Ulang County, Upper Nile State
Demographics
2008 NBS Census population: 85,044
2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 58,708
2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 141,402
2024 UN OCHA population estimate*: 58,708
2024 IPC population estimate: 145,644
2025 UN OCHA population estimate*: 167,265
Ethnic groups: Eastern Jikany Nuer (Gaajok: Cie-Lang)
Displacement Figures as of September 2024: IPD data unavailable (-84 Sept. 2023) and 113,586 returnees (+66,309 Sept. 2023)
IPC Food Security: November 2024 – Crisis (Phase 3); IPC Projections: December 2024 to March 2025 – Crisis (Phase 3); April to July 2025 – Emergency (Phase 4)
Economy & Livelihoods
Ulang County is located in Upper Nile State. It borders Baliet County to the north and Luakpiny/Nasir County to the north-east. It also borders Jonglei State (Nyirol County and Akobo County) to the south-west and Ethiopia to the east.
The county is classified as part of the Nile-Sobat Rivers livelihood zone and the Northeastern maize and cattle livelihood zone (FEWSNET 2018). It is a lowland area, characterized by grasslands, forests and swamps that are particularly susceptible to flooding. An estimated 50% of households engage in farming as their primary livelihood (FAO & WFP 2019), with the remainder made up mostly by those rearing livestock, fishing and gathering. This number of households engaged in farming has been maintained as of 2021. Gross cereal yields were reported at 0.55 tonnes per hectare in 2021, declining to 0.5 tonnes per hectare in 2022 (FAO/WFP 2022, FAO/WFP 2023). The main crops are maize and sorghum, as well as pumpkin, cowpeas, sesame (simsim), tomatoes, okra, onion, eggplant, cabbage, and other vegetables. Some households keep cattle, goats, and sheep.
The Sobat River flows east to west along the length of Ulang County, forming part of the county’s southeastern border with Ethiopia and northwestern border with Nyirol County. Fishing on the Sobat River is seasonal, taking place primarily in the swamps towards the end of the rainy season and into the dry season.
IPC projections for Ulang are at Crisis levels (IPC Phase 4) of food insecurity as of November 2024, where they are projected to remain through March 2025, whereupon they are projected to deteriorate to Emergency levels, where they will remain from April 2025 at least through July 2025. Moreover, as of 2023, 25% of households in the county met 25-50% of their caloric needs through humanitarian assistance, and these conditions are expected to last until at least July 2023.
While Ulang was comparatively not as affected by flooding in 2021 as many of its neighbours, it was affected the year prior. In 2020 Ulang experienced significant flooding due to heavy rains that raised water levels in the Sobat river leading to flooding in low-lying areas as well as farther inland.
Infrastructure & Services
Ulang Town is the County HQ. The main roads are seasonal and market access can be difficult during the rainy season. The main local market is in Ulang town, and other nearby markets include Malakal, Akoka and Panyikang towns.
Ulang County relies on river transport along the White Nile and Sobat Rivers for some services, including food distribution. While this has been interrupted at times due to insecurity, it has continued to be used since the 2013 outbreak of conflict.
The county is home to ten (10) Early Childhood Development centres, one hundred and five (105) primary schools, and one secondary school, Ulang Secondary school located in Ulang Payam.
In December 2024, the WHO reported that Ulang County had fourteen (14) health facilities, of which eleven (11) were functional. These functional facilities included seven (7) primary health care units (PHCUs), four (4) primary health care centres (PHCCs), and no hospitals. This means there were approximately 0.63 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 1.2 PHCCs per 50,000 people in the county at that time.
According to OCHA’s 2025 Humanitarian Needs Overview, there are an estimated 121,634 people in need in Ulang County, which represents approximately 73% of the county’s total population reported by OCHA for 2025. For comparison, in 2024, OCHA reported that there were an estimated 54,251 people in need in Ulang County, of whom 25,833 were non-displaced people, with the remainder comprising IDPs and returnees. According to OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023, there were 98,980 people with humanitarian needs in Ulang (down markedly from 130,100 in 2021), which represented approximately 70% of the estimated population for the county reported in the HNO in that year. In 2021 the HNO noted that humanitarian needs are particularly urgent in the area of WASH with Ulang one of eight counties across the country designated as having high WASH severity needs. This is in part a reflection of a reliance on surface water, a lack of sanitation facilities as well as areas witnessing insecurity.
Conflict Dynamics
Located along the borders with Ethiopia and Jonglei State – as well as lying along the border region between the Lou Nuer and Eastern Jikany Nuer clans – Ulang County has historically been swept up in instability linked to national-scale conflicts that has informed the relationship between parts of the Lou and Eastern Jikany clans. While the relative isolation of the county has limited some of the direct impacts of more recent national-level conflicts, the county has been particularly exposed to localised and cross-border conflict, which have often taken place at the margins of these civil wars, or during interludes between large-scale episodes of national conflict.
During the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005), Ulang was one of a number of areas affected by fighting between the SPLM/A and Anya-Nya 2 forces in the 1980s, which was clustered in villages along the Sobat River (Simonse 1999, p.52). Many of the SPLM/A forces based in Ulang joined the SPLM/A-Nasir faction commanded by Riek Machar following the 1991 split in the movement. The Nasir faction would undergo further (often violent) splintering after initial gains in the early 1990s, feeding into a series of widening localised conflicts involving parts of the Lou Nuer and Eastern Jikany Nuer clans.
These inter-clan conflicts initially broke out in Ulang following a dispute between Eastern Jikany and Lou Nuer over fishing rights, which – in the absence of local government and mediation institutions – soon escalated into a broader conflict (Simonse 1999, p.52). The dispute also emerged from the combination of ecological changes in Akobo County as well as an influx of returnees from Gambella to the area after 1991, which catalysed a land dispute in the area of Wanding in southern Ulang (Schomerus and Allen 2010, p.24). Amid spreading conflict, Ulang town was destroyed by Lou Nuer militia in 1994 (UNICEF/OLS 1994; Johnson 2003, p.118). Following these events, members of Ulang’s Gaajok section reportedly mobilised and engaged in a series of retaliatory attacks, and by 1996 were able to contain incursions from Lou Nuer militias (PACT Sudan 2006, p.118; Stringham and Forney 2017, p.189).
Intermittent violence and peacemaking between the Lou and Eastern Jikany Nuer would continue in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Bradbury et al. 2006, pp.40, 53, 154). This included a peace conference held in Ulang in 2004, that identified disputes over access to water and grazing lands, cattle rustling, and political divisions as being critical factors in making sense of the violence affected the Lou and Easter Jikany communities (ACHA 2004).
After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, Ulang was affected by the resumption of violence between parts of the Lou Nuer and Eastern Jikany Nuer clans (Arnold and Alden 2007, p.5; MSF 2006; ICG 2009, p.7), which took place at irregular intervals until a 2010 peace initiative (Breidlid and Arensen 2017, p.39). Many of the same conflict-producing disputes that had been identified in the 2004 Lou-Eastern Jikany peace conference would continue to be identified in subsequent consultations with the local community in the CPA and post-independence eras, which also highlighted limited law enforcement capacity within Ulang (UNDP 2012, pp.47-49; Saferworld and SSBCSSAC 2010).
Since the outbreak of the national conflict (2013-2018), the southern part of Upper Nile State became one of the principal theatres of conflict in the country. While the SPLA-IO controlled most rural areas of southern Upper Nile State, the SPLA was largely able to retain control Nasir town after retaking it in May 2014, which formed a staging ground for military offensives. However, Ulang was relatively insulated from the conflict, in part due to its remoteness and accessibility. Nevertheless, parts of the county (including Ulang town) were affected in the initial stages of the national conflict (Small Arms Survey 2014a), though the primary effects of the conflict upon the county took the form of large-scale mobilisations of youth to support the opposition (Small Arms Survey 2014b).
Reports of fighting between the government and opposition emerged in early 2016 (Sudan Tribune 2016b), while in August 2016 the SPLA-IO alleged that government planes have bombed parts of the county after the collapse of the 2015 ARCSS two months earlier (Radio Tamazuj 2016a). Later in 2016, over 30,000 civilians were reported to have fled Ulang due to fighting in September, and in anticipation of further conflict (Radio Tamazuj 2016b). However, Ulang did not appear to have been affected by the serious rounds of fighting that took place in some other parts of southern Upper Nile until the 2018 R-ARCSS.
Around the same time, residents fled Ulang town due to fighting between militias from the Lou and Eastern Jikany Nuer in the western outskirts of the town in mid-April 2016, with extensive looting also reported (GOAL 2016). Informant reports indicate the conflict was reportedly linked to a dispute over cattle grazing. Conflict between parts of the two communities resumed following the signing of the 2018 R-ARCSS. In March 2019, an incident in the area of Doma town resulted in a number of deaths, which was reportedly linked to fighting between parts of the Lou Nuer and Eastern Jikany Nuer (Radio Tamazuj 2019; UNSC 2019, p.7).
Ulang was also increasingly affected by internal conflict within the Eastern Jikany’s Gaajok section after the R-ARCSS. In March 2021, an unknown group ambushed an SPLM-IO barge on the Sobat River (Radio Tamazuj 2021), which was later reported to have been linked to intra-sectional tensions within parts of the Gaajok section (Radio Tamazuj 2022). Heavy fighting within the Gaajok section was again reported in late May 2021 in Ulang, killing dozens (Eye Radio 2021). The conflict was the focus of a local peace initiative, which aimed to put in place measures to prevent a rapid escalation of conflict in future (UNMISS 2022).
Wider conflict dynamics impacting Upper Nile State have also affected Ulang. Armed youth from the Eastern Jikany Nuer community (including from Ulang) were alleged to have been involved in attacks in the disputed Akoka County in early 2021 (UN Panel of Experts 2021, p.20), and is discussed further in the profile for Baliet County. Clashes between SPLA-IO and SPLA-IO Kitgweng Faction forces were also reported in late 2021 in Ulang following a defection, though these clashes have been relatively limited in scale compared to other parts of Upper Nile (Craze 2022, fn.46).
Finally, Ulang has reportedly been affected by periodic raids involving militia from the Murle community (Nonviolent Peaceforce 2020). This includes two high-profile raids in 2013 and 2016 (Al Jazeera 2013; Sudan Tribune 2016a), alongside unconfirmed incidents in 2023, where the alleged involvement of Murle militia has been called into question by authorities from the Greater Pibor Administrative Area (Radio Tamazuj 2023a; Radio Tamazuj 2023b). There are sensitivities around claims of Murle involvement in raids, particularly in areas which do not adjoin Pibor County. Informants note that – while Ulang is a considerable distance from Pibor– raiding into areas of the county south of the Sobat River have occurred, typically when Murle raiders are following the tracks of migrating cattle in north-eastern Jonglei State (which are sometimes moved northwards to graze in areas to the south of the Sobat). However, as is discussed further in the profile for Pibor County, there is a general tendency for raids to be attributed to the Murle without firm evidence, and incidents initially attributed to the Murle in and around Jonglei State may later transpire to involve other communities, including members of the same community affected by the raid.
Administration & Logistics:
Payams listed in Government and UN documents: Ulang (County HQ), Doma, Kurmuot, Yomding
Payams listed by local actors: Ulang Town (County HQ), Doma, Nyangore, Ying, Barmach, Kurmout-1, Kurmuot-2, Yomding, Kerchot
UN OCHA 2020 map of Ulang County: https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-ulang-county-reference-map-march-2020
Roads:
- The county’s one primary road runs through the northern portion of the county, connecting Nasir town to the east to Bailet and Malakal towns to the west. The road was deemed impassable during the rainy season of 2024 and dry season of 2025.The Sobat River runs along the southern and western edges of Baliet County, with various destinations in the county listed along the route.
UNHAS-Recognized Heli-Landing-Sites and Airstrips: Ulang
The logistic cluster serves several ports in Ulang County (including Ulang and Yomding) and coordinates humanitarian barge and boat traffic. As of 2025, the logistics cluster is operating river transportation at 50%, owing to funding constraints.
References
ACHA, African Center for Human Advocacy (2004). A Report on the Jikany/Luo Peace Conference Held at Riang Location, Eastern Upper Nile, 1 March 2004. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive 1 February 2024.
Al Jazeera. (2013). Deaths reported in South Sudan cattle raids. Retrieved 1 February 2024.
Bradbury, M., Ryle, J., Medley, M. and Sansculotte-Greenidge, K. (2006). Local Peace Processes in Sudan. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 17 July 2023.
Breidlid, I. and Arensen, M. (2017). ‘The Nuer White Armies: Comprehending South Sudan’s most infamous community defence group’ in Saferworld, Informal armies: Community defence groups in South Sudan’s civil war, 27-40. Retrieved 17 July 2023.
Craze, J. (2019). Displaced and Immiserated: The Shilluk of Upper Nile in South Sudan’s Civil War, 2014-19. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 17 July 2023.
Eye Radio. (2021). At least 43 reportedly killed in Ulang communal violence. Retrieved 1 February 2024.
FAO/WFP. (2019). Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.
FEWSNET. (2018). Livelihoods Zone Map and Descriptions for the Republic of South Sudan (Updated). Retrieved 10 July 2023.
GOAL. (2016). Greater Ulang Counties Post Conflict Assessment Mission Report – 12th to 16th May 2016. Retrieved 2 February 2024.
ICG, International Crisis Group. (2009). Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan. Retrieved 27 September 2023.
Johnson, D.H. (2003). The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford: James Currey.
MSF. (2006). Upsurge of violence harming civilians in southern Sudan. Retrieved 1 February 2024.
Nonviolent Peaceforce. (2020). Strengthening Local Peace and Protection Mechanisms in Greater Ulang. Retrieved 1 February 2024.
OCHA. (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2021. Retrieved 10 July 2023.
PACT Sudan. (2006). Sudan Peace Fund (SPF): Final Report October 2022 – December 2005. USAID.
Radio Tamazuj. (2016a). SPLM-IO claims govt bombing kills dozens in Ulang County. Retrieved 1 February 2024.
Radio Tamazuj. (2016b). Civilians leaving SPLM-IO areas in Upper Nile in fear of clashes. Retrieved 1 February 2024.
Radio Tamazuj. (2019). 8 civilians killed in opposition-held ‘Sobat State’. Retrieved 1 February 2024.
Radio Tamazuj. (2021). SPLA-IO boats ambushed in Upper Nile, 7 dead. Retrieved 1 February 2024.
Radio Tamazuj. (2022). Upper Nile: Warring Ulang clans reconcile after year-long feud. Retrieved 1 February 2024.
Radio Tamazuj. (2023a). Attack on civilians at Akobo-Ulang border leaves 15 dead. Retrieved 1 February 2024.
Radio Tamazuj. (2023b). Five children still missing after Ulang attack. Retrieved 1 February 2024.
Saferworld and SSBCSSAC, Southern Sudan Bureau for Community Security and
Small Arms Control. (2010). Report of consultations on community-level policing structures in Jonglei and Upper Nile States, Southern Sudan. Retrieved 1 February 2024.
Small Arms Survey. (2014a). The Conflict in Upper Nile State (18 March 2014 update). Retrieved 1 February 2024.
Small Arms Survey. (2014b). The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describes events through 9 October 2014 Retrieved 1 February 2024.
Schomerus, M. and Allen, T. (2010). Southern Sudan at odds with itself: dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace. Retrieved 17 November 2023.
Simonse, S. (1999). Conflicts and peace initiatives within the civil war, 1992-1999 – East Bank Equatoria. Retrieved via Academia.edu 7 January 2024.
Sudan Tribune. (2016a). Armed Murle militias attack Sobat state, kill 24: official. Retrieved 1 February 2024.
Sudan Tribune. (2016b). South Sudan’s rival armies trade accusations over new clashes in Upper Nile region. Retrieved 1 February 2024.
Stringham, N. and Forney, J. (2017). ‘It takes a village to raise a militia: local politics, the Nuer White Army, and South Sudan’s civil wars’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 55 (2), 177-199. Retrieved 2 February 2024.
UNDP. (2012). Community Consultation Report: Upper Nile State, South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.
UNICEF/OLS. (1994). . Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive 1 February 2024.
UNMISS. (2022). Following a cycle of conflict, UNMISS reviews dividends from local peace initiatives in Ulang. Retrieved 1 February 2024.
UN Panel of Experts. (2021). Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2521 (2020), S/2021/365. Retrieved 2 February 2024.
UNSC. (2019). Situation in South Sudan: Report of the Secretary-General, S/2019/491. Retrieved 2 February 2024.
Reports on Ulang
Arnold, M. and Alden, C. (2007). “The Gun Is Our Food”: Demilitarising the White Army Militas of South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.
Short, A. (2015). Cattle and Pastoralism in Greater Upper Nile Research Report
Small Arms Survey. (2011). Fighting for spoils: Armed insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile. Retrieved 17 July 2023.
Small Arms Survey/HSBA. (2016). The Conflict in Upper Nile State. Retrieved 17 July 2023.
* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.
