The Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) signed in 2015 between the Government of South Sudan and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) was meant to restore peace and stability to South Sudan, but it failed to do so. The key parties to the agreement signed because of the tremendous international pressure they were under rather than out of

conviction of the provisions of ARCSS. They signed amidst public protest and reservations. As a result, none of the signatories felt ownership of the agreement. Since none of them felt committed to the agreement, its implementation was taken as no one’s responsibility. Each party was expecting outside forces to put pressure on the other, especially with regard to the provisions the other party had reservations about or which they felt would threaten their existent privileges.

The international community, through their backing of and support for IGAD,was the midwife to the agreement. These international actors were however conspicuously absent when needed most , especially when the agreement started unravelling very fast in July 2016. Events were allowed to unfold and take their course, without any meaningful international intervention. The lack of robust and effective strategies for managing any disputes arising from the agreement can be identified as one of the contributing factors leading to the collapse of ARCSS.

The inability of the IGAD and Troika to ensure that the parties delivered on what they had committed to with their signature has been one of the weaknesses of this peace agreement. The sheer knowledge that one can get away with flouting the will of the international community with impunity may breed and already has bred all sorts of problems: wilful obstructions, harassment and intimidation of individuals or parties who are trying or willing to implement stipulated provisions.