Malakal County, Upper Nile State

DEMOGRAPHY

2008 NBS Census population: 126,483
2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 76,231
2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 195,528

Ethnic groups: Shilluk/Chollo, Padang Dinka, Nuer  Displacement Figures Q3 2022: 69,370 IDPs (+31,583 Q1 2020) and 15,990 (+8,082 Q1 2020)

IPC Food Security: November 2022 – Emergency (Phase 4); IPC Projections: December 2022 to March 2023 – Emergency (Phase 4); April to July 2023 – Emergency (Phase 4)

ECONOMY & LIVELIHOODS

Malakal County is located in Upper Nile State and hosts the state capital in the city of Malakal. It borders Fashoda County to the north, Baliet County to the east and Panyikang County to the south and west. It also has a narrow international border with Sudan to the north-west. Malakal town lies along the eastern bank of the White Nile, which flows northwards through the county.

The county is classified as the Northern sorghum and livestock livelihoods zone (FAO 2018). The south of the county is in a low-lying area that consists of savannah grassland, bush and patches of forest.  The White Nile River is a key resource for transportation connecting Malakal to Renk and Sudan; Malakal to Juba and Malakal to Nasir and Ethiopia. Livestock rearing is an important livelihood activity with trade, cereal-production and fishery also widely practiced. In both zones, communities in the county are mostly agro-pastoralists.

A March 2019 FAO/WFP report estimated that only 12% of households had farming as their primary livelihood, likely reflecting the larger urban population relative to neighbouring counties as well large-scale displacement. More recent figures from the FAO/WFP indicate the figure has increased to 15% of households in the county being engaged in farming, with a gross cereal yield of 0.6 tonnes per hectare in 2021 (FAO/WFP 2022), declining to 0.5 tonnes per hectare in 2022 (FAO/WFP 2023). Other livelihoods include rearing livestock, fishing and foraging. The main crops are sorghum and maize, as well as pumpkin, cowpeas, sesame and vegetables. Malakal County is one of the few areas in South Sudan that practices large-scale mechanized farming, although these operations have been curtailed since the outbreak of fighting in 2013. Better-off households keep cattle, goats and sheep. Fishing is seasonal, taking place primarily in the swamps towards the end of the rainy season and into the dry season.

The violence in the region since December 2013, however, has induced large-scale displacement internally and externally, disrupted normal farming cycles, and severely imperilled livelihoods, especially around Malakal town. Malakal has hosted a large Protection of Civilians (PoC) site since the outset of the national conflict in 2013. Additionally, a sustained risk of sexual and gender-based violence when leaving the PoC has impacted the ability of women to collect firewood and access livelihoods. As of February 2023, Malakal PoC hosted over 41,000 IDPs (South Sudan NGO Forum). Malakal distinguishes itself from other PoC sites by its proportionally large ‘commuter’ population that leaves in the morning and returns on the same day (up to 70% of the daily measured flow). On 4 September 2020, UNMISS announced their intention to transition the PoC sites across the country, legally redesignating them as formal IDP settlements under the jurisdiction of the South Sudanese government. Malakal is the last remaining PoC site to be redesignated.

IPC projections for Malakal are at Emergency levels (IPC Phase 4) of food insecurity as of November 2022, and are project to remain at Emergency levels until at least July 2023. As of November 2022, over 25% of households in Malakal were predicted to meet over 50% of their caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance, though projections for December 2022 to July 2023 indicate that fewer than 25% will require humanitarian assistance during this time period.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES

Malakal town in Central Malakal Payam is the county HQ, as well as Upper Nile State’s capital. When the number of states in South Sudan was increased during the controversial redistricting of December 2015, Malakal County was included in Eastern Nile State, and eventually to Central Upper Nile state in January 2017. However, when the 10-state arrangement was agreed in early 2020, it once again became a part of Upper Nile State.

Contests between parts of the Shilluk and the Padang Dinka communities over control of Malakal town (including its administration and resources) alongside ownership of land on the eastern bank of the River Nile has become particularly acute during the recent national conflict, with redistricting further stoking tensions between elements of the two communities (Craze 2019; Pritchard 2020). In 2021, the government announced that Malakal County was to be renamed ‘Makal County’, with Malakal town itself becoming a municipality (Eye Radio 2021). Under this arrangement, administration of Makal County (minus Malakal town) would be conducted from the town of Wau Shilluk on the west bank of the River Nile. This would in practice risk limiting the ability of the Shilluk community (who had been largely dislodged from Malakal town towards the west bank of the River Nile or into the PoC during the conflict) to participate in the governance of Malakal town (Craze 2022).

Following the outbreak of civil war in December 2013, fighting resulted in the destruction of key infrastructure and institutions in Malakal town, including healthcare facilities, churches and mosques. The county is home to Upper Nile University, one of the country’s key public higher education institutions. However, after conflict broke out the campus was closed and some operations were relocated to Juba. More recently, the campus is being rebuilt to serve the county as well as the broader region. Malakal Airport was previously the only international airport in South Sudan other than Juba International Airport, and one of only four tarmacked airstrips in the country. However, international flights were stopped following the outbreak of the civil war.

Malakal Teaching Hospital is the key healthcare facility in the county and broader region and is supported by humanitarian organizations. In 2014, the hospital was attacked and looted, and a number of civilians were killed.  Malakal County was reported to have twenty-one (21) health facilities including thirteen (13) functional health facilities, among them two (2) PHCUs, nine (9) PHCCs and four (4) hospitals in 2022. This means that there were an estimated .08 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 1.54 PHCCs per 50,000 people according to the WHO, which ranks Malakal as the county with the lowest ratio of PHCUs/person in South Sudan.

In addition to disputes between the Shilluk and Padang Dinka, tensions between the Shilluk and Nuer have re-escalated in the wake of the split (largely along ethnic lines) in the Kitgweng faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army – In Opposition (SPLA-IO) in 2022 (discussed further below). This conflict has affected parts of northern Jonglei and western Upper Nile states, and displaced at least 22,000 people to the Malakal PoC site (WHO 2022). According to OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023, there are an estimated 164,314 people with humanitarian needs in the county, up markedly from 114,200 in 2021. This represents approximately 84% of the estimated population of Malakal County reported in the HNO, and reflects the deterioration in security and stability in and around the county.

Malakal County is home to six (6) Early Childhood Development centres (down from twenty-five (25) in 2021), thirty-two (32) primary schools and thirteen (13) secondary schools located throughout Lelo, Malakal Centre, Malakal North and Malakal South payams.

CONFLICT DYNAMICS

In 1914, the newly established town of Malakal became the capital of the Upper Nile Province (Akol 2014, p.24), and remains the capital of Upper Nile State in the present day. Historically a centre of commerce, cultural interaction, and learning, the town has also been increasingly associated with competing claims regarding ownership, alongside conflict and displacement. It has also become a node for wider conflicts affecting the Upper Nile region, which have amplified divisions between elements of the state’s largest ethnic communities. However, rather than emerging from ethno-political divisions, war has instead tended to produce them, with these divisions being successively reinforced during periods of peace dominated by (often contentious) phases of political reordering. Over time, disputes in and around Malakal have tended to become increasingly ethnicised, and have often expanded to encompass wider areas of Upper Nile State.

Conflict and divisions during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005)

Malakal was a government garrison town during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005), and became a conduit for Khartoum to coordinate and supply various paramilitary forces during the conflict. Despite a number of SPLM/A plans to seize Malakal, no serious effort was made to do so (Madut-Arop 2006; Nyaba 1997). During the second half of the 1980s, increasing hunger among residents of Malakal (including displaced persons) raised tensions between civil and military authorities in Malakal, while both the government and SPLM/A were alleged to have pursued policies that prevented the provision and/or distribution of aid to the town (Africa Watch 1990, p.117, 132-33; Burr and Collins 1995, p.55, 97, 108, 225).

Following the 1991 SPLM/A split, divisions within parts of the Shilluk/Chollo community resulted in fighting between members of the SPLM/A who wished to remain loyal to John Garang, and those who defected to the SPLM/A-Nasir faction. Lam Akol – a Shilluk SPLM/A commander based in Upper Nile –played an important role in establishing this new faction. As the SPLM/A-Nasir faction disintegrated across the 1990s, Upper Nile experienced significant instability and insecurity, resulting in large numbers of Shilluk civilians based in settlements on the east bank of the River Nile seeking sanctuary in predominantly Shilluk areas west of the Nile, or else into parts of northern Sudan. Within Upper Nile, fighting between the Nuer and Shilluk components of the Nasir faction would lay the groundwork for enduring tensions between parts of the two communities (PACT Sudan 2006, p.117). During this time, relations also deteriorated between parts of the Shilluk and Padang Dinka communities (who had previously shared a number of areas on the Nile’s east bank), resulting in periodic conflict between these communities and their respective opposition factions, including over land (Craze 2013, p.134).

After Lam Akol rejoined the SPLM/A in 2003, predominantly Shilluk areas on the west bank of the Nile were affected by significant violence in 2004, resulting in mass displacement (HRW 2004). This was linked to activity (allegedly organised by SAF Military Intelligence) from pro-government forces under the command of Gabriel Gatwich Chan (known as ‘Tanginye’), who hailed from the Lak Nuer clan of Fangak County (Africa Confidential 2004; Small Arms Survey 2011a) This also resulted in violence between parts of the Nuer and Shilluk communities within Malakal town (Sudan Tribune 2004). As with violence in the mid-1990s, these events would go on to influence subsequent rounds of conflict in southern Upper Nile and northern Jonglei states.

Disputes and instability in the CPA and post-independence era (2005-2013)

Tensions between parts of the Shilluk communities and parts of the Nuer and Dinka communities persisted – and in some instances worsened – following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. With regards to tensions between parts of the Padang Dinka and Shilluk, land disputes would increasingly extend to the control of Malakal town and ultimately encompass the administration and governance of Upper Nile State more broadly. As discussed below, these have influenced recent conflict in Upper Nile and have contributed to political polarisation in the state (PAX 2021; Pritchard 2020).

There is historical evidence that both Shilluk and Dinka have co-existed and inter-married in the area for centuries with multiple waves of inward and outwards migration (PAX 2021, p.12; Craze 2022, p.16), though these narratives have increasingly been replaced by accounts that conflate the issues of community relations and land politics, and reframe these issues around which community first settled in the area (Deng et al. 2015, p.vii). Although this reframing has been associated with an intensification of competition and conflict in Malakal, there are also parts of the affected communities who express a desire to reconcile and revive past inter-relationships among the communities of Upper Nile in Malakal (Ojewska 2021).

Territorial disputes and conflict between elements of the Shilluk and Dinka communities on both sides of the White Nile date back to the displacement during the second civil war that is mentioned above. Some Shilluk commentators have claimed that during this period Dinka communities moved into land on either side of the White Nile that the Shilluk community considers their own. According to the Small Arms Survey, Malakal became a focal point for claims in 1994 when both the Shilluk and Padang Dinka petitioned the government of Sudan to recognise their claims of ownership over Malakal (Craze 2019, p.24). The issue re-escalated after a contested round of administrative reorganisation by the SPLM/A in 2004 (Craze 2019, p.24). These tensions ultimately resulted in clashes over land ownership in 2005-06 and 2009, and grievances were exacerbated in the course of subsequent redistricting, including the contested creation of Akoka County in 2010 (discussed further in the profile for Baliet County) and changes to South Sudan’s administrative structure between 2010 and 2015 (discussed below).**

Meanwhile, Malakal experienced significant fighting among parts of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) in 2006, 2009, and 2011. During the 2006 and 2009 incidents, tensions reportedly escalated following the arrival of ‘Tanginye’ (who commanded parts of the SAF contingent of the JIU) in the town. Tensions in all three instance were also reportedly heightened due to brewing concerns regarding the status of these (predominantly southern Sudanese) forces that were aligned to Khartoum in the event of a South Sudanese vote for independence, with the violence in 2011 coming shortly after the referendum on independence was undertaken (Small Arms Survey 2011a; Verjee 2011, p.10). These were in addition to clashes between parts of the Padang Dinka and Shilluk in Malakal during a ceremony to mark the fourth anniversary of the CPA in January 2009, which spread to nearby areas (Africa Confidential 2009, Small Arms Survey 2016, p.7).

Additionally, Malakal was affected by the instability that surrounded the 2010 elections, during which SPLA forces were deployed to predominantly Shilluk areas of Fashoda and Panyikang to conduct a disarmament campaign. The campaign occurred amid national-level tensions surrounding the establishment a new political party led by Lam Akol (Small Arms Survey 2011b). Human Rights Watch observed that a number of human rights abuses allegedly occurred during the campaign (HRW 2011), while the Small Arms Survey has reported that the SPLA forces were predominantly from the Nuer community, further straining relations between parts of the Shilluk and Nuer (Craze 2019, p.31). Activity from a number of opposition groups linked to Shilluk commanders increased following the elections, including the Agwelek opposition group linked to Johnson Olonyi. By mid-2013, opposition forces commanded by Olonyi had negotiated an amnesty agreement with the SPLA, though other opposition factions remained active in Upper Nile and the border areas with Sudan.

Displacement and political realignments during the national conflict (2013-2018)

During the national conflict (2013-2018), control of the Malakal town alternated between the SPLA-IO and SPLA multiple times. Between December 2013 and October 2015, it is estimated that the town had changed hands 12 times. In periods of intense fighting, the town experienced significant destruction, and was repeatedly deserted as the civilian population fled to the nearby UNMISS base and neighbouring counties. By April 2015, however, the SPLA (with support from allied forces under the command of Olonyi) had regained controlled of much of Upper Nile State – including Malakal – while the SPLA-IO maintained a presence in the rural areas of the south-eastern counties of the state.

However, underlying tensions between elements of Upper Nile State’s Shilluk and Padang Dinka communities resurfaced, feeding into antagonisms between the Agwelek and SPLA by early 2015 (Small Arms Survey 2015). In May 2015, Olonyi defected from the SPLA, ultimately aligning his mostly-Shilluk Agwelek force to the SPLA-IO. The Agwelek temporarily took control of Malakal town from the SPLA, though ultimately withdrew from the town following a series of losses (Small Arms Survey 2016). Amid growing divisions in the Agwelek, a further government offensive in early 2017 largely pushed the opposition from much of the west bank of the Nile. This offensive resulted in significant fighting and displacement in parts of Malakal County (including Wau Shilluk on the west bank of the Nile), pushing many Shilluk civilians towards the border with Sudan (Craze 2019, pp.74-76).

The Malakal Protection of Civilians (PoC) site has been a significant source of tension and sensitivity in Malakal County during and after the national conflict. Its population is drawn from multiple ethnic groups, but has increasingly comprised members of the Shilluk and Nuer communities, many of whom remain in the site due to insecurity or the fear that leaving Malakal would equate to relinquishing claims to land they had previously owned in the town. As has been reported by CIVIC, MSF and the Small Arms Survey, in February 2016 – and following tensions among groups of Shilluk and Padang Dinka IDPs – Padang Dinka fighters and members of the SPLA attacked the PoC site, resulting in the death and injury of a number of civilians, while a significant portion of the Nuer and Shilluk areas of the camp were razed (CIVIC 2017; Craze 2019, pp.63-65; MSF 2016). Dinka and Darfuri areas were left undamaged. To date, Malakal has experienced minimal returns from the PoC and tensions over land ownership continue.

Malakal after the R-ARCSS (2018-present)

These developments occurred alongside controversial administrative changes that saw South Sudan’s 10 states being replaced by 28 in 2015 and then 32 states in 2017, with redistricting around Malakal and southern Upper Nile being particularly contentious. Although these changes were reversed when the R-TGoNU was formed in February 2020, administrative restructuring has been associated with a hardening of territorial claims and further polarisation between communities in and around Malakal (Pritchard 2020). Moreover, as noted in the ‘Infrastructure & Services’ section above, the administrative status of Malakal town carries further sensitivity implications.

Malakal has become a focal point for political tensions after the 2018 R-ARCSS, which escalated as wrangling over the sensitive appointment of the Governor of Upper Nile State intensified. At points this has contributed to violence in the town and its outskirts (CSRF 2021, p.13), including an incident that is allegedly attributed to a militia from the Padang Dinka community known as Abu Shoq (Craze 2022, pp.23-24). These tensions have been reinforced by perceptions that adequate and representative security arrangements are not in place for IDPs or vulnerable groups in Malakal – which have potential consequences in the event of a redesignation of the site and transfer of security responsibilities away from UNMISS (Small Arms Survey 2023, p.5). This highlights the need – but also the complexity of establishing – effective and impartial judicial mechanisms to promote accountability and the resolution of disputes relating to land and housing in the town as part of durable solutions (CSRF 2021, p.9, 12-13).

Malakal was one of the counties most affected by the conflict that followed from the split in the SPLA-IO Kitgweng faction in mid-2022. The conflict – which is discussed in greater detail in the profiles for Fashoda and Panyikang counties in Upper Nile, and in the profiles for Ayod, Canal/Pigi and Fangak counties in Jonglei – reached Wau Shilluk in October and December 2022. Prior to this, Abu Shoq militia reportedly mobilised in Malakal to prevent reinforcements from the Agwelek faction travelling from Manyo County from arriving in Panyikang County, though no clashes were reported following the mobilisation (UNMISS/UN OHCHR 2023, p.35). The conflict also resulted in an increase in the number of people seeking safety in the Malakal PoC site from both Jonglei and Upper Nile states (UNMISS/UN OHCHR 2023, p.9, 20, 29), reportedly placing additional pressure on the site (Small Arms Survey 2023, p.2).

In early June 2023, fighting between elements of the Shilluk and Nuer broke out in the Malakal PoC site, following smaller clashes in late May 2023. This occurred in the context of a significant number of returnees already arriving in Malakal after fleeing the conflict in Sudan that began in April 2023 (OCHA 2023; REACH 2023). The June fighting resulted in at least 20 deaths and re-displaced much of the Nuer IDP community to locations outside of the PoC site in and around Malakal town (Eye Radio 2023a; Eye Radio 2023b). Most of the more than 6,000 Nuer IDPs who vacated the PoC site have remained in Malakal, whilst an unspecified number returned to the PoC site (OCHA 2023). This has further complicated the ethnic geography of the county and efforts to resolve longstanding Shilluk grievances around their claims to land, housing and property in Malakal town.

ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS

Payams listed in Government and UN documents: Central Malakal (County HQ), Eastern Malakal, Northern Malakal, Southern Malakal, Lelo, Ogot

Alternative list of payams provided by local actors: Central Malakal (County HQ), Eastern Malakal, Northern Malakal, Southern Malakal, Lelo

UN OCHA 2020 map of Malakal County: https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-malakal-county-reference-map-march-2020

Roads:

• A primary road runs north-south between Malakal town and Paloich (in Melut County). The Logistics Cluster listed the entirety of this road as impassable during both the rainy season of 2022 and dry season of 2023.
• Another primary road runs southeast to Nasir town. The Logistics Cluster listed the entirety of this road as impassable during both the rainy season of 2022 and dry season of 2023.
• A tertiary road runs along the west bank of the White Nile River through Fashoda County, connecting Wau Shilluk to Kodok town in Fashoda County. Seasonal road conditions are unknown.
• Primary and secondary roads connect Malakal town to parts of northern Jonglei State. Seasonal road conditions are unknown.
• Malakal is an important port and dispatch hub, with barges running north to Renk town and south to Bor town (Jonglei state). Wau Shilluk is one of the destinations served from Malakal.

 UNHAS-Recognized Heli-Landing Sites and Airstrips: Malakal

REFERENCES

Africa Confidential. (2004). Desperate Darfur. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

Africa Confidential. (2009). New politics, new threats. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

Africa Watch. (1990). Denying “the Honor of Living”: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

Akol, L. (2014). South Sudan: From Colonial Neglect to National Misrule. London: Gilgamesh Publishing.

Burr, J.M. and Collins, R.O. (1995). Requiem For the Sudan: War, Drought, And Disaster Relief on the Nile. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press.

Craze, J. (2013). Dividing lines: Grazing and conflict along the Sudan– South Sudan border. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 10 January 2024.

Deng, D.K., Pritchard, M. and Sharma, M. (2015). A War Within: Perceptions of Truth, Justice, Reconciliation and Healing in Malakal POC. South Sudan Law Society. Retrieved 31 March 2024.

Deng, L. and Logan, S. (eds.) (2019). The Struggle for South Sudan: Challenges of Security and State Formation. London: I.B. Tauris.

Eye Radio. (2021). Malakal becomes a municipality, Makal named a county in Upper Nile state. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Eye Radio. (2023a). Upper Nile authorities impose night curfew in Malakal. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Eye Radio. (2023b). Death toll in Malakal camp violence rise to 20. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

FAO/WFP. (2019). Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

FEWSNET. (2018). Livelihoods Zone Map and Descriptions for the Republic of South Sudan (Updated). Retrieved 10 July 2023.

HRW, Human Rights Watch. (2004). Sudan: Peace, but at What Price? Retrieved 10 January 2024.

HRW, Human Rights Watch. (2011). South Sudan: Improve Accountability for Security Force Abuses. Retrieved 10 January 2024.

Johnson, D.H. (2003). The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford: James Currey.

Leonardi, C. (2013). Dealing with Government in South Sudan: Histories of Chiefship, Community and State. Oxford: James Currey.

Madut-Arop, A. (2006). Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace: A Full Story of the Founding and Development of SPLM/SPLA. Booksurge Publishing.

MSF. (2016). MSF internal review of the February 2016 attack on the Malakal Protection of Civilians Site and the post-event situation. Retrieved 7 March 2024.

Nyaba, P.A. (1997). The Politics of Liberation: An Insider’s View. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

OCHA. (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2021. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

OCHA. (2023). Situation Report: Malakal Conflict Induced Displacement due to violent clashes in Malakal PoC (As of 4th July 2023). Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Ojewska, N. (2021). In a flashpoint South Sudanese town, women peacemakers try to bridge the divide. The New Humanitarian. Retrieved 31 March 2024.

PACT Sudan. (2006). Sudan Peace Fund (SPF): Final Report October 2022 – December 2005. USAID.

Radio Tamazuj. (2021). UNMISS not withdrawing from Malakal protection site.  Retrieved 17 July 2023.

REACH. (2023). Emergency Situation Overview: Sudan-South Sudan Cross Border Displacement June 2023 | Malakal County | Upper Nile State | South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2011a). Gabriel Tang Gatwich Chan (‘Tang-Ginye’). Retrieved 10 January 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2011b). SPLM/A–Shilluk Conflict in Upper Nile. Retrieved 10 January 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2023). Upper Nile Prepares to Return to War. Retrieved 10 January 2024.

South Sudan NGO Forum. (2023). Humanitarian situation in Malakal still not ripe to decommission PoC. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

 Sudan Tribune. (2004). Heavy fighting in southern Sudan between Nuer and Shilluk. Retrieved 31 March 2024.

UNMISS/UN OHCHR. (2023). Attacks against civilians in Greater Upper Nile, South Sudan: August to December 2022. Retrieved 5 January 2024.

Verjee, A. (2011). Sudan’s Aspirational Army: A History of the Joint Integrated Units. CIGI. Retrieved 31 March 2024.

WHO. (2022). WHO South Sudan: Monthly Humanitarian Situation Report (Issue 11, November 2022). Retrieved 17 July 2023.

REPORTS on MALAKAL

CIVIC. (2016). “Those Who Could Not Run, Died”: Civilian Perspectives on the Conflict in South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

CIVIC. (2017). A Refuge in Flames: The February 17-18 Violence in Malakal PoC. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Craze, J. (2019). Displaced and Immiserated: The Shilluk of Upper Nile in South Sudan’s Civil War, 2014-19. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Craze, J. (2022). The Periphery Cannot Hold: Upper Nile since the Signing of the R-ARCSS. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

CSRF. (2021). Conflict Sensitivity Analysis: UNMISS PoC Sites Transition: Bentiu, Unity State and Malakal, Upper Nile State. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

International Crisis Group. (2022). South Sudan’s Splintered Opposition: Preventing More Conflict. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

IOM. (2018). If We Leave We Are Killed: Lessons Learned from South Sudan’s Protection of Civilian Sites 2013-2016. Retrieved 17 July 2023

PAX Christi. (2022). Voices on the Conflict in Malakal. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Pritchard, M. (2020). Fluid States and Rigid Boundaries on the East Bank of the White Nile in South Sudan. European Institute of Peace. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2015). The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describes events through 9 April 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2016). The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describing events through 8 March 2016. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.

**Note: As in other areas of South Sudan, land or boundary tensions rarely relate only to competition over resources, and are often accompanied by issues (for instance including but not limited to: competing historical narratives and their use in contemporary disputes; competing perceptions of the importance of land to community integrity; politicisation; shifting economic value, or perceptions of future value; and/or administrative competition) that are in practice difficult to reduce to any one element alone. For more discussion on the recent history of administrative reorganisation and its various aspects, see Leonardi (2013, ch.9) as well as a number of chapters in the volume edited by Deng and Logan (2019).