jangok, Malual, Pamach, Wudier

UN OCHA 2020 map of Longochuk County: https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-longochuk-county-reference-map-march-2020

Roads:

• Mathiang and Mangok Centre lie on a primary road that runs from Pagak in Maiwut County in the southeast to Paloich (Melut County) and Bunj (Maban County) to the northwest (with a junction located at a disputed area along the common border between Melut and Maban counties). In both the rainy and dry season of 2024 and 2025 respectively, the Logistics Cluster listed the southern portion of the road prior to the junction as being impassable. In the rainy season of 2024, the road running between Bunj and Paloich was deemed passable by the Logistics Cluster, though the portion of the road between Munj and Jemam was deemed “passable with difficulties.” In the dry season of 2025 the roads running between Bunj and Paloich were deemed passable.

• A smaller road runs along the River Daga, by the county’s border with Maban County, from Dajo town to Gul Guk. Seasonal road conditions are unknown.

UNHAS-Recognized Heli-Landing Sites and Airstrips: None

Additional Airstrips: Daga Post (MAF); Chotbora (airstrip currently not serviced)

References

Africa Confidential. (2001). Opening new fronts in the oil war. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

Arnold, M. (2007). ‘The South Sudan Defence Force: Patriots, Collaborators or Spoilers?’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 45 (4), 489-516. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

Concordis International. (2012a). Crossing the Line: Transhumance in Transition Along the Sudan-South Sudan Border. Retrieved 12 December 2023.

Concordis International. (2012b) Longechuk Migration Conference Outcomes April 2012. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

Cordaid. (2016). Assessing Small-Scale Gold Mining in South Sudan. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

Craze, J. (2019). Displaced and Immiserated: The Shilluk of Upper Nile in South Sudan’s Civil War, 2014-19. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

ECOS, European Consortium on Oil in Sudan. (2006). Oil Development in Northern Upper Nile, Sudan. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive 3 February 2024.

Eye Radio. (2017). Koma Community torn between two states of Maiwut & N. Upper Nile. Retrieved 7 January 2024.

Eye Radio. (2022). 10 soldiers killed in rival SPLA-IO factions clashes in Nasir. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

Eye Radio. (2023). Koma community begs President Kiir for separate County. Retrieved 7 January 2024.

FAO/WFP. (2019). Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

FEWSNET. (2018). Livelihoods Zone Map and Descriptions for the Republic of South Sudan (Updated). Retrieved 10 July 2023.

FEWSNET. (2019). Risk of farming (IPC phase 5) will persist in 2020 despite slight improvements during harvesting period. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Hassan, K.A. (2020). Spilling Over: Conflict Dynamics in and around Sudan’s Blue Nile State, 2015–19. Small Arms Survey. Retrieved 4 February 2024.

ICG, International Crisis Group. (2006). Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

ISS, Institute for Security Studies. (2004). The South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF): A challenge to the Sudan Peace Process. Retrieved 12 March 2024.

IRNA. (2021). Flood IRNA Report Longechuk County Upper Nile State, October 2021. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Mulla, R.K. (2005). Report of the Mabaan and Nuer Longuchuk Peace conference, 13 March 2005. PACT. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive 19 February 2024.

OCHA. (2019). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2020. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

OCHA. (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2021. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

OLS. (1999). Operation Lifeline Sudan Weekly Report: 22 Dec 1999. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

PACT Sudan. (2005). Quarterly Report: Jan 1st – March 31st 2005. USAID. Retrieved 19 February 2024.

PACT Sudan. (2006). Sudan Peace Fund (SPF): Final Report October 2022 – December 2005. USAID.

Radio Tamazuj. (2014a). Fighting south of Adar oil field in Upper Nile. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2014b). Displaced near Longochuk, Upper Nile. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2017a). Koma citizens demand annexation to Northern Upper Nile state. Retrieved 7 January 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2017b). Kiir rejects annexation of Koma to Northern Upper Nile state. Retrieved 7 January 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2023). Tension in Longechuk after clash between SSPDF and SPLA-IO. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2024a). Construction of Longechuk road resumes after 12 years. Retrieved 28 April 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2024b). 4 youths arrested in Longechuk County for blocking commissioner’s return. Retrieved 15 February 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2024c). Returnees in Longechuk County need urgent aid. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2015). The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describes events through 9 April 2015. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2016). The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describing events through 8 March 2016. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Stringham, N. and Forney, J. (2017). ‘It takes a village to raise a militia: local politics, the Nuer White Army, and South Sudan’s civil wars’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 55 (2), 177-199. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

Sudans Post. (2022). Gov’t allied militia attacks SPLA-IO base in Longechuk. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

Sudan Tribune. (2015). South Sudan’s rival forces trade accusations over renewed fighting. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

Sudan Tribune. (2016). SPLM-IO generals join FVP Taban Deng. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

The Radio Community. (2022). SSPDF and SPLA-IO trade blames over ongoing clashes in Longechuk. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

UNDP. (2012). Community Consultation Report: Upper Nile State, South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

UNMISS. (2012). Refugee influx into Longochuk and Maiwut counties. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

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pursuant to resolution 2577 (2021), S/2022/359. Retrieved 2 February 2024.

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Young, J. (2016). Popular Struggles and Elite Co-optation: The Nuer White Army in South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Reports on Longochuk

Short, A. (2015). Cattle and Pastoralism in Greater Upper Nile Research Report.

* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.

** Note: ‘White’ armies are distinguished from ‘black’ armies in that the white armies are informal, and the black armies are the organized, uniformed forces.