Nzara County, Western Equatoria State

DEMOGRAPHY

2008 NBS Census population: 65,712
2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 69,045
2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 83,759

Ethnic groups: Azande (plural)/Zande (singular)

Displacement Figures Q3 2022: 7,702 IDPs (+1,572 Q1 2020) and 10,356 returnees (+2,648 Q1 2020)

IPC Food Security: November 2022 – Minimal (Phase 1); IPC Projections: December 2022 to March 2023 – Stressed (Phase 2); April to July 2023 – Stressed (Phase 2).

ECONOMY & LIVELIHOODS

Nzara County is located in Western Equatoria State. It borders Ezo County to the north-west and Yambio County to the east. It also borders Lakes State (Wulu County) to the north-east and the Democratic Republic of Congo to the south-west.

The county falls within the western plains groundnuts, sesame and sorghum livelihoods zone (FEWSNET 2018). It is estimated that 85% of households in Nzara County practice agriculture (FAO/WFP 2018), an estimate which has held steady until 2021 (FAO/WFP 2022). Gross cereal yields were estimated to be 1.75 tonnes per hectare in 2021, increasing to 1.9 tonnes per hectare in 2022 (FAO/WFP 2023). Other livelihood activities such as collecting wild food, harvesting honey, and fishing for domestic consumption are also common.

The agricultural potential of Nzara County has attracted significant attention from commercial interests, with a post-World War II agro-industrial processing complex known as the ‘Zande Scheme’ (and later ‘Equatoria Board’) being operational in the area until the late 1980s. This complex formed the backbone of the local economy and was designed to grow and process cotton, palm oil, timber and other lucrative cash crops. The scheme and its associated resettlement – which encompassed several nearby areas of present-day Western Equatoria State – followed an earlier forcible resettlement of the Azande population as part of colonial efforts to new settlements limit the spread of sleeping sickness. The Zande Scheme involved relocating people back to more remote areas, in a bid to revive supposedly traditional social structures whilst introducing economic development to the area. While some colonial-era accounts spoke positively of the effects of the Zande Scheme, the scheme has been reappraised as being the cause of social and political upheaval among residents of the area, whilst being guided by paternalistic assumptions on the part of colonial authorities (Braak 2022, pp.71-73; Daly and Rolandsen 2016).

The area is also rich in forest products, particularly teak, as evidenced by the presence of large foreign firms in the area that export the raw materials, often as part of grey and black-market activities (Verjee 2013). The value of the teak trade is unknown. While logging and various other casual jobs along the informal forest-product supply-chain are viable livelihood opportunities, the trade is defined by widespread environmental degradation and exploitation of labour (ADB 2013).

In November 2022, Nzara was classified as experiencing a Minimal (IPC Phase 3) level of food insecurity, making it the least food insecure county in Western Equatoria State. This level is predicted to decrease to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) level conditions from December 2022 until July 2023.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES

The county’s headquarters are located in Nzara town in Nzara Centre Payam. Nzara town has a large market that serves the local population; however, residents also frequently travel to Yambio to access its more developed market.

Between 2008 and 2017, a combined contingent of the Ugandan People’s Defence Force and the US Army Special Forces Division were posted at a large base in southern Nzara to train and support South Sudanese to counter the LRA insurgency. A micro-economy sprung up around the base but dissipated with the departure of forces in 2017.

Nzara County is home to eleven (11) Early Childhood Development centres, thirty-two (32) primary schools and four (4) secondary schools. All five secondary schools are located in Nzara payam.

Nzara County was reported to have twenty-three (23) health facilities, twenty-two (22) of which were reported to be functional. Among them are fourteen (14) PHCUs, six (6) PHCCs and two (2) hospitals in 2022. This means that there were an estimated 2.51 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 3.59 PHCCs per 50,000 people according to the WHO. Both Nzara Hospital and St. Tereza Hospital are reported to be of limited functionality. The latter is a Catholic Church hospital run by the Comboni Missionary Sisters with support from partner organizations, with facilities that recently underwent renovation. Additionally, Nzara has the unfortunate distinction of being the site of the first recorded Ebola case in 1976 (Stanford 1999).

According to OCHA’s 2023 Humanitarian Needs Overview, the county has over 48,143 people with humanitarian needs (representing a large increase compared to the estimate of 22,900 in 2021), which accounts for approximately 58% of the estimated population reported in the HNO. Prior to independence in 2011, Nzara County hosted refugees fleeing violence in eastern DRC as well as IDPs from surrounding villages, especially those along the borders with the DRC. This put additional pressure on local infrastructure. As a result, community-led initiatives have been created to serve the growing population during these periods, as evidenced with the establishment of community schools.

CONFLICT DYNAMICS

Nzara fell within the area of the Zande Scheme (discussed above) and attained historical significance for events that occurred shortly before Sudanese independence in 1956. Amid local and national-level political tensions, demonstrations broke out at Nzara in late July 1955, following the decision by the board to lay off 300 workers from the scheme. Six people were killed and others wounded after the military and merchants from northern areas of Sudan fired upon the demonstrators (Daly and Rolandsen 2016). The incident is credited – along with the Torit Mutiny that followed several days later – with catalysing the first Sudanese civil war (1955-1972). Nzara, as with other predominantly Azande areas of Western Equatoria, was the scene of significant fighting during the 1960s. At the outset of the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005), military units deserted their positions in Nzara. Nzara was taken by the SPLM/A during a series of gains made in Greater Equatoria in 1990, and would remain under SPLM/A control during the military setbacks that followed after the 1991 split (Roque 2017; Braak 2022).

After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, Nzara was affected by insecurity relating to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The insecurity followed the collapse of the Juba peace talks between the LRA and the Ugandan government in mid-2008, and prompted the formation of ‘Arrow Boys’ in Azande-inhabited areas of Western Equatoria (Schomerus and Rigterink 2016, p.17). The Arrow Boys are a community protection force (who include female members) that were initially established in eastern areas of the state in 2005, and have enjoyed periods of popular and local political support for their role in countering the LRA, and resisting perceived encroachments by pastoralists. LRA attacks and abductions were reported in Nzara County from late 2008 to 2010, leading to displacement as well as clashes between the LRA and local Arrow Boys (IRIN 2009; Sudan Tribune 2009; Sudan Tribune 2010). During the operations against the LRA, the Ugandan military established a base in southern Nzara County in Li-Rangu Payam, and SPLA Commandos were also stationed in Nzara in a counter-LRA role (Africa Confidential 2016). The Ugandan base closed in 2017, though the area continued to host SPLA/SSPDF Commandos. Some Arrow Boys received training at Nzara from US Special Forces involved in operations against the LRA (Small Arms Survey 2016).

During the national conflict (2013-2018), the presence of the Ugandan military and SPLA Commandos (who were a multi-ethnic force, ICG 2016, p.27) limited the spread of the conflict to Nzara. However, some opposition activity did occur within the county, in the context of mounting tensions between Juba and local actors in Western Equatoria. In late 2015, the Arrow Boys network largely split into two factions, one of which was aligned with the SPLA-IO and the other to the South Sudan National Liberation Movement (SSNLM), with both factions reported to have been active in Nzara (ICG 2016, p.32). The SSNLM were involved in clashes with the SPLA in early 2016, and ultimately integrated into the military following a peace deal reached in April 2016 (Small Arms Survey 2016, pp.12-13). In August 2015, local authorities in Nzara County alleged dozens of civilians at Brissi village after tensions were killed amid escalating tensions between the military and the local community following an ambush against the SPLA in July. The military disputed allegations of its involvement in the killings, though acknowledged they had been engaged in operations against a local militia (Sudan Tribune 2015). Fighting in neighbouring counties also resulted in spikes of increased insecurity on roads leading in and out of Nzara County. This restricted the freedom of movement and limited access for traders and transportation of goods to supply the local market. SPLA Commandos were also reported to have launched a counter-offensive in Nagero County from Nzara in May 2018 (UNMISS/UN OHCHR 2018).

Since the signing of the R-ARCSS in 2018, Nzara has been affected by periodic localised insecurity and military activity, though at a lower level than nearby parts of the state. In June 2019, SSPDF soldiers were alleged to have killed two people and torched three dwellings as they pursued members of the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA, who are a signatory to the R-ARCSS) at Mogoroko village (CTSAMVM 2019a, p.24). Three people were killed by unknown attackers in Sakure Payam in September 2021, with the victims all being related to officials linked to Nzara or Yambio counties (Eye Radio 2021). In late 2019, reports emerged of alleged recruitment and abduction of civilians and former combatants from Nzara, Ezo, and Yambio counties into the SPLA-IO (McCrone 2020). CTSAMVM (2019b, pp.14-16) concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe the SPLA-IO had abducted civilians and former combatants for the purposes of recruitment.

ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS

Payams: Nzara Centre (County Headquarters), Basukangbi, Ringasi, Sakure, Sangua

UN OCHA 2020 map for Nzara County: https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-nzara-county-reference-map-march-2020

Roads from Nzara:

  • A primary road runs westward through Nzara to Wau (Western Bar el Ghazal State) via Tambura, and eastward to Yambio and Juba (Central Equatoria State). During the rainy season of 2022, the section of the road running north to Wau was designated ‘passable with difficulties’, whereas the eastern parts of the road were also deemed ‘passable with difficulties’ until Maridi, and thereafter passable all the way to Juba. The same road was considered passable during the dry season of 2023, excepting the stretch of road running north between Tambura and Wau, which was designated ‘passable with difficulties’.
  • Secondary and tertiary roads that connect Nzara include:
    • Yambio – Sakure: a secondary road connects Yambio to the Congolese border to the south via southern Nzara County.
    • Nzara – Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): a tertiary road connecting to border with DRC to the west, via a remote area of south-easter Ezo County.
    • Nzara – Li-Rangu: A tertiary road connects Nzara to Li-Rangu in Yambio County.

Parts of the road network have been recently graded by WFP with funding under the multi-donor partnership for recovery and resilience with an aim to link farmers to markets in Nzara and Yambio. Seasonal road conditions are unknown.

UNHAS-Recognized Heli-Landing Sites and Airstrips: None*

*A military airstrip exists at the former UPDF base in southern Nzara, but is not used by UNHAS. Its current conditions are unknown. Note that the MAF lists an airstrip in Nzara town, with an informant observing the that the airstrip was in good condition as of March 2023.

REFERENCES

ADB, African Development Bank. (2018). South Sudan: A Study on Competitiveness and Cross-Border Trade with Neighboring Countries. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Africa Confidential. (2016). The fight moves south. Retrieved 19 December 2023.

Braak, B.J. (2022). Overcoming ruptures: Zande identity, governance, and tradition during cycles of war and displacement in South Sudan and Uganda (2014-2019). Doctoral thesis, Leiden University. Retrieved 19 December 2023.

CTSAMVM. (2019a). Technical Committee Meeting No.12 Outcomes Report. Retrieved 15 December 2023.

CTSAMVM. (2019b). Technical Committee Meeting No.17 Outcomes Report. Retrieved 15 December 2023.

Daly, M. and Rolandsen, O. (2016). A History of South Sudan: From Slavery to Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eye Radio. (2021). 3 killed at home in Nzara. Retrieved 19 December 2023.

FAO/WFP. (2023). South Sudan 2022 Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) Summary of findings. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

FEWSNET. (2018). Livelihoods Zone Map and Descriptions for the Republic of South Sudan (Updated). Retrieved 10 July 2023.

ICG, International Crisis Group. (2016). South Sudan’s South: Conflict in the Equatorias. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

IRIN [The New Humanitarian]. (2009). Southerners still besieged by suspected LRA fighters. Retrieved 15 December 2023.

McCrone, F. (2020). Hollow Promises: The Risks of Military Integration in Western Equatoria. Small Arms Survey. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

OCHA. (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2021. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

REACH. (2020). Integrated Needs Tracking (INT) County Profile – Nzara County. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

Roque, P.C. (2017). The Rebel Governance of the SPLM/A and UNITA A comparative study on parallel states in Angola and South Sudan. Doctoral thesis, Oxford University. Retrieved 15 December 2023.

Schomerus, M. and Rigterink, A. (2016). Non-state security providers and political formation in South Sudan: the case of Western Equatoria’s Arrow Boys. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2016). Conflict in Western Equatoria: Describing events through 17 July 2016. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Stanford University. (1999). Ebola Sudan Outbreaks. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Sudan Tribune. (2009). W. Equatoria forces kill four LRA in Nzara County. Retrieved 15 December 2023.

Sudan Tribune. (2010). Hundreds flee renewed attacks by LRA rebels in WES. Retrieved 15 December 2023.

 Sudan Tribune. (2015). W. Equatoria state officials accuse army of killing civilians. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

UNMISS/UN OHCHR. (2018), Violations and abuses against civilians in Gbudue and Tambura States (Western Equatoria) April-August 2018. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Verjee, A. (2013). ‘Is all well in the teak forests of South Sudan?’ in African Arguments. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

WFP. (2020). WFP South Sudan Roads Project: Roads to Zero Hunger. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

REPORTS on NZARA

Adkins, B. (2015). Forestry and Prospects for Stability, Livelihoods and Peace-building in the Equatorial States of South Sudan, in Schomerus, M. (eds.) Conflict and Cooperation in the Equatorias. AECOM/USAID. Retrieved 15 December 2023.

Danish Refugee Council. (2013). Armed Violence and Stabilization in Western Equatoria: Recovering from the Lord’s Resistance Army. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Hance, W. (1955). The Zande Scheme in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Economic Geography 31 (2), pp. 149-156. Retrieved 15 July 2023.

Reining, C.C. (1966). The Zande Scheme: An Anthropological Case Study of economic development in Africa. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.

* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.